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ABSTRACT

World history textbooks currently used in U.S. high schools adopt Western civilization as the integrating element of world history. The high school world history approach with Western civilization as the essence was a product of the late 19th century and early 20th century. The historical consciousness of this period continues to influence decision making with regard to the selection and organization of high school world history textbooks. This study traces conceptual origins of the Western-centered approach to world history by undertaking an exploration of conceptualizations of world history in high school textbooks in the late 19th and early 20th century. This research sought to answer the following questions: In the textbooks published during the period between 1875 and 1934, what kinds of themes determined the selection and the organization of world history? How did those organizational themes come into prominence?; Specifically, what kinds of historical experiences--events, ideas, aspirations, and enterprises--gave rise to particular organizational themes and topics? and What assumptions and premises undergirded the conception of world history? To answer these questions, the study analyzed high school textbooks in general history, European history, and world history from 1875 to 1934. Findings reveal the limits of the Western-centered approach to world history and, in the end, suggest a revision of the high school world history course that would be more relevant to contemporary needs. Includes extensive footnotes and 4 figures; contains a 264-item bibliography. Appendixes contain lists of the 38 textbooks analyzed. (BT)

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THE WEST AND IGNORE THE REST:
Conceptualizations of World History
in American High School Textbooks, 1875-1934

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Submitted to the faculty of the School of Education
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree
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To my parents, with love and gratitude

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Abstract

Sunjoo Kang

THE WEST AND IGNORE THE REST:
Conceptualizations of World History
in American High School Textbooks, 1875-1934

Currently used world history textbooks in American high schools adopt Western civilization as the integrating element of world history. The chronology and conceptualization of world history contained in typical textbooks feature the issues and topics of Western civilization. In the last several decades, critics, such as social historians and multicultural and global educators, have complained that such attention to Western civilization is too Western-centered to help students live in a global, multicultural society. Still, advocates of the Western-centered approach argue that Western civilization should continue to be the organizational core of the high school world history course because Western civilization is the seat of democracy and the origin of modernity. The high school world history approach with Western civilization as the essence was a product of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. The historical consciousness of this period continues to influence decision-making with regard to the selection and organization of high school world history textbooks.

In order to help educators assess strengths and weaknesses of the Western-centered approach in high school world history courses and textbooks, this research traces conceptual origins of the Western-centered approach to world history by undertaking an exploration of conceptualizations of world history in high school textbooks in the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. This research seeks to answer the following questions: In the textbooks published during the period

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between 1875 and 1934, what kinds of themes determined the selection and the organization of world history? How did those organizational themes come into prominence? More specifically, what kinds of historical experiences – events, ideas, aspiration, and enterprise – gave rise to particular organizational themes and topics? What assumptions and premises undergirded the conception of world history? In order to answer these questions, this research analyzes high school textbooks in general history, European history, and world history, published from 1875 to 1934. In so doing, this research reveals the limits of the Western-centered approach to world history and, in the end, suggests a revision of the high school world history course that would be more relevant to contemporary needs.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

For several decades, American high school world history courses, organized around Western civilization, have been under heavy attack by social historians and advocates of multicultural education and global education. They have argued that the growing multicultural and global concerns of the world today demand more multicultural and global themes and perspectives in high school world history courses. They have pointed out the misconception of the "non-West" that world history courses have conveyed. They have demonstrated that the new research in the field of world history makes the world history course with Western civilization as the sole and central theme of organization obsolete. When the National Center for History in the Schools published the *National Standards for World History* in 1994, the debate around the high school world history course became one of the most controversial national, educational issues. While advocates of a multicultural global approach tended to support the *Standards* for their adoption of multicultural and global themes and perspectives, advocates of a Western-centered approach mostly criticized the *Standards* because of their diminished attention to Western civilization. Advocates of the Western-centered approach believe that Western civilization should continue to be the organizational core of world history. Currently used world history textbooks have generally adopted the Western-centered approach, although they have attempted to celebrate diverse cultural traditions and adopt global themes.

The world history that advocates of the Western-centered approach suggest today, by and large, originated in the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century: the era of nationalism, Euro-American colonial penetration into the rest of the world, and the ideological clash between democracy and communism. Decisions about world history that were made during that period continue to influence how world history is taught today. Therefore, tracing the conceptual origins of high school world history courses in the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century will be perhaps one of the profitable ways to help educators gain insights into issues in the contemporary debates on the high school world history course, and decide what needs to be retained and discarded from the past as they develop a new world history course. For these purposes, this study examines the conceptualizations of world history in American high school textbooks during the period between 1875 and 1934.

WORLD HISTORY COURSES, 1875-1934

For the purposes of this study, "world history" refers to what history educators conceived as a continuous narrative linking together the story of mankind from its earliest beginnings to the present day. A course called "world history" began to appear in the high school curriculum in the 1920s; it was a full year course generally offered in the tenth grade. Scholars, however, have argued that high schools had already taught "World History"—according to our definition of a continuous narrative linking the story of mankind from its earliest beginnings until today—even before the 1920s, in a one-year

course entitled "General History," as well as a two-year sequence referred to as "European History."

In the American high school, courses that taught a general, comprehensive history of humankind first appeared in the first half of the nineteenth century. Generally, the courses were either a two-year sequence of "Ancient history" and "Medieval and Modern history" or a one-year course called "General history" or "Universal history." Before approximately 1875, only a few high schools offered such courses on a regular basis, however. In fact, history was not regarded as a distinct school subject but as an adjunct to other humanistic subjects such as Classical literature, Geography, and Reading. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, with the establishment of the history profession in the United States, high schools began to recognize history (general history as well as American history) as a separate school subject in their courses of study. Until about 1900, the one-year general history course was the most popular program to deal with the history of mankind. The popularity of the one-year general history course rapidly increased toward the close of the nineteenth century; nevertheless, as a result of a secondary curriculum reform movement in the 1890s, the time devoted to the history of humankind increased from one year to two years and the course came to be referred to as "European history" instead of "General history."

In the late 1880s, the desire for uniformity in the secondary curriculum as well as in university entrance requirements contributed to a quest for standardization, classification, inspection, and accreditation (Tyack, 1967, p.356). When college students had come from the immediate vicinity, college admission requirements had not been a problem, because local high schools prepared students to meet the entrance requirements

of the local college. With the advent of the railroad and the nationalization of public life, students began arriving at colleges from wider and wider areas. To a certain degree, high schools needed a uniform guideline for students' preparation for college entrance because it was exceedingly difficult for the secondary schools to prepare so many students differently depending on their choice of college. This situation led the National Council of Education to establish the Committee of Ten in 1892 to make a blueprint for secondary school curriculum as well as university entrance requirements. The Madison Conference, one of the subject committees of the Committee of Ten, was responsible for setting national standards for History, Civil Government, and Political Economy. The Madison Conference recommended an eight-year consecutive history program for elementary and secondary school students (National Education Association, 1893). It designed history programs in which the history of humankind was taught in three consecutive years: Greek and Roman history, with their Oriental connections, in the last year of elementary school, followed by French history and English history in the first and the second years of the high school. Greek and Roman history and early civilization in the Orient represented ancient history and French and English histories were regarded as medieval and modern history. The history recommendations of this committee were not widely adopted by schools.

The secretary of the National Education Association's (NEA) Secondary Education Department requested that the American Historical Association (AHA) make recommendations on the still-unresolved question of college entrance requirements. The AHA responded by setting up its famous Committee of Seven in 1896. In its report (American Historical Association, 1899), the Committee of Seven adamantly opposed the

implementation of the one-year general history course. Instead, it recommended a two-year sequence of European history, with the first year covering "Ancient history to the death of Charlemagne" and the second year covering "Medieval and Modern history after the death of Charlemagne." Soon, history course developers and textbook writers accepted the direction of the Committee of Seven. High schools generally offered the ancient history course and medieval and modern history course in consecutive years. Responding to the history program change, textbook writers presented the history of the human race in two volumes: ancient history in one volume and medieval and modern history in the other volume. Until about the 1920s, high schools typically offered a two-year sequence course generally referred to as European history; as a result, high school European history textbooks were invariably published as two volumes.

In the 1920s, as high schools began to offer more industrial and commercially related subjects as well as more subjects in the social sciences, school administrators reduced the time devoted to European history courses. As a result, high schools frequently offered a one-year course called world history. Textbook writers, responding to the demand for a concise history of the world, immediately prepared one-volume textbooks in world history. Therefore, between 1920 and 1934, world history textbooks were published in two formats: two-volume textbooks for the two-year world history programs and one-volume textbooks for the one-year world history programs.

This study, using those general history, European history, and world history textbooks as primary source materials, analyzes how history educators between 1875 and 1934 conceived of world history. Michael Apple (1992) views the textbook as "official knowledge," what students are expected to learn. "Whether we like it or not, the

curriculum in most American schools is not defined by courses of study or suggested programs, but by one particular artifact, the grade-level-specific text..."(Apple, 1988, p. 85). Controversies, over "official knowledge," as Apple (1992) observed, usually center around what is included and excluded in textbooks. Teachers can develop their own curricula, but they tend to choose to use textbooks rather than to develop their own curricula. Teachers are seldom formally trained to develop their own curricula. Even if teachers were willing and able to design instruction, typical schools are unable to support teachers by providing them with space or sufficient reference and background materials (Venezky, 1992, p.442). Studies on textbook adoption have reported that teachers heavily depend on textbooks as the primary teaching material (Shaver, Davis, and Helburn; 1979; Porter, 1981; Weiss, 1987). These studies found that teachers are largely subservient to their textbooks. Therefore, making decisions of what to include and exclude in textbooks is, indeed, to make decisions about what should be to taught. Analyzing textbooks published between 1875 and 1934 in this study will reveal what history and social studies educators intended to teach in world history courses and how they made the decisions about what to teach in this period.

CURRENT DEBATES ON ORGANIZING WORLD HISTORY

While people in today's world are deeply divided by diverse cultural traditions, the world is virtually a single economical and ecological unit and people in every corner of the world interact with increasing intensity. More than ever before, people in the world become involved in international trade, consume international products, and find

themselves surrounded by political, economic and ecological problems on a global scale. In order to cope with this world reality, scholars and educators argue that citizens in every country must be equipped with the ability to view and solve problems in a global and multicultural context as well as a national one. For this purpose, social studies educators and historians agree that the high school world history course, along with U.S. history, is vital to citizenship education and for training future generations of American leaders.

Indeed, in the United States, the world history course is likely to be the single, best course to give students an opportunity to be acquainted with the cultures and histories of those parts of the world other than the United States, and to deal with issues and problems of the world from a broad point of view. After graduation, most students may never again be exposed to any courses that teach about the history of the world or even world problems. Therefore, what is taught about the history of the world in the high schools helps to shape the perspectives and knowledge that future citizens have about the world. In this sense, decisions about what to include and what to exclude from the high school world history course, how the course should be structured, and what the viewpoint for such a course should be are important. To draw consensus upon how to conceptualize a course is, however, increasingly difficult in the contemporary society of global interdependence and cultural pluralism. For example, some "militant monoculturalists" urge "exclusive celebration of the Western tradition" (Nash, Crabtree, and Dunn, 1997, p.99). Some "extreme multiculturalists" stigmatize Western civilization as "the world's oldest evil empire," and, to counter the Western-centric view, attempt to construct a specific "group-centric" or "region-centric" perspective by "romanticizing" the history of

their particular group, or world regions other than Europe (Nash et al., 1997, p.99). While various groups with different conceptions of world history agree that students should have an opportunity to study diverse cultural traditions including Western civilization, their opinions diverge on whether or not Western civilization should be, as it has been, the focus of the high school world history course.

The National Standards and the Critiques

The National Standards for World History, published by the National Center for History in the Schools in 1994, provoked a debate between advocates of a Western-centered approach and advocates of a global-multicultural approach. The *Standards* attempted to go beyond the traditional world history organization that virtually depended upon issues and conceptions of Western civilization as an organizing focus. Instead, the *Standards* adopted global and multicultural themes and perspectives.

In writing the *Standards*, the developers stated that their primary task was to identify those developments in the past that engaged and affected relatively large numbers of people and that had broad significance for later generations (National Center for History in the Schools, 1994, p. 4). Some of these developments were concerned with particular civilizations or regions. Others involved patterns of human interconnection that extended across cultural and political boundaries. At one level, the *Standards* introduced students to the histories of major civilizations and cultural traditions so that students could undertake an exploration of values, ideas, institutions and important personalities of major civilizations. The *Standards*, however, encouraged students to study those

civilizations and cultural traditions in a global context rather than to study them as autonomous, or self-perpetuating units. At another level, the *Standards* urged the study of large-scale developments that affected people across political or cultural borders and had enduring influence on people's lives as a whole. As a result, the *Standards* made room for expanded studies of cultures, which had been marginalized and were even unfamiliar to the American public. They also directed much more attention toward those movements and trends transcending civilizations rather than to autonomous developments within a civilization.

Many scholars, journalists, and educators supported the *Standards* because they were designed to bring a global-multicultural point of view in teaching world history by emphasizing historical processes and events taking place on a large global scale and by giving fresh attention to histories of the world beyond Europe.[1] Critics, however, claimed that the *Standards* were an outcome of "political correctness" (Gugliotta, 1994). The documents set forth 31 basic standards and about 2,500 illustrative teaching examples. Critics charged that too many of the teaching examples illustrated in the *Standards* were "politically biased, moralistic and judgmental."[2] Critics charged that the *Standards* were

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[1]Some of the opinions to defend the *Standards* can be found in Carol Gluck, "Let the Debate Continue," *New York Times* (Op-Ed), Nov. 19, 1994; Keith Henderson, "The Making of History Standards," *The Christian Science Monitor*, Nov. 18, 1994 and Nash et al. (1997). More debates on the *Standards* are available: http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/10/index-f.html and http://www2.h-net.msu.edu/ ~teach/threads/ standard.html

[2]Concerning the teaching examples, Cheney stated, "In one of the sillier sections of the World History Standards – and one of the most quintessentially politically correct – students are asked to read a book about Michelangelo, not in order to discuss art, but so that they can discuss social oppression and conflict in Europe during the Renaissance" (Gugliotta, 1994). In response to this charge, Dunn stated as follows: The passage actually reads: "Use books such as Irving Stone's The Agony and the Ecstasy, Claudia Van Canon's The Inheritance, and Barbara Willard's A Cold Wind Blowing to discuss social oppression and conflict in Europe during the Renaissance. How did such conditions conflict with prevailing humanist principles?" Moreover, a student exemplar on page 43 of the U.S. standards reads: "Analyze examples of Renaissance art, such as Michelangelo's painting of the Sistine Chapel or the sculpture of David for what it says about the relationship between man and God and the position and power of the individual." In other words, Dunn criticized that Cheney made blatant, condemnatory generalizations from bits of language and

imbalanced by minimizing the importance of Western civilization in human history. Paul Gagnon (1994), a historian at University of Massachusetts, Boston and author of *Democracy's Untold Story: What World History Textbooks Neglect* (1987), argued that the *Standards* diminished the ideas, institutions, and achievements of Western civilization by giving too much attention to Asia, Africa, and the Americas and to interactions among peoples (Nash et al., 1997, p.186).[3] Some critics even argued that the original *Standards* promoted "a tendentious anti-Western perspective," downplayed the achievements of American democracy, and encouraged "presentism" (Stern, 1999, p.163). According to critics, the standards-writers were so concerned about including the stories of previously neglected parts of the world and about correcting their unjust treatments that they disregarded the historical significance and the positive features of Western civilization.

The most serious problem within the *Standards*, according to critics, however, lay in the conceptualization of world history since 1500. Lynne V. Cheney, the former chairperson of the National Endowment for the Humanities, on November 11, 1994, in the *Washington Post*, asserted that world development since 1500 was due to the dynamics of Western civilization and that, therefore, "the rise of the West" should be the organizing principle as well as "the key to the rise of democratic standards" (Gugliotta, 1994). Nevertheless, *the Standards*, according to critics, mainly focused on "sins," of Western civilization, filling public school history curricula with material drawn from "a mammoth grab-bag of world cultures past and present" (Gugliotta, 1994).

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scattered omissions. However, critics generally expressed their dissatisfaction with the teaching examples in the *Standards* (Dunn, 1994, p.177).

[3]Paul Gagnon. "Problems with World History Standards as prepared by the National Center for History in the Schools," 20 June 1994, cited from Nash et al., (1997), p.186.

Responding to those criticisms and drawing upon recommendations made by a panel convened by the Council for Basic Education, in 1996, the National Center for History in the Schools released a revised edition of the Standards that sought to correct the "bias" in the original standards. In the revised edition, all teaching examples, which had been the main targets of the heavy attacks from critics, were eliminated. The *Standards*, however, kept their inclusive and global characteristics in shaping world history. This emphasis remains the target of criticism. For example, according to John D. Fonte, the former Humanities Administrator at the National Endowment for the Humanities, "The revised world *Standards* are biased because they both romanticize and overemphasize the significance of non-Western cultures while denigrating and de-emphasizing the role of Western civilization"(1997, p.20). Fonte (1997) analyzed the appropriateness of the focus on Western civilization by comparing how many standards were assigned to the study of Western civilization and the study of non-Western civilization. He states: "For example, for the period from 300 to 1500 C. E. there are 222 standards, but only 25 percent of them examine Western civilization. Of the remaining *Standards*, 60 percent discuss non-Western civilization and the rest are cross-cultural" (Fonte, 1997, p.20). He complained that Western civilization did not get as much attention as it deserved in the revised *Standards*. In critics' views, world civilization must be divided into only two cultural areas: "the West" and "the non-West," and more than half of the discussion in a world history course should be devoted to Western civilization.

Cheney stated: "There is nothing wrong with studying the rest of the world, but not through this massive amount of detail" (Gugliotta, 1994). Although critics seemingly asked for fewer details to help students understand the grand stream of world history,

what they really sought was, as Ross E. Dunn (1994) – editor of the *Standards* and a history professor at San Diego State University – argued, for world history courses to return to a traditional conceptualization in which Western civilization overwhelmed all developments in other parts of world history in order that Western civilization and world history would be regarded as largely the same thing.

Western-centered World History

Contemporary advocates of the Western-centered approach to world history believe that American education in the humanities should be primarily concerned with transmitting "ideals and knowledge rooted in Western civilization" (Nash et al., 1997, p.165). To Americans, "Western" usually means European, or European and American. However, when people talk of Western civilization, they are usually not thinking of the civilizations in Europe and America. Western civilization refers to the connection of Europe with America as one community, one that excludes the cultural traditions of eastern Europe and Native American in the pre-Columbian period. In fact, Western civilization primarily refers to a distinct cultural tradition and historical development that began in ancient Greece and Rome, evolved in western Europe, and finally spread to North America, where it flourished, matured, and produced its greatest achievements in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.[4] An underlying assumption is that countries

[4]Lawrence Birken, in his article, "What is Western Civilization (1992)," identifies two existing definitions of Western civilization: one is an expanded definition of Western civilization, which includes classical Greco-Roman civilization and the medieval and modern western civilization; the other one is a restricted definition, which excludes the classical civilization. However, when Western civilization is evoked, it generally indicates "the expanded definition" of which Birken speaks. According to Birken, "the

identified as part of Western civilization have a distinct cultural coherence and a continuous historical development within world history (Barraclough 1955; Federici 1995).

In the conception of the advocates of Western-centered approaches, world history consists of two parts: Western civilization and non-Western civilization. They assert that in an ideal world, students should take both the history of Western civilization and world history that includes histories of Western civilization as well as non-Western civilization, but in reality most students will take only one or the other; furthermore, most schools cannot reasonably offer both courses on a regular basis. Because this is the case, they urge that the world history course be organized around Western Civilization. Paul Gagnon insists, "If students have done no systematic study of the history of Western civilization before the 9th or 10th grade, it must become the heart of whatever course is then offered" (1989, pp.37-8). Two sets of ideas defend Western civilization as the central organizational theme of high school world history courses: Western civilization as the seat of liberal democracy and Western civilization as the origins of modernity.

The Seat of Democracy

Democratic citizenship has been regarded as a primary goal of social studies in the United States. To advocates of the Western-centered approach to world history, democratic citizenship is based on "solid factual knowledge," which basically includes the fundamental ideas central to the political vision of the eighteenth-century American founders; the history of the origins and growth and adventures of democratic societies on

expanded definition" is generally both defended by "cultural conservatives" and attacked by "cultural radicals."

earth, past and present; and the current condition of the world and how it got that way (Gagnon, 1987, pp.19-20). In order to teach the "factual knowledge," democracy should be the central theme of world history as well as other subjects in the social studies curriculum. Advocates of the Western-centered approach defend democracy as the central theme of world history based on the following two points: First, democracy is the one of the foundational ideas of the American nation; second, democracy is the most advanced form of political institutions.

Advocates of the Western-centered approach defend their view of world history on the basis of the need for a coherent national education. To them, the political and cultural heritages of western Europe are the origin of American culture, and they are the only glue that binds together American people with different cultural and historical roots. In many countries, a common ancestry and blood are the basis of national unity and commitment. Advocates of the Western-centered approach argue that in the United States what ties people together, however, is not ethnic homogeneity, but "a system of laws and beliefs" on which this country was built (Kagan, 1991, p.183). Because the American system was developed within the context of Western civilization, it seems obvious that all Americans should learn about Western civilization if they are to understand American origins and share in Western heritage, purposes, and character (Kagan, 1991, p.183).

Educators and scholars with multicultural and global perspectives believe that now is one of the times to rewrite world history and reconceptualize school world history, responding to increasing cultural and ethnic pluralism and intensified global interdependence in the present world. They argue that an effective social studies curriculum highlights and celebrates the diversity of the American society (Risinger,

1992). They insist that while it is essential that students should learn about the origins of the beliefs and principles that have made the United States unique among nations, they should also learn about the contributions and heritage of all Americans with diverse cultural and historical roots (Risinger, 1992). However, it is inadequate to study various world cultural traditions largely in isolation because this sort of approach limits students' outlook within separate cultural traditions while world processes take place in a global context. Therefore, the cultural tradition and historical development of particular civilizations as well as their interrelatedness should be important subjects of world history. They reduce the importance of western-European political and cultural heritages while emphasizing the contributions and heritages of other parts of the world.

To supporters of the Western-centered approach, the increase of multicultural and global recognition in the school curriculum brings confusion to the education of Americans. They believe that while teaching diversity is important, it should not be done by placing at risk those national features that binds the American people together as a nation. Some of the great features are Western ideas of individual freedom, political democracy, and human rights.[5] Although the functions of nation-states in world affairs have become weaker than before and while global interdependence is increasing, states are still the major actors in world affairs and the basic units to maintain security in the world. Therefore, "a mastery of national culture" should remain the essence of education of children, "who enter neither a narrow trivial culture nor a transcendent world culture but a national literate culture" (Hirsh, 1987, p.18). Paul Gagnon predicts that mainstream Americans cannot come to sympathetic understanding of strangers in their midst, or of

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[5]The Educational Excellence Network, John Fonte's "Recommendations to the National Council for History Standards," 24 April 1992. Cited from Nash et al. (1997), p.162.

foreign lands and cultures, without first facing up to the historical record of the best and worst in themselves (1989, p.38). Based on this reasoning, those who favor a focus on Western civilization assert that citizenship education should overcome "fragmentation" and offer "a common learning experience" around Western civilization (Weber, 1998, p.206). They strongly believe that western culture should be taught prior to non-western cultures. After Western civilization has been taught, they argue, a variety of world cultures can reasonably be investigated through area studies. To supporters of the Western-centered approach, the history of Western Civilization provides students with inescapable historical roots of American democratic ideas; therefore, for the purpose of imparting the national culture, Western civilization is as essential as American history.

Supporters of the Western-centered approach also defend their approach on the basis that Western civilization produced democracy, which they perceive as a goal of humanity. Chester Finn Jr., a professor of Education and Public Policy at Vanderbilt University, argued: "The full story of democracy, neither disguising nor apologizing for its innate superiority to other forms of government, should be the centerpiece of our teaching of history."[6] In order that all people in the world can cherish democracy and willingly take responsibility for preserving and extending it, advocates of the Western-centered approach argue that students must understand how it works, how it came to be, and how hard it is to sustain. They believe that because no other civilization but Western civilization invented "liberal democracy" and "many of the moral values that sustain it," Western civilization should be the creative core of world history (Gagnon, 1987, p.39). Donald Kagan, professor of Classics and Western Civilization at Yale University, thinks

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[6]The Educational Excellence Network, "Recommendations to the National Council for History Standards," 24 April 1992. Cited from Nash et al. (1997), p. 169.

that "it is both right and necessary" to teach Western Civilization, not as one among many, but as "the center" of citizenship [general] education and "we fail to do so at the peril of our students, our country, and of the hopes for a democratic, liberal society emerging throughout the world today" (1991, p.183).

In organizing world history, advocates of the Western-centered approach argue, the origin and growth of democratic ideals and institutions and the struggle of democratic societies against totalitarianism through historical time should be the "exclusive overarching themes" (Gagnon, 1987, p 38; Nash et al., 1997, p.168).[7] In accordance with these themes, Gagnon suggested the following topics for the high school world history course (1987, p.39).[8]

- Why study history?
- The legacy of the Greeks
- The fall and legacy of Rome

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[7]In her paper presented to the National Council for History Standards, Ruth Wattenberge (1992), of the American Federation of Teachers, stated: "Students need to know and understand a great deal about democracy's roots in Egypt, Greece, and Rome, about its evolution in England and Europe, and about how it has unfolded here... They need to understand the ideologies, institutions and practices that drive and sustain dictatorships of left and right." American Federation of Teachers, untitled paper presented by Ruth Wattenberge to the National Council for History Standards, 10 April 1992. Cited from Nash et al. (1997), p.167.

[8]These are almost identical to the main topics for the study of Western civilization that are suggested by the Bradley Commission on History in Schools (Gagnon, 1989, p.30); 1) The political, philosophical, and cultural legacies of ancient Greece and Rome. 2) Origins, ideas, moral codes, and institutions of Judaism and of Christianity in all its forms. 3) Medieval society and institutions; relations with Islam; feudalism and the evolution of representative government. 4) The culture and ideas of the Renaissance and Reformation, European exploration, the origins of capitalism and colonization. 5) The English revolution, its ideas, the practices of parliamentary government, at home and in the colonies. 6) The culture and ideas of the Enlightenment, comprising the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century and the intellectual revolution of the eighteenth. 7) The American and French revolutions, their sources, results, and world influence. 8) The Industrial Revolution, its social consequences, and its impact on politics and culture. 9) The European ideologies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and their global influences: liberalism, republicanism, social democracy, Marxism, Nationalism, Communism, Fascism, and Nazism. 10) The new nineteenth-century imperialism, ultimate decolonization, and the consequences of both for colonizers and colonized. 11) The two world wars, their origins and effects, and their global aftermath and significance. 12) The making of the European community of nations; new approaches to cooperation and interdependence. These topics testify to the fact that advocates of the Western-centered approach believe that world history is mostly about the history of Western civilization.

- Basic ideas of Judaism and Christianity
- The Middle Ages as a source of representative government.
- The triumph of the British parliament in the Seventeenth century
- Ideas from the Enlightenment
- The American and French Revolutions
- The major ideologies of the Nineteenth century
- Nation-states, nationalism, and imperialism.
- World War I before and after.
- Totalitarianism left and right.
- Appeasement and democratic foreign policy.

According to this perspective, the principal knowledge to be taught in world history is the growth of the democratic ideal and its embodiment in political institutions. Therefore, world history should give its focus to the times and places where the democratic ideal was shaped, flourished or confronted critical challenges. It is natural in this view that Western Civilization becomes the essential context in which democratic ideas were shaped, developed, and practiced through historical times.

Origins of Modern Civilization

Supporters of the Western-centered approach also justify the importance of Western civilization in world history on the basis that students need to understand the contemporary world. They argue that because Western civilization created "modernity" and made it a world phenomenon, making sense of the modern world requires understanding the logical development of Western civilization.

Many scholars in the study of Western civilization argue that, compared to other modes of life, Western civilization is "unusual and even unique" (Barraclough, 1955, p.47; Kagan, Ozment, and Turner, 1980, p.v). According to Kagan (1994), all early civilizations shared the following common experiences: "cultural uniformity and

stability," "the lack of reason in intellectual and political ideas and practices," "monarchy as the standard form of government," and "a mutually supportive unified structure" of religious and political institutions and beliefs. Kagan (1991) perceived that while other cultures carried those characteristics, standing "still" in "a stable form" throughout their historical developments, Western civilization discovered the ideas of "liberty" and later "science" or "reason." As a result, Western civilization escaped from those common experiences. From the Greek city-states to the present, Western civilization perpetuated and nourished its liberal and rational tradition and, as a result, it established the following unique and independent cultures:

> More than any other it [Western civilization] has asserted the claims of the individual against those of the state, limiting its power and creating a realm of privacy into which it cannot penetrate. By means of the philosophical, scientific, agricultural and industrial revolutions that have taken place in the West, human beings have been able to produce and multiply the things needed for life so as to make survival and prosperity possible for ever-increasing numbers, without rapacious wars and at a level that permits dignity and independence. It is the champion of representative democracy as the normal way for human beings to govern themselves, in place of the different varieties of monarchy, oligarchy, and tyranny that have ruled most of the human race throughout history and rule most of the world today. It has produced the theory and practice of the separation of church from state, thereby protecting each from the other and creating a free and safe place for the individual conscience. At its core is a tolerance and respect for diversity unknown in most cultures. One of its most telling characteristics is its encouragement of criticism of itself and its ways (Kagan, 1991, p.184).

Advocates of the Western-centered approach conceive that individualism, industrialization, representative democracy, nation-state, and critical tradition perpetuate Western civilization as its core of unique characteristics. Those characteristics became virtually modern world features since about 1500, when the western-Europeans initiated

the process that led to today's world, creating world unity. Advocates of the Western-centered approach argue that many "non-Western societies" have adopted a Western-style economic system and Western science and technology, although they have frequently attempted to reject the Western values and political ideologies and have sought to retain their traditional beliefs (Kagan et al., 1980, p.v). Advocates of the Western-centered approach perceive that some of "the non-Western societies" have, deliberately or inadvertently, absorbed the Western value systems and political ideologies. Consequently, for better or worse the civilization of the West has become the most influential culture of the world. According to Hugh Thomas, the West, "for good or evil, has provided the world's dynamism."[9]

According to supporters of the Western-centered approach, the unique characteristics of Western civilization were formed through its evolution into a self-sufficient system without having significant influence from its encounters with other cultures.[10] They assert that the unique characteristics of Western civilization are virtually a logical outcome of the blended development of two, distinctive cultural heritages: the Greco-Roman heritages and Germanic heritages within the framework of Christianity. They acknowledge that Western civilization owes its basic knowledge and skills to earlier civilizations of the Near East. However, they argue that because Western civilization eventually took a different historical path from those countries and created its unique civilization beginning in ancient Greece and Rome, Greco-Roman civilization is the true historical root of Western civilization. Historians emphasizing the uniqueness of Western

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[9] Cited from Hunt (1985), p.157.

[10] How advocates of the Western-centered approach conceptualize Western civilization is illustrated by the works of Barraclough (1955); Kagan et al. (1980); Kagan (1991); Roberts (1976; 1995) and Perry et al. (1995).

civilization perceive that the West owes its intellectual culture to the Classical tradition in Greco-Roman civilization, its political existence to the Roman Empire, and its spiritual unity to the Catholic Church (Barraclough, 1955, p.33). Advocates of the Western-centered approach conceive that in the Middle Ages, the German barbarian invaders, who in the fourth and fifth centuries migrated into and settled in the soil of the Roman Empire, inherited Greco-Roman civilization and Christian traditions and created a new civilization. It would be eventually fulfilled as Western civilization, as it is known today. The Christian Church gave form and unity to the new civilization arising in western Europe. Western Europe emerged as a coherent whole. In geography, government, religion, and language, western Europe became "a land distinct from both the Eastern or Byzantine world and the Arab or Moslem world" (Kagan et al., 1980, p.223). Western civilization equipped itself with new religious values and institutions from Christianity and it devised new political and social systems.

According to advocates of the Western-centered approach, since the sixteenth century, the nations of the West have undergone the modern transformation of their own societies and governments through science, technology, capitalism, and liberal democracy. The emergence of the modern world in Europe is ascribed to a logical realization of Medieval European characteristics rather than as a consequence of special conditions and opportunities of the time (Dunn, 1980, p.38). Since the seventeenth century, the striking technological revolution and the remarkable growth of military power allowed the nations of the West to dominate large portions of the rest of the world. The West has asserted itself as the crucial force for the transformation of non-Western

civilizations from the traditional to the modern. As a result, Western culture has become the most powerful paradigm in the world.

Supporters of the Western-centered approach argue that although China, India, and Islamic empires were culturally advanced places from which their neighboring countries imported higher cultures throughout historical times, they had virtually no enduring impact on the rest of the world and showed no similar dynamics to that of Western civilization in creating the modern world (Roberts, 1995, p.xv). They believe that the dynamism of Western civilization in modern times in creating modern civilization is unprecedented throughout the history of mankind. Western values and institutions are the most powerful and desirable model in the world today. The roots of modern science and technology, together with popular government and institutions, stem from Western experiences and ideas. Modern achievements and values as well as problems are steeped in Western civilization. Therefore, in order to understand how modern features took shape, they argue, it is vital to understand the history of Western civilization and its logical fulfillment from ancient times to the modern period and its expansion over the world.

Structure of World History

In narrating world history before the sixteenth century, high school world history textbooks generally adopt a region-based structure. They divide the world into civilizations or cultural regions as units and describe each history of civilization over a period of several centuries. Textbooks describe cultural, political, and economic developments in early civilizations in Mesopotamia and Egypt and then in China, India

and along the Mediterranean Sea. The textbooks mention that, in Ancient times, major civilizations of Egypt, Mesopotamia, India, and China, Greece and Rome developed classical styles, made great achievements in their own rights, and had a large impact on the life of the societies within the boundary of each civilization. The textbooks assign a separate chapter to each major civilization in order to celebrate its distinct cultural complexities and styles and to distinguish its classical civilization, on which the later development of each civilization was founded.

After the description of classical civilizations, the textbooks take cultural areas as a unit of description. They describe the autonomous development of each cultural zone of Europe (Christianity), Africa and Middle East (Islam), East Asia (China with Confucianism) and South Asia (India with Buddhism and Hinduism) and the Americas until about the sixteenth century. The textbooks describe those cultural regions as if they have completed their development as "traditional" civilizations by the sixteenth (or the seventeenth) century.

By the turn of the sixteenth century, however, the textbooks turn their focus to western Europe, where modern civilization was created. The textbooks devote several continuing units of text to a detailed elaboration of the development of modern western Europe between the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries.[11] They describe the transformation of western Europe from medieval to modern though such events as the

[11]For examples, in Sol Holt and John R. O'Connor (1994), *Exploring World History*, Units 1 and 2 are about early civilizations in Mesopotamia and Ancient Egypt and then ancient Middle East, India, China, Africa, and America. Unit 3 treats classical civilization in Greece and Rome. Unit 4 is about Europe's early development. Unit 6 turns to the Rise of Asia, Africa, and the Americas. In units 6 through 12, the focus is on European history (modern changes, imperialism and totalitarianism) and other parts of the world reemerge in Unit 13, treating modern nationalism. In Elisabeth Gaynor Ellis and Anthony Esler (1997) *World History Connections to Today*, the units are organized as follows: The first 3 units are devoted to explorations of diverse cultural zones; Unit 4 deals with Renaissance and Reformation in Europe during

Renaissance, the Discovery of New World, religious reformation, the Enlightenment, political revolutions, and scientific and industrial revolutions. Through these events, western Europe experienced proliferation of knowledge and scientific technological innovation. The Church was separated from the state, opening the age of the nation-state. The largely agricultural-based society, with small-scale trade, was transformed into a society with large-scale machinery industry and worldwide trade. Democracy triumphed over aristocracy and autocracy.

From the seventeenth century to the present day, the textbooks focus on how the world became dominated by the West. In the eighteen century, the United States emerged as an actor on the stage of world history, through the American Revolution and through American participation in European expansion of wealth and power in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the nineteenth century, the West spread aggressively into other parts of the world, using military strength and colonial control to become the world's foremost power. In the final chapters, the textbooks describe encounters between the advancing and powerful Western states and non-Western, traditional societies that have not modernized in ways characteristic of the West. According to world history textbooks, since the sixteenth century, no other great empires or powers have existed, except those of the West. When treating societies beyond Europe and the United States, the textbooks focus mainly on their contacts with the West and Western impact on their domestic life. According to textbooks, while those societies lost their political, economic, and cultural autonomy, they were modernized as a result of the encounters with the West.

1300-1600 and then European overseas expansion; the units 5 through 7 are concerned with modern European transformation, 1700-1914; and Unit 7 and 8 treat the world since World War I.

Weaknesses of the Western-centered Approach

Recently, an increasing number of high school world history textbooks have attempted to incorporate global and multicultural themes, proclaiming, in their introductions, their infusion of global and multicultural perspectives. Those textbooks, according to reviewers, still adopt Western civilization as the integrating element of world history (Dunn, 1980; Johnson, 1987; Hitchens, 1990; Beers, 1993; Commeyras and Alvermann, 1994).[12] Today, most high school world history textbooks follow the Western-centered approach, giving greater attention to Western civilization than to any other civilization, as they have in the past.

For the period before the sixteenth century, textbooks, authors declare in their books, are inclusive. They attempt to describe the cultural and political complexities of each civilization and, in some cases, highlight the economic and scientific advance of China and the development of great empires in non-European cultural regions, although the number of pages devoted to each classical civilization and cultural region is not necessarily equal. The textbooks commonly devote about two-thirds of the total text to the development of Western Civilization. Africa, the Middle East, East Asia, and South Asia are covered in the remainder. Still, in treatment of regions beyond the West, textbooks focus on brief treatments of dynastic changes, drawing little attention to their changes in culture, political ideas, economic conditions and structures. This makes it difficult to understand the subtle development of those societies. Additionally, ideas,

[12]The following textbooks are among those books that adopted Western civilization as the central theme: T. W. Wallbank et al. (1987); B. F. Beers, (1984; 1991); M. Perry et al., (1991; 1995); L. S. Krieger, et al., (1992); S. Holt and J. R. O'Connor, (1994); T. L. Smart and A. O. Kownslar, (1987); E. G. Ellis and A. Esler, (1997).

institutions, and developments in Western civilization overwhelm those of other civilizations. Textbook authors frequently present historical events and movements that have been meaningful only to the history of Western Europe as if they had had significant worldwide influences. Lockard points out that students may think that most of the important historical developments have taken place only in the West, even though non-Western areas, China, India, South Western Asia (the Islamic states), and the Eastern Mediterranean basin societies, were considerably more impressive in their accomplishments (1980, p.71).

Furthermore, the conceptual framework and periodization of world history in textbooks has generally been drawn from the history of Western civilization and imposed upon the history of non-Western civilization. For example, in textbook organization, two historical stages of Western civilization before modern times -- the ancient classical period in Greece and Rome and the western-European Christian Middle Ages -- have become the organizational structure for narrating histories of other parts of the world. The textbooks include mostly those historical developments that fit the sequence of Western history. In other words, only when the histories of other civilizations provide parallel examples of developments taking place in Western history in a given historical period, do the textbooks sporadically discuss them without any regard to their own historical evaluation (Association for Asian Studies, 1993, p. 8).

In the treatment of world history in the textbooks, from the sixteenth century to the present date, world history is essentially a history of Western civilization. Societies other than Europe virtually disappear in the world history domain until great European states with military forces and advanced technological skills show up at their shores.

Unquestionably, the West was changing rapidly in this period. There is no doubt that from about the seventeenth century, European states became aggressive in expanding their economic and political power over the world. However, in this period, there were also crucial developments in great-scale empires in the Middle East, China, India, and Russia, with long-standing and large-scale consequences. For example, in China, Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) expanded its territorial boundary over Manchuria, Mongolia, Turkestan, and Tibet. Ottoman Turks rose as a great empire governing parts of Southeastern Europe and the Middle East and North Africa. In India, the Mughul Empire and in Russia, the Tsarist Empire also expanded their territories. This process of territorial expansion by these great empires was accompanied by implantation of their cultural and political influences. Before Europeans achieved their colonial domination of Africa and their economic and military ascendancy in Asia in the nineteenth century, for about 300 years, those regions had perpetuated their own autonomous developments and celebrated their territorial and cultural expansion. Textbooks frequently ignore these developments. From a Western perspective, these developments are only locally or regionally important, having less enduring influence than those developments in Western civilization on other parts of the world. Local or regional perspectives other than those of the West are not likely to be introduced to students when selecting important events and in explaining and evaluating them. Instead, they frequently give readers the impression that about the time of European arrival at the shores of Africa and Asia, the societies in those regions where confronted by increasing political and economic problems that could be solved by rearranging and reorganizing their social, political, and economic systems according to Western approaches. The West came as the force for modernization in those

non-Western regions. Textbooks picture Western countries as active, while the countries of the other areas of the world were passive. In particular, according to *National Project on Asia in American Schools*, world history textbooks typically present the well-known events that took place in non-Western countries in the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries as consequences of actions by the West (Association for Asian Studies, 1993, p.8). The Western-centered approach to world history has pictured the West as the sole dynamic center of cultural innovation.

It is important for American citizens to understand that American political ideals and moral values originated in Western civilization. However, they should also understand that Western civilization is a civilization that was shaped in a global context, in which every society throughout history has been, to a degree, interconnected, having influence on each other. The Western-centered approach, however, undermines the impact from other parts of the world on establishing Western civilization by giving little attention to its encounters with other peoples and cultures and its transformation from those encounters. This approach magnifies an ethnocentric perspective by treating Western civilization as if western Europe and the United States were the sole centers of cultural creation and diffusion since the sixteenth century, subordinating developments in other cultural zones. James Becker argues, "Such a focus on Western culture, accompanied by fragmented views of other cultures often undercuts the most significant contributions of study of world history -- the understanding of interrelationships between peoples, countries, and continents"(1991, p.75). Critics complain that such an attention to Western civilization in the high school world history course is too Western-centered to help students live in a global, multicultural society that promotes ethnic diversity and

increasing interdependence. They also point out that the limited capacity of the Western-centered approach to include diverse civilizations blinds students to the accomplishments and viewpoints of other societies and to the complex processes of global interdependence.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Research Questions

World history textbooks used in American high schools reflect the Western-centered approach by giving much more emphasis to Western civilization than to any other civilization, by making Western civilization the standard for selecting topics and organizing chronology, and by visualizing modern world history as essentially the same as Western civilization. The high school world history approach with Western civilization as the essence was a product of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. In this period, according to previous studies, American history educators invariably conceived of Western civilization as high civilization overarching the past of peoples beyond western Europe and America (Allardyce, 1990; Nash et al., 1997). The historical consciousness of this period continues to influence decision making with regard to the selection and organization of high school world history textbooks.

Educators would be able to critically assess strengths and weaknesses of the Western-centered approach in high school world history courses and textbooks and to make better suggestions for their revisions, if they understood how the present course

came to be. In order to help educators gain an insight into the development of the Western-centered approach to world history, this research undertakes an exploration of conceptualizations of world history in high school textbooks in the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. This research seeks to answer the following questions: In the textbooks published during the period between 1875 and 1934, what kinds of themes determined the selection and the organization of world history?; how did those organizational themes come into prominence? More specifically, what kinds of historical experiences – events, ideas, aspiration, and enterprise – gave rise to particular organizational themes and topics; and what assumptions and premises undergirded the conception of world history?

This research is largely concerned with "official knowledge," also called the "intended curriculum," content that students are expected to learn.[13] Generally speaking, "official knowledge" can be traced from primary sources such as state frameworks, district courses of study, listings of courses taught in a school, and syllabi. These curriculua frequently offer some guidelines for "the body of content to be taught" and recommend or designate textbooks for teachers' use. However, for the purposes of this study, textbooks are the most important source materials. First of all, as Apple (1988; 1992) argued, the textbook has been an embodiment of "official knowledge" in the United States. Second, during the period in question, 1875-1934, textbooks were the most important teaching material that teachers used. By 1900, the history textbook was regarded as the history curriculum. Teachers taught what was in the textbook and students recited it. According to Rolla M.Tryon (1934; 1935), the history textbook between 1860 and 1900 was "King of Kings" and "Lord of Lords." He continued: "It

was the 'be all and end all' of the content in history taught in both the elementary as well as the secondary schools" (Tryon, 1935, pp. 154-55). Between 1900 and 1934, the National Education Association (NEA) and the American Historical Association (AHA) took leadership in developing the history program guidelines. The report of the AHA's Committee of Seven (1899), the report of the AHA's Committee of Five (1907), the report of the NEA's Social Studies Committee (1916), and the report of the AHA's Committee of History and Education for Citizenship (1921) provided guidelines for states, school districts, schools and teachers to use when developing courses of study. Those courses of study seldom provided detailed outlines of history courses. Instead, they frequently recommended or designated textbooks for teachers' use. In this period, teachers generally used textbooks rather than developing their own course outlines. Therefore, an analysis of textbooks published in the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century will reveal the body of knowledge that educators and publishers intended to teach.

Prior studies, including Gray (1932), Tryon (1935), Wesley (1937), Woodward and Westbury (1981), Allardyce (1990), and Nash, Crabtree, and Dunn (1997) have analyzed world history textbooks for the period in question. However, except for the studies of Allardyce (1990) and Nash et al. (1997), those studies used a limited approach to textbook analysis. They focused only on what is most evident both in the table of contents and in the index.[14] They offered information about the topics included in textbooks and the degree of emphasis put on certain topics and periods. They provided no historical meaning to the fact that those topics and periods were taught and emphasized.

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[13] "Intended" is also labeled as "recommended," "adopted," "official," "formal," or "explicit."
[14] In Venezky's (1992) terms, those studies analyzed the "manifested curriculum."

They did not consider the historical context in which textbooks were produced in their analysis.

This research aims to go beyond this approach to textbook analysis. This research seeks to reveal a series of messages that world history textbooks carried beneath what seems obvious -- inclusion and exclusion of certain topics and emphasis on certain topics and periods.[15] In other words, this research examines how world history was conceptualized in high school world history textbooks in the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century and the context in which the world history conceptualization was produced. This research seeks to reveal meaning and values of the effective dominant American culture in the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century and that culture's interpretation of the nature of the world and its historical process.

In this approach to textbook analysis, Allardyce (1990) and Nash and others (1997) have taken leadership. No in-depth study has been undertaken to explore the conceptualization of the high school world history course between 1875 and 1934. Brief descriptions given by Gilbert Allardyce (1990, pp.45-54) and by Gary B. Nash, Charlotte Crabtree, and Ross E. Dunn (1997, pp.46-52) are the only studies that provided insights into the world history content and organization for the period, 1875-1934. These studies confirm that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, history educators in the United States conceptualized world history primarily as if Western civilization were the crux of human development.

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[15] In Venezky's (1992) terms, this study is mostly concerned with the "latent curriculum" which is "a series of secondary messages, transmitted on top of the manifest curriculum through commission and omission." According to Venezky, the "latent curriculum" reflects the selective tradition of society.

According to Nash et al. (1997) and Allardyce (1990), between 1875 and 1934, the focus of non-European history was continuously on "Western experiences" "as if they had been the history of humankind." As Nash, Crabtree, and Dunn argue:

> The idea of world history as coincidental with the Western experience remained firmly entrenched in American schools through World War I ... In the interwar period, educators and academic scholars continued to define world history as the story of Western progress, one that largely excluded the experiences of Africans, Asians, and Latin Americans. (Nash et al., 1997, p.49)

The early general history course was confined to the Mediterranean basin and to Western Europe with brief allusions to the rest of the world (Allardyce, 1990, p.47). According to previous research, before World War I, history educators took it for granted that any study of the world's past meant studies of Europe and Europeans abroad. The early general history textbooks referred to ancient Asian civilizations such as that of "Egypt, Mesopotamia, India, and China as early contributors to civilization" but then they declared that those civilizations stopped their development and "fell into dead tradition and stasis" (Nash et al., 1997, p.47). According to previous studies, the textbooks visualized such traditions as stationary since ancient times and the course of world history, thereafter, became identical to Western civilization from the Aegean Sea, then to Rome, then to Western and Central Europe and then to the United States. "The grand story of Christian and democratic civilization" provided the grounds to defend European history as the whole history of humankind.

Organizational Themes in Existing Studies

According to previous studies, in the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, "psuedoscientific race theories" explained basic cultural and historical differences among human groups (Allardyce, 1990, p.46). Racial themes help justify preoccupation with European history. "Racialist assumptions" at that time were a routine part of lessons in both school and church and were reflected in history conceptualization in a way to inculcate in children "a racist view" of non-white races, in particular, American Black people (Nash et al., 1997, pp.50-1).[16] The substantial knowledge that history courses taught in the decades before World War I had probably been "dominant Anglo-Saxon values and attitudes" that set cultural standards in the United States and Europe (Nash et al., 1997, pp.46-7).

According to Allardyce, this racial theme was replaced, after the end of World War I, by the theme, "growth of democracy," which was presented by the Committee of History and Education for Citizenship (1921). This committee was appointed by the Board of Historical Service, a wartime organ of the American Historical Association, in response to a request of the National Education Association to review and revise the social studies curriculum, considering social changes brought by the war. In this committee's scheme, according to previous literature, "Western experiences," continued to be the focus of the world history course. Nash and others state:

[16]About the description of Africa, Nash et al. observe: "Virtually every textbook presented Africa in a way that helped condition children's view of race." "Africa had no history of its own." They quoted the following words from a widely used book, "Most of the inhabitants were dark of skin. Many of them were even darker of mind, for the light of civilization had not yet reached them.... The vast interior was unknown and untamed. It seemed securely guarded by deserts and distances, by jungles, fevers, and savage tribes" (Nash et al., 1997, p.51).

> Since the nineteenth century, educated Americans had linked this country's culture and institutions to the traditions and achievements of Europe. After 1918, they were even more zealous to present the United States to the world as a responsible member of the club of democratic nations that had won the war. More than that, the idea of the American nation as the culmination of centuries of struggles toward a more perfect liberty became part of the vocabulary of our national culture (Nash et al., 1997, p.49).

The organizational theme in world history at first was "race," and after World War I it became "democracy." These themes justified equating world history with European history. Previous research, however, provides no clear answers to how and why organizational themes in world history courses changed from "race" to the "growth of democracy."

According to Allardyce (1990), there was also "a third force" that influenced the construction of the world history course: "the so-called New History," of James Harvey Robinson. "In the work of the Committee on Social Studies of the Commission on the Reorganization of Secondary Education (1916)," Allardyce stated, "Robinson stole the show with his ideas on recent history as instruction for democratic citizenship" (1990, p.49). However, Allardyce does not describe or explain Robinson's idea or how it had an impact on high school world history courses. Robinson's idea of "New History" and its contribution to conceptualizing world history for high school students requires elaboration.

Previous research identified a contending trend of thought with regard to the focus and organization of world history after World War I. After World War I, the advent of internationalism called for infusions of non-Western experiences into the world history

course. Allardyce (1990) found a new idea of world history transcending "a Eurocentric perspective" in the work of the English writer, H. G. Wells. Allardyce stated:

> [A] reflection of the crisis of confidence caused by the Great War was an expression of the loss of faith in western values. Here began the reaction against Eurocentrism in world history. Influential, in this connection, was the work of H.G. Wells, *The Outline of History*, calling in 1920 for world history in schools as a basis for a world community of understanding and belief (Allardyce, 1991, pp.48-9).

Nash and the others (1997) also found the movement to infuse "internationalism" into social studies curriculum in the AHA's 1929-34 Commission's report, which emphasized the importance of understanding the place of the United States in a "world civilization" and the need for giving greater attention to "international peace efforts" and to "contemporary developments in Asia, Africa, and Latin America." Previous literature, however, has never explored Wells' idea of world history, the conception of "internationalism" or their impact on world history conceptualization. It is clear from previous literature that despite the attempt to infuse "internationalism" into world history courses after World War I, world history textbooks underwent no significant change. The notion of Western civilization as the progressive center throughout world history proved remarkably tenacious. The assumption of European White supremacy also showed its perpetuating influence on conceptualization of world history after World War I. According to Nash and others, "the much-used World history" textbook published in 1932 contained the following paragraphs:

> From the times of Pericles and Caesar to the present the chief roles in the great drama of history have been taken by the white men of Europe.... The

> European White man has taught, and if need be, has compelled, his yellow and brown and black brothers to adopt the ways of Europeans (Nash et al., 1997, p.51).

Although the textbooks of the 1930s showed improvement over the nineteenth-century books, they continued to drag along "the baggage of cultural arrogance" (Nash et al., 1997, p.51).

Historical Contexts in Existing Studies

According to Allardyce (1982), American historians inherited from Europe the idea that civilization originated in the ancient Near East, evolved through classical Greece and Rome, and then moved on to medieval and modern Europe. European civilization, in this way, was the sum of world history. In Europe, as Allardyce (1982) stated, historians, under the pressure of vibrant nationalisms, concentrated on writing and teaching national history rather than the history of European civilization as a whole. However, in the United States the history of European civilization, together with American history, continued to be core courses in schools as well as in colleges.

Scholars explain that historians' conscious connection of European experiences to those of the U.S met distinctive American needs during this period. In order to teach the public the greatness of the nation, American historians in the era of nationalism were obliged to show that the nation's history had an antiquity reaching far beyond the arrival of Columbus in time and beyond the dimensions of the North American continent in space (Beers, 1993, p.97). In order to accomplish the task, American historians attempted to explain that American civilization was part of the great European civilization, by

searching and illuminating European elements that had been passed down to the United States. The original idea of Western civilization linking European heritage with American history was born in the late nineteenth century.

Nash and the others (1997) offered several factors to explain why the history of the world focused solely on "Western experiences" and ignored histories of other areas in teaching the history of humankind. First, Western countries dominated the rest of the world politically and economically, lending credence to Western civilization as the only civilization to progress.[17] Second, studies in non-Western civilization were less developed in the field of history at that time and did not offer enough information about the histories of the rest of the world to integrate into the history of the world.[18] Lastly, after the end of World War I, scholars and educators tended to equate "the forces of modernity -- science, technology, democracy, liberalism, an enlightened social scientific reasoning" -- with European civilization (Nash et al., 1997, p.50). Therefore, in order to trace the origin of "the contemporary way of thinking and living," historians at that time concentrated on European history.

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[17] In Nash and others' own words, "The nations of Western Europe collectively assumed global military control or economic domination, a fact that, despite Japan's participation in imperial enterprise, seemed to confirm the idea that the West was the exclusive agent of historical change. The Second Industrial Revolution was in full swing, and the industrializing, urbanizing countries of Europe and North America were changing so fast that by comparison the rest of the world seemed not to be changing at all" (Nash et al., 1997, p.48).

[18] The study of "tribal" peoples and ancient Asian empires was considered to be the business of philologists, archaeologists, and the new specialism in anthropology, but not historians (Nash et al., 1997, p.48).

The Limits of Existing Studies

Existing literature has shown that from the earlier era of history instruction roughly the 1870s to the 1930s, the experiences of Europe and America continuously dominated the written history of humankind. After World War I, although "internationalism" brought a more culturally inclusive perspective to world history, the theme, Western civilization, remained as an organizational core. According to existing studies, before World War I, there was a sort of consensus that the school history curriculum should be designed to teach children with diverse cultural and historical roots the cultural and historical heritages of the West on which the American nation was built. After the end of World War I, there seemed to be different ideas of world history regarding the degree of incorporation of non-Western histories. However, there was virtually no challenge to the adoption of Western civilization as the core idea for organizing the world history course.

Previous studies have provided evidence that high school world history courses were imbedded with Eurocentrism and even a racist view. In the background lay the intellectual trends that correlated racial differences with cultural progress of a race, and the social and political context that saw the expansion of Europe and American power over the world. Existing studies have helped educators see that world history was originally conceived with "Western experiences" as the essence of human experiences. Certain problems need elaboration, however.

Previous studies have claimed that "Western experiences" dominated world history as if they had been the history of humankind. However, those studies did not

explain what were meant by "Western experiences" or what logic justified "Western experiences" as the whole of human experiences. Previous studies have revealed that in the high school world history course in the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, primary organizational themes were "race," "the growth of democracy," the "James Harvey Robinson's idea of New History," and "internationalism," but they have provided no insight regarding how those themes were embodied to construct world history. Previous studies briefly pointed out some of dominant intellectual trends and historical contexts that gave rise to "Western experiences" as the whole of human history, but they were unable to describe the historical experiences and educators' interpretations of them or what influenced the rise and the fall of those organizational themes. Most of all, previous studies have largely failed to interpret the meaning of the historical consciousness that influenced the structure of the world history course in the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century.

In order to solve the unsolved problems in previous studies, a more expanded and in-depth study is required. This study undertakes that task. For this task, this study analyzes mainly textbooks. Selection of the textbooks depends on reports and studies of popularly used textbooks during the period in question. The committee reports and published works by history and social studies educators are also important primary source materials to explore conceptualization of world history as well as to understand cultural and historical contexts that produced the conceptualization of world history.

OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS

The conceptualization of world history in contemporary high school textbooks reflects the Western-centered approach in such a way that Western democracy and modern developments overarch all other developments. This study reveals how democratic and modern developments in Western civilization came to claim central roles in the organization of world history courses while developments in regions other than the West were incorporated into world history courses in a superficial way by means of high school general history, European history, and world history textbooks between 1875 and 1934. This study describes American culture and historical experiences that paved the way for the ascendancy of the Western-centered world history approach.

This study is composed of five chapters, including an introductory chapter and a concluding chapter. The first of the three substantive chapters, Chapter Two, focuses on how a liberal vision of world history became prominent in high school textbooks. Chapter Three traces how a modernist vision of world history exerted its influence on the conceptualization of world history in high school textbooks. Chapter Four is concerned with the influence of two different visions on world history conceptualization after World War I: a liberal democratic vision and an internationalist vision.

Chapter Two explores the conceptualization of world history in general history textbooks published from 1875 to 1900 and its adaptation in the first three decades in the twentieth century. This chapter finds that in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the racial doctrines of White supremacy among human races and Aryan (later called Indo-European) supremacy within the White race invariably gave exclusive focus to ancient

Greek and Roman civilization and medieval and modern western European civilization as the great stream of human history. It describes how the history of humankind unfolded under those racial doctrines and the intellectual, political, and social climate that gave rise to those racial doctrines in general history teaching and writing. Chapter Two reveals that writers of general history textbooks in the last quarter of the nineteenth century sought the origins of modern democratic ideas in the liberal tradition of the Aryan race (or the Teutonic race – the last descendent of the Aryan race), and that under the rubric of the supremacy of the Aryan race, general history textbooks celebrated the unique western European idea of liberty. In this respect, this study specifically calls those writers "Aryan liberal writers." Chapter Two also describes how this conception of world history continued to influence the conceptualization of world history, subordinating histories of the non-Western nations to the history of Western civilization, after American history writers disclaimed racial themes.

Chapter Three focuses mainly on the views of so-called "New Historians." Chapter Three first describes the idea of "New History" and its adoption by textbook authors and by European history course developers before World War I. This chapter finds that "New Historians," impressed by contemporary industrialization and commercialization and encouraged by progressivism and pragmatism in the progressive era, sought to explain how modern life and problems came to be as they were. In so doing, "New Historians" began to construct world history with "modernity" as the organizational theme. Chapter Three also explores the extension and adaptation of the conception of world history that was constructed under the principles of "New History" before World War I in the post-war decade.

Chapter Four treats two influences on world history conceptualization after World War I. One line of thought was developed around a focus on "Americanization," a belief that American democratic ideals and values are the most important goals of education. The Committee of History and Education for Citizenship (1921) was responsible for developing a modern world history course that responded to the demands for Americanization. This committee presented a high school modern world history course whose focus was limited to "the growth of democracy." Chapter Four describes the committee's ideas for modern world history and their impact on world history conceptualization in high school textbooks. In this study, the emphasis on Americanization is referred to as the "liberal democratic vision."

The other source of influence was a heightened intent to provide for international understanding and cooperation for world peace. Chapter Four explores H. G. Wells' idea for a universal history and the efforts by American social studies educators to develop new social studies courses that promoted "internationalism." Internationalism underscored the importance of understanding histories of nations beyond Europe and the United States, nations such as Russia, China, Japan, and Latin American nations. This chapter describes the internationalists' contribution to world history by expanding the scope of world history to histories of nations outside Europe and the United States. This chapter finds that the world history devised by internationalists was also locked into the chronology and structure of Western civilization.

Chapter 2

The Aryan Virtue of Liberty

This chapter examines the world history conception of general history textbook writers in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and its continuous adaptation in the first three decades of the twentieth century.[1] In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, William Swinton, John D. Quackenbos, John J. Anderson, Joel Dorman Steel and Esther Baker Steel, Phillip Van Ness Myers, George Park Fisher, Frank Moore Colby, and George Burton Adams were popular writers of general history and European history textbooks (Tryon, 1935, pp.154-67).

General history and European history textbooks written by those writers in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, except those of Phillip Van Ness Myers, lived a short life. The Committee of Seven of American Historical Association (AHA) in its report (1899) strongly opposed the teaching of a one-year course in general history; instead, it recommended a two-year course of European history - Ancient history and Medieval and Modern history. Within several years following the publication of the report, a new generation of textbook writers emerged, writing ancient history and medieval and modern history in separate volumes. Willis Mason West and George Willis Botsford were among them. Myers, who had already presented ancient history and medieval and modern history in separate volumes before the publication of the Committee Seven's report kept publishing his textbooks, with a few revisions, until about 1930.

[1]This chapter mainly analyzes textbooks in Appendix A.

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, history writers, without further scrutiny, casually accepted the notion of race developed in racial studies including anthropology, ethnology, and comparative philology in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Europe. The assumption that different races made different degrees of historical progress was a premise on which historical writers based their works. Without any variation, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, general history writers upheld the doctrine of the racial doctrine of White supremacy and Aryan (Indo-European) supremacy, which was a general outcome of racial studies. They also accepted the assertion of racial studies that only the last descendent of the Aryan race, the Teutonic race, to which Americans belonged, had the capacity to create modern civilization. The White European domination of the world and the Darwinian law of natural evolution allowed no doubt of the Aryan race as the fittest of all human races. The writers conceived history as a story of civilized nations. In their direct reference as well as narrative conception, civilization was a product of only the Aryan race; therefore, the history of the Aryan race, which was unfolded as a great story of ancient Greeks and Romans followed by the Teutons, was virtually identical with the history of the human race.

The exclusive validity of the Aryan race's history as the sole focus of world history was found in the race's inherent idea of liberty and its creation of a new civilization in the Middle Ages based on its inheritance of Greco-Roman heritages. The writers commonly accepted the conception that the world progressed toward liberty, and the Aryan race was the agent of the world process of evolution toward liberty. To specify the conceptualization of world history in their textbooks, this study calls the writers of

those books "Aryan liberal writers." This chapter explores the world history conceptualization of the "Aryan liberal writers" in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and its continuing adaptation in the early twentieth century.

The world history conceptualization of the "Aryan liberal writers" persisted until the mid-1930s in popularly adopted European history and world history textbooks written by Phillip V. N. Myers and Willis Mason West. Most general history writers retired from their writings, in the beginning of the twentieth century, when the craft of history scholarship clamored for the disassociation of such an ill-founded notion of race from historical study. About this time, Willis Mason West, however, began his textbook writing career, with the liberal vision that was virtually identical with that of the "Aryan liberal writers." He denounced the adoption of race as a historical factor, but his narrative conception was undergirded by the same racial doctrine as that of the general history writers in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Henry Elson (1921), in his world history textbook, proclaimed the supremacy of the White race and the Aryan (Indo-European) race. He devoted about nine-tenths of his book to "an account of the Indo-European (Aryan) branch" because he perceived that the Indo-Europeans had dominated the world for the past 2500 years.

Textbooks written by the "Aryan liberal writers" dominated the market of high school general history textbooks during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. In the early twentieth century, high schools continued to use those textbooks. In fact, in the leading syllabus in the early twentieth century, *A History Syllabus for Secondary Schools* (1907), prepared by the Special Committee of the New England History Teachers' Association, the textbooks of "Aryan liberal writers," such as Philip Van Myers, Willis

Mason West, George Burton Adams, and George Willis Botsford were among these recommended for teachers' use.[2] In 1932, Arthur Dillman Gray reported that two world history textbooks, Henry W. Elson (1921)'s *Modern Times and the Living Past* and Willis Mason West (1922), *The Story of World Progress*, with Hutton Webster's *World History*, had been the leaders among twelve or more World History textbooks that had been adopted or recommended in 124 courses of study.[3] This report testifies to the wide acceptance of the view of human history that pictured the supremacy of the Aryan race in the American public.

HISTORY INSTRUCTION BEFORE 1875

In the United States, before 1875 history existed in the school curriculum as a subordinate subject in classical literature courses such as Greek and Latin, geography, and readings. In the Greek or Latin language courses, the myths and legends from ancient Greece and Rome served as background knowledge of classical literatures and at the same time as moral lessons. The course in geography taught the history of different countries, but it was just a short description of countries and states for the purpose of expanding accurate geographical knowledge of students. For example, the curriculum of the Boston Latin School for October 15, 1789, showed that King's "History of the

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[2]According to Fleming (1909), after the publication of the Report of the Committee of Seven (1899) two high school history syllabi were published: "A History Syllabus for Secondary School," by New England History Teachers' Association and "The History and Social Science Syllabus" of the New York State Education Department, a slight modification of the New England syllabus. According to Fleming, the syllabus published by the New York State Education Department was based upon the texts of Myers.

[3]Webster's textbooks also proclaimed the supremacy of the White race and the Indo-European race while defining other races as "savage" and "barbarians." In his narrative, instead of race, democracy and Christianity were integrating core of world history.

Heathen Gods" was included in a course on the *Making of Latin* (Russell, 1914, p.311). As early as in 1784, Jedidiah Morse, in his elementary textbook, *Elements of Geography*, devoted some of its space to the history of each country and state treated therein. The course in reading also taught history, but it was not much more than a story of heroes, and its main purpose was to cultivate moral integrity in students. According to a list of historical texts, comprising the collection made by Henry Barnard with certain additions, between 1799 through 1814, seventeen history textbooks were published. Among them, there were three texts in United States history, eight in general history, four in ancient history, two in English history and one in ecclesiastical history (Russell, 1914). Bruce Edgar Wesley stated:

> During the colonial and Revolutionary periods in America some history was taught in connection with reading and geography. In the academies history was sometimes offered, but the subject had a very limited place in the secondary curriculum before 1825 and almost no place in the elementary school (Wesley, 1937, p.62).

To summarize, in the early years of the nineteenth century, history was usually taught in association with the classics, geography, or reading, particularly with the declamatory work. Where it was found as a differentiated subject, it was as a rule either a course in "Greek or Roman Antiquities" or a course in "General History."

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the private secondary school, usually called the Academy, offered classical departments for college preparation and English departments for non-college-preparatory purposes, but it laid stress mostly on the function of college preparation. Accordingly, the curriculum tended to be classic-oriented while religious-moral and disciplinary aims were also emphasized. In the first half of the

nineteenth century, the public high school appeared, with the original intention of providing non-college-preparatory studies, though in the latter decades of the nineteenth century it expanded its offerings to include college-preparatory as well as non-college-preparatory functions. The nineteenth century saw the shift of the dominant secondary school institution from the private secondary school called "Academy" to the public high school and the shift of the secondary school curriculum from classical subjects to modern subjects. In this transition between 1800 and 1870, the secondary school curriculum began to include new, "modern" subjects such as geography, English grammar, ancient history, algebra, geometry, physical geography, English composition, and United States history to prepare students for college admission requirements (Krug, 1960). A movement toward establishing history as a separate school study had begun.

From the following, although somewhat scattered, evidence, historians have concluded that at approximately the end of the 1830s, secondary schools began to teach history as an independent school subject. In 1814, the Boston Latin School used Valpy's *Chronology of Ancient and English History* as the textbook for the second year (Russell, 1914, p.311). In 1818, the English Department of Phillips Academy at Exter included history, with elements of ancient history appearing on the list of subjects for the second year and elements of modern history, particularly of the United States, on the list for the third year (Tryon, 1935, p.104). The English Classical High School, founded in Boston in 1821, provided *Ancient and Modern History and Chronology* in the second year and *History particularly that of the United States* in the third year (Russell, 1914, p.311). In 1827, Massachusetts passed a law requiring the teaching of United States history in the

high schools of towns of 500 or more families and the teaching of general history in the high schools in towns of 4000 or more inhabitants (Tryon, 1935, p. 105).

Between 1830 and 1870, there is not enough evidence to draw conclusions about general trends with respect to the teaching of history in the secondary school including high schools and academies. Some records of course offerings in a few states such as New York, Massachusetts, and Ohio infer that the few secondary schools that existed during this period tended to offer some subjects in history as independent subjects. For example, Central High School of Philadelphia was offering Roman, Greek, United States, and English history as well as the history of civilization in 1845. In 1857, ancient history and modern history were offered in the first year of the high school of Columbus, Ohio (Tryon, 1935, p.113).

However, before 1870, school history was generally regarded as an adjunct to classical languages, geography, or reading rather than a distinct subject of study. A foreigner, P.A. Siljestrom observed in 1853: "History does not hold the same rank among the studies in the schools, as does geography, for instance. In connection with the historical studies some instruction is given in the political laws of the country" (Tryon, 1935, p.115).[4] Even as late as in 1895, a school administrator stated that "Only a few years earlier history was scarcely worthy of a place in an American college course, let alone as a school subject. Between 1870 and 1885, courses of study in history were established" (Harlgey, 1895, p.333). Approximately from the 1870s, the rate of secondary and elementary school student's enrollment of history as a separate course began to rise.[5]

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[4] Siljestrom, P. A. 1853. *Educational Institutions of the United States*. London. John Chapman: 221. Cited from Tryon 1935: 115.

[5] According to Edgar Bruce Wesley (1937), during the period from 1870 to 1900, an increasingly large percentage of students studied history. In Ohio, for example, the percentage of history students rose

More universities introduced history as an entrance requirement. The rapid growth of history textbooks published since the 1870s evidenced the growing popularity of history (Russell, 1915). Judging from this evidence, it was about 1870-1890 that history began to be generally recognized as a separate subject of study.

ARYAN SUPREMACY OVER THE REST

Ideas of Scientific History

Until the 1870s, few systematic rules for historical research or criteria for historical interpretation were formulated in the United States. No profession of history, similar to those in theology and law, developed. The universities paid little attention to history. History was the avocation of gentlemanly scholars, journalists, and writers, working as individuals (Shafer, 1965). Although much history was written, the primary purposes of most American writers were to tell a tale in literary form and to point out moral lessons from the past. In the latter half of the 1870s, history became a profession. The craft of history scholarship in the United States began to formulate systematic rules for historical research and criteria for historical interpretation. Many German-trained, American historians returned to teach in American universities.[6] Visiting English and German historians gave lectures at Johns Hopkins, Cornell, and Chicago. From these

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from 1.97 percent in 1870 to 38.16 percent in 1900. During this period, the study of United States history and general history increased markedly throughout the North Central States, while the study of ancient history appeared to have remained fairly constant. By 1890, about 28 percent of all high school students in the United States were studying some history other than United States history. By 1900, this percentage had risen to about 38 percent (Wesley, 1937, p.63).

[6]Herbert Baxter Adams established his history seminar at Johns Hopkins in 1876. Almost at the same time, Henry Adams began to teach at Harvard and Charles Kendall Adams at Michigan.

sources, American historians acquired a new sense of scientific ideas for the study of history. According to Krieger (1965), in the United States, scientific history involved mainly two different historical approaches, usually-- in this period -- coincident but inherently separable. In one sense, scientific history refers to the development of distinctive critical methods, the main source of which was a German historian, Leopold von Ranke. His idea was to "let the fact tell the story." In the other sense, scientific history refers to the use of hypotheses drawn from the "natural sciences as fundamental laws of reality applicable to history" (Krieger, 1965, p.225). In particular, strong emphasis was placed on the Darwinian law of evolution. It had the most fundamental influence on establishing "the naturalistic and developmental perspective" in history (Ross, 1984; Saveth, 1960). It decisively substituted "natural selection" for "providence" in understanding the universe and in writing the history of the humankind.

The Darwinian theory put a new emphasis upon the concept of evolution, "the concept of cumulative, on-going change, operating through an endless chain of tangible causes and effects," as the very essence of historical wisdom in historical study in the last quarter of the nineteenth century in the United States (Higham, Krieger, and Gilbert, 1965, p.94). History became conceptualized in the biological evolutionalist's terms. Historians thought that all events and human experiences were tied to each other in the chain. The historian's task was to make each link intelligible by discovering "the genetic connections with what preceded and what followed" (Higham et al., 1965, p.94). Scientific historians traced the evolution of political institutions because they believed that institutional history exemplified the scientific mind of objectivity by providing an impersonal, external framework for historical events.

With the introduction of scientific history from German historical scholarship, graduate and undergraduate schools in universities began to train professional historians. The growth of the history profession, with the movement to introduce other modern disciplines in colleges and high schools in the nineteenth century, helped legitimate history as an independent, core subject in high schools. The idea of scientific history also brought critical changes to the conceptualization of the history of the human race. In educational practice before the penetration of scientific history, history writers used to be mostly interested in the great scenes, the historic "tableaux" of famous events and episodes. Their aim was more literary than historical. They evoked individuals with virtues and qualities and the rise and fall of empires not to exalt history but to recapture their experience and ultimately to illuminate a moral truth.[7] In other words, general history reflected the dominant view of history as a collection of moral instances that taught lessons through example.[8] The purpose of European history was to offer usable empirical values, which could provide Americans a moral and religious guide for American history rather than providing a historical and philosophical analysis of past events. Therefore, content was mostly episodic. General history textbooks before about 1875 seemed to lack any point of view other than the presentation of a great array of fragmentary, unrelated, and just chronologically arranged events. General history failed to provide interpretation or synthesis, and even where generalizations were given,

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[7]In this regard, Richard Hofstadter stated that history before the introduction of the idea of scientific history was "a forum for moral judgments" (1968, p.26). Historians generally agreed that the main purpose of history before approximately 1875 was the inculcation of moral and religious values" (Tryon, 1935, Butts, 1947).

[8]Commonly, the history textbook authors had cited, in their prefaces, the words of Dionysius of Halicarnassus: "history is philosophy teaching by examples." Goodrich (1856), Tytler (1823), Worcester (1835).

they had been not from a historical point of view but from a moral or religious point of view. There were no attempts to develop historical meanings from historical events or to make clear characteristics of historical periods or transformation.

The classicist's viewpoint and the theological viewpoint exerted influence on the writing and teaching of history. The theological viewpoint explained history with "Providential power" and "God's unchanging truth" as the central force. It presented the Christian schema of the turning points of sacred history – historical time was divided into the periods before and after the birth of Jesus.[9] The classicist viewpoint basically assumed that history was a man-made process. The classicists believed that the classics were essential components of western European culture in the nineteenth century; therefore, classics must be the central subjects of gentlemanly scholars and national leaders. In the United States, because history instruction evolved from classical studies, even after history became an independent school subject, classical studies largely influenced the selection of important topics and perspectives in history courses (American Historical Association, 1899). The classicist belief that the classical languages and literature were superior to the modern subjects gave ancient history special status among other subjects in history throughout the nineteenth century. Until immediately before World War I, as a rule, ancient history acquired a substantial portion of the general history and European history textbook.[10] Later development in medieval and modern

[9] For example, a universal history textbook writer, Willson (1860) adopted that ancient history was before the Christian era and modern history embraced all the time from the beginning of the Christian era (A.D.1) to the present. For him, the Middle Ages was the period between the overthrow of the Western Empire of the Romans (A.D. 476) to the discovery of America (A.D. 1492).

[10] The classicists' influence was manifested particularly in instruction of ancient history. The Committee of Seven (American Historical Association, 1899) and the Special Committee of the New England History Teachers' Association (1907) complained that the perspective and emphasis in ancient history had been determined by literary and linguistic factors rather than by historical considerations. The Committee of Five (American Historical Association, 1912) also fought the battle against the classicists.

history contributed to the persistence of the classicists' view that ancient history was richer in the desired kind of examples than even the history of their own country.[11]

General history written before 1870 universally identified the Creation in the Bible as the beginning of the history of mankind. It included a description about the people and events written in the Old and New Testaments. Ancient nations in the Near East were also accounted for in connection with Biblical history.[12] The classicist viewpoint emphasized, as the main focus of the ancient period, the history of Greece and Rome, the two predominant nations in the ancient period. This classicist view seemed to contribute to establishing "the cultural trajectory of Western civilization, which began solely in ancient Greece" (Bernal, 1995, p.4). The classicist view also determined the perspective and emphasis of topics. Regardless of whether writers of general history took their adopted the Christian schema or the classical schema for purpose of periodization, the characteristics of the medieval period were always marked as a contrast to the civilization of the Greeks and Romans and to the enlightenment of modern times. J. E. Worcester, in his universal history textbook, stated: "During this period Europe was sunk

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They urged that both classical and non-classical students needed to study ancient history as an independent subject, not because it supported their classical work but because it gave them a wider and deeper knowledge of the life, thought, and character of the ancient world. The influence of classical literature on history was evident in the history syllabus designed by the Special Committee of the New England History Teachers' Association, one, widely used syllabus. The committee stated: Ancient history "should have for a main object to familiarize them [students] with the persons and events they are to meet in their reading of the Greek and Roman authors. They should be taught to understand the mythology, the religion and the manners and customs of the people, rather than learn the names of consuls, the detail of conflicts, or the minutiae of administration" (Special Committee of the New England History Teachers' Association, 1907, p.18). The Classicists had a critical impact upon school history, which gave ancient history the central place of history instruction until about the early twentieth century.

[11] In the last quarter of the nineteenth century as the American history profession developed, historians became interested in European medieval history. In the beginning of the twentieth century, James Harvey Robinson, leading American historian, began to write European modern history in American terms (Higham et al., 1965, p.38). The development of studies on medieval and modern history was gradually reflected in school history.

[12] Even in the late nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, there remained a few ancient history textbooks that designated the Creation in the Bible as the beginning of History. For

in ignorance and barbarism" (Worcester, 1835, p.4).[13] The Middle Ages was represented as dreary centuries of ignorance, corruption, superstition, and barbarism or violence. According to Worchester's universal history textbook, in the Middle Ages, learning and literature had declined; the state of morals, both among the clergy and laymen had been exceedingly low; Christianity had lost almost all its original excellence and was corrupted into a degrading superstition; the political state of Europe was also characterized by anarchy, violence, and rapine (Worcester, 1835, p.4). This assumption about the Middle Ages frequently led to its omission or abridgment in schools (Sullivan, 1903, p.485). The influence of the classicists' view also was clear on defining characteristics of modern times. The recovery of pre-Christian classical culture in the fifteenth century, together with technological innovations –gunpowder, the compass, and the printing press- marked the beginning of modern times (Worcester, 1835; Anderson, 1869).[14] Modern times were defined in a sense that they were not medieval. Modern Europe emerged from the feudal and clerical, barbaric, and religious.

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, a new generation of general history textbook writers arose. They began to incorporate ideas of scientific history into their

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example, in the general history textbook of John Quackenbos (1878), the Biblical account of the Creation and Deluge was mixed with the racial themes without inconsistency.

[13]Marcius Willson, general history textbook writer, also stated: "The history of Europe during several centuries after the overthrow of the Western Roman empire offers little real instruction to repay the labor of wading through the intricate and bloody annals of a barbarous age. The fall of the Roman empire had carried away with it ancient civilization; and during many generations, the element of society which had been disrupted by the surges of barbarian power, continued to be widely agitated, like the waves of the ocean, long after the fury of the storm has passed" (Wilson, 1860, p.237).

[14]J. E. Worcester (1835), the writer of a universal history textbook, divided ancient history from the creation to the establishment of the new empire of the West under Charlemagne, A. D. 800. To him, the rest of the time from that period was modern history. In between ancient and modern times, according to Worcester, there were the Middle Ages, which embraced the time intervening between the extinction of ancient literature (the fifth century) and the appearance of modern literature (the fifteenth century). Anderson (1869) divided history into three periods. Ancient history was considered to end 476 A. D., with the destruction of the western division of Roman Empire. Medieval history extended from 476 A. D. to about the time of the fall of the eastern division of the Roman Empire.

writings. They had not been professionally trained in the study of history. However, it seems that from one source or another most of them were blessed by ideas of scientific history when they began to write their textbooks. Myers obtained his B.A. and A.M degrees during the 1870s when the surge of scientific history raised a great wave in history scholarship.[15] His dependence on foreign so-called scientific historians such as Leopold von Ranke and Edward Freeman for guidance in writing his textbooks also testifies to his adoption of scientific history. Fisher, unusual for students at that time, studied in Germany, the homeland of Rankenian scientific history, for two years 1852-54.[16] After 1861 he served as a professor in ecclesiastical history in the Divinity School at Yale University. During his service at Yale University, he wrote his general history textbooks (1885/ 1898). Quackenbos had been in charge of the department of Modern History at Columbia College for several years before he wrote his general textbook (1878).[17] Swinton (1876)[18] and Fisher (1885), in their prefaces, noted their debts for the review and the "annotation" of American scientific historians such as Charles Kendall

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[15] Myers received the B. A. (1871) and A. M. (1874) degrees from Williams College in Williamstown, Massachusetts. He studied law at the Yale University Law School (1873-74) and received the L.L.B. degree (1890). He was appointed to the University of Cincinnati in 1890 as a lecturer in history and political economy and instructor in rhetoric and served as dean of the academic faculty (1895-97) (Ohles, 1978, pp.938-9).

[16] Fisher, after his graduation from Brown University in 1847, studied at Yale Divinity School. After 1861, he taught ecclesiastical history in the Divinity School for forty years (Kunitz and Haycraft 1938, pp.173-4).

[17] Quackenbos graduated with the A.D. 1868 and A. M. 1871 degrees from Columbia College (Ohles, 1978, p.1067). In the preface of his general history textbook (1878, p.3) Quackenbos noted his purpose as follows: "Directed to the subject by his studies while in charge of the department of Modern History at Columbia College for several years past, he has aimed to produce such a work in the volume now presented to the public."

[18] Swinton's family emigrated from Scotland to Canada in 1843. He attended Knox College in Toronto, Ontario, a Presbyterian preparatory school that later became one of the colleges of the University of Toronto. He entered Amherst (Massachusetts) college but completed only part of the freshman year. In 1852, Swinton became professor of languages at Edgeworth Female Seminary in Greensboro, North Carolina. He taught at the Mount Washington Collegiate Institute in New York City (1855-58) while studying for the Presbyterian ministry (Ohles, 1978, p.1203).

Adams, who wrote a manual of historical study in the manner of scientific history and Herbert Baxter Adams, who was a German-trained scientific historian.

General history writers tried to make it clear that their history dealt with no "pedantries of history" but rather with "the broad, vital facts," which they believed to be essential characteristics of the "modern method" (Swinton, 1876, p.v). They were focused on the evolution of political institutions, which was regarded as a more scientific subject than "personalities," which had been the main focus of their predecessors.

Before the introduction of Darwinian scientific history into historical study, the doctrine of historical unity and continuity mattered little in the United States. History educators had given little attention to teaching the history of humankind as a continuous development (Robinson, 1898). Now, history educators began to emphasize that the history of the human race had unity. William Swinton, one of the most popular general history textbook writers stated in his textbook:

> Unity of history: In the largest sense, history is a unit: its epochs form but acts in one grand Providential drama; one thread of progress binds nation to nation; and, looking at humanity as a whole, we see that (Swinton, 1876, p.6).

General history writers in the last quarter of the nineteenth century visualized the history of humankind as an "unbroken evolution" from ancient Greece and Rome, through medieval and modern Europe, and at last to the United States (Fisher, 1885, p.9). The doctrine of unity and continuity also emphasized the study of the Middle Ages, which had been neglected for a long time, in the vital connection with the preceding ages and the following ages. History educators criticized the existing practice of history

instruction, which led students to perceive history as the collection of sporadic incidents. They complained that because a large number of the secondary schools taught only Greek and Roman history, offering no other branch of history, students were likely to conclude that history ended and then began again; the histories of different countries were disconnected (National Education Association, 1893, p.171). History educators argued that history was not a collection of national histories, but "a story of the human race." They argued that the story of the human race was one subject; therefore, the high school history course should be arranged so as to make the study a continually developing and enlarging one (American Historical Association, 1899, p.30). General history textbook writers in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, with the method and conceptions of scientific history, began to write the story of the human race as a unified whole. The history of civilization, one thread of human history, was visualized as essentially identical to the story of the Aryan (Indo-European) race with the emphasis on the "unity" of history that was transmitted from the Greeks and the Romans to the Teutons in western Europe.

Race as the Organizational Theme

The White as the Race of Progress and Civilization

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, the writers of general history and European history textbooks began to use such terms as "progress," "civilized," "savage," and "barbarians" to define elements of history. They stated that history was chiefly concerned with the progress of civilization (Colby, 1899,

p.17; Botsford, 1914, p.2). The term, "civilization," in most case, referred to the achievements of the White race. Swinton, in his textbook, *World History*, defined history as "the series of leading civilized nations," and argued: "it has to do with but one grand division of the human family, namely, with the Caucasian, or white race" (Swinton, 1876, p.2). Hutton Webster, in his textbook, *World History*, also declared that history is "a narrative of what *civilized* men have thought or done in past times" (1921, p.1). Webster declared: "Civilization has been developed and history has been made chiefly by the White Race" (1921, p.21). The writers associated the word civilization with the idea of a government strong enough to protect the lives and property of the citizens, a well-ordered society, high level of morality, and some advancement in the arts and sciences (Benjamin, 1894, p.4; Bostford, 1914, p. 2). In the view of general history and European history writers between 1875 and 1934, only the "White race" achieved the highest level of an organized society with strong government, great wealth, refined culture and extensive morality. The writers argued that only the "White race" had the brain to establish civilization. William F. Allen and Phillip V. N. Myers, in their textbook, *General History for Colleges and High Schools*, described the characteristics of the "White race":

> Of all the races, the White or Caucasian, exhibits by far the most perfect type, physically, intellectually, and morally... Possessing richer mental and spiritual endowments than the other races; and animated, in most of its branches, with a wonderful energy, the migrations and conquests of its different peoples, and the achievements of its various families in the fields of science, art, literature, philosophy, and religion, fill most of the pages of the historian, and render instructive the story he has to tell (Allen and Myers, 1889, p.4).

General history writers claimed that because the "White race" had the perfect physical, intellectual and mental capacity, it could establish civilization and make progress.[19] In their view, the superiority of the White race was proven by the fact that historically great empires and states as well as modern European nations, which dominated the rest of the races, commonly belonged to the "White race" (Swinton, 1876, p.2).

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as Europeans explored New Worlds, they launched racial studies to study human types. The racial studies systematically categorized and explained the human types in association with their physical and cultural differences. A result was the idea of a racial hierarchy with the White race on the top, followed by the "Yellow race" and the "Black race" at the bottom. Throughout the nineteenth century, Americans accepted the prevalent racial idea that the human race was divided into "separate unalterable races defined by inherent physical, intellectual and spiritual qualities" (Elson, 1964, p.66). They widely assumed that nature had conferred specific characteristics on each member of a racial group throughout historical time (Elson, 1964, p.65). By the 1840s, apart from a tiny minority who had believed in complete racial equality, Americans took the superiority of the "White race" for granted (Iriye, 1993, p.9). The idea of racial distinction became an important factor in deciding social and political issues during the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries as seen in such cases as Indian warfare on the frontier, the pro-slavery arguments of Southern politicians and publicists, and the advocates of White man's civilizing mission in non-White continents. The White race was, almost always, viewed as the normal, the most

[19]While in his textbooks published after 1900 Myers dropped this racist remark about the superior physical, intellectual, and mental characteristics of the White race, it did not bring any changes in the content of his general history and European history textbooks.

advanced.[20] This idea of race was reflected in American school textbooks in stories, descriptions, even arithmetic problems in the latter half of the nineteenth century (Elson, 1964, p.66).

With few exceptions, general history and European history textbooks written in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century typically addressed the dogma of "the White race superiority." Where offered, the phenomenological description of races was, in evaluative terms, mingled with moral judgment. Writers of general history and European history perceived that "the Black or Negro race" had "the lowest intelligence among the three groups of the human race" and stayed in the stage of just "savage," contributing "practically nothing to the progress of the world" (Botsford, 1914, p.4). The writers wrote that "the Yellow or Mongolian race," represented by the Chinese, had once reached a certain stage of a civilization quite advanced on various lines, but they had never made any progress beyond that stage. On this ground, Elson, in his textbook, pronounced the civilization of the "Yellow race" as "half-civilized"(1921, p.13). The writers argued that China exerted no power in shaping the general course of history. Therefore, only the Caucasian, they argued, was the race of civilization. In their view, the others had done little worth recording" (Steel and Steel, 1883, p.10).[21] With this logic, they excluded the "Yellow race" and the "Black race" from the domain of civilization.

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[20]Arnold Guyot and Marry Howe Smith, writers of a geography textbook, had their own original theory to explain this racial hierarchy. In a section entitled "The White Race the Normal or Typical Race," they developed the idea that the typical man was to be seen "in the unrivalled works of the ancient sculptors" (1866, p.118). They conjured up that the degree of degeneration from the typical race was directly dependent on geographical distance from the original habitat of the normal race. The degree of perfection of the type is therefore proportioned, not to intensity of material agencies but to distance from the central or highest race irrespective of climatic conditions; the degree of culture of the races also varies in the same order. They argued that the central race is the race of culture and progress, both now and in all ages past.

[21]In Fisher's word, "It is the Caucasian variety which had been chiefly distinguished in history, and active in the building-up of civilization" (1885, p.9).

General history writers, therefore, were not obliged to give space to any history of the "Black race" or the "Yellow race." Basically nothing was mentioned about historical achievements of the "Black race." Although some textbooks treated Chinese civilization, it was barely a short summary of the early history of China, which had risen and grown in isolation and had stopped its development a long time ago.[22]

Progress was pictured as uneven. Different societies and races were advancing at different speeds and stayed in different stages of development. The White race established the highest level of civilization with unprecedented speed of progress. The Yellow race stayed "half-civilized," and the Black race was never civilized. Civilization was the term to distinguish the cultural, political, economic, and intellectual development made by the White race from those of the non-White races. General history writers felt no need to study the quality and creative ability of other peoples because they presumed that the natural law confined the best quality and ability to the White race in order to establish civilization. The European-White domination of the world made it look like a proven fact that the White race was the only race of civilization and progress. Therefore, they gave little attention to the world contribution and the progress made by the non-White races.

The Aryans as the Agent of Civilization

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Europe, comparative philology and ethnology generally grouped the European White race into three sub-races: "Hamites," "Semites," and "Aryans." These three races were again divided into sub-groups of peoples. American general history textbooks writers in the last quarter of the nineteenth

[22]A few general history and European history textbook writers in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and in the early twentieth century presented a condensed summary of ancient Chinese history.

century and early twentieth century employed this White racial categorization to describe different developments made by different races in the White stock.

Figure 2-1: Typology of the White Race in Myers' Textbook, 1906[23]



According to the writers, the history of the civilized world was the history of the "Aryans," the "Semites," and the "Hamites," the three main branches of the "Caucasian" race. The "Semites" generally included the peoples in the Middle East (Near East) – the "Babylonians," the "Assyrians," the "Phoenicians," the "Hebrews," the "Aramaeans," and the "Arabians" They were generally credited for their contribution in religious development: the three religious traditions of the Jewish, the

[23]Other deviations of racial categorizations are also found. For example, according to Steel and Steel (1883), the "Aryan race" included "Parisians"; "Hindoos," "Greco-Italian" (to which French, Italian, Spaniards, and Portuguese belonged); "Celts" (to which Welsh, Irish, Highland Scots, and Britons belonged); "Teutons" (to which Germans, Dutch, English, Swedes, Danes, and Norwegians belonged); and "Slavs" (to which Russian, Poles, and Bohemians belonged). The "Semitic race" included "Assyrians,"

Christian and the Moslem people. The "Semites," however, were thought to have no enduring influence on world civilization. The "Hamites" generally referred to the "Egyptians" and "Libyans (modern Berbers)" who have inhabited in north Africa. In the conception of general history writers, the achievements of "Hamites" were not prominent enough to be given specific attention. Swinton described:

> The Hamitic nations, the Egyptians and Chaldaeans though they developed a peculiar type of civilization, yet grew up and remained in a great degree apart from the rest of the world, having no considerable influence on the main current of history. ...Aside from this [religious development], the Semites do not make nearly so important or so conspicuous a figure in history as do the Aryans, or Indo-Europeans (Swinton, 1876, p.4).

The writers argued that contributions of Hamites and the Semites, like those of the Chinese, were much smaller than those of the Aryans. Colby declared: "As a rule, the non-Aryan races have never been progressive" (1899, p.12). The writers argued that the Hamites and the Semites remained at the point where their early civilizations flourished, and they were just barely above barbarian stages. This was because they were, in their disposition, "conservative" and "unprogressive" (Swinton, 1876, p.4). Based on the same logic of racial characteristics that ruled out the Yellow and the Black races, the writers declared that the "Semites" and the "Hamites" were doomed to failure. They pictured the Aryan race as the sole race that was responsible for the establishment of civilization.

In constructing general history, the writers adopted the nineteenth century dominant German philologists' view of "the Aryan westward dispersion from primitive

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"Hebrews," and "Phoenicians" and the "Hamitic race" included "Chaldeans" and "Egyptians." Webster (1913) divided the White race into the two main groups: the "Indo-Europeans" and the "Semites."

Asia."[24] The writers identified the origin of the Aryan race in the prehistoric period of the undivided Aryans in Asia. They imagined that the condition in the "Aryan" primitive age was "far above mere savages" with the basic development in government, social life, religion, and with the simple mechanical arts (Swinton, 1876, p.4). The writers pictured the history of humankind after the ages of the "Semites" as only Aryan expansion. Tracing back from the present nations of world power, they found common traits among the past great nations. The entire civilization of the Greeks, Romans, followed by Western European peoples such as English, French, German, Scandinavians, and Americans, were the offspring of a single race: the primal Aryans—the "Teutonic race" or the "Nordic race" (Colby, 1899, p.17). The writers concluded that only the Aryan race built those nations that have shown ability to advance in culture, playing the leading part in the great drama of human progress. Therefore, they believed that the Aryan race was peculiarly "the race of progress" (Swinton, 1876, p.4). They declared that "the great stream of historical progress" was to be seen only in the history of the Aryan race (Fisher, 1898, p.12). The Aryan race's peculiar capacity for progress was the source of bearing and advancing civilization (Allen and Myers, 1889, p.6). The writers believed that the Aryan race perfected society with high morals, refined literature and art, and well-built social and political systems. They claimed that the world was now practically subject to the Aryan race's power. With the blessing of the Aryan's high culture, the world civilization would reach its highest level of improvement. The history of humankind was

[24]According to Stocking, nineteenth-century German philologists developed the hypothesis of an origination of European languages from an Aryan homeland. On the basis of linguistic and other similarities, the philologists traced the affinities of all the various "races" of man, and if possible, to reduce their present diversity to a primitive unity analogous to that of the Indo-European family. They claimed that the Aryans were the primitive ancestors of modern European civilized populations (Stocking, 1987, pp.24-5).

the history of civilization, in which the Aryan race played the main role in making progress. The histories of non-Aryan races deserved little attention. The history of the world was confined only to the story of the Aryan race.

The Europeans as the Possessor of Liberty

Swinton pointed out that the non-Aryans [the Hamites and the Semites] "have not, like the Aryans, been the planters of new nations; and they have never attained a high intellectual development, or that progress in political freedom, in science, art, and literature, which is the glory of the Aryan nations"(1876, p.4). The writers of general history textbooks stressed that political freedom and modern science and art were only the products of the Aryan race, while non-Aryan races everywhere attained no "freedom" or improvement in science, art and literature. Freedom and modern science became the fundamental standards to measure the progress of races and nations.

From about the late 1890s, in general history, European history, and world history textbooks, the "lack of freedom and improvement of science, art and literature" of the non-Aryans became stereotyped as "Oriental" or "Asiatic." In the 1890s, the writers of general history called nations of the Hamites and Semites, along with ancient India and China as "Asiatic civilization" (Fisher, 1898)," or "Oriental civilization" (West, 1903; Botsford, 1914). Meanwhile, they employed the term "European civilization" to label the civilization established by ancient Greeks and Romans and handed down to the Teutons. From the late nineteenth century, "European civilization" versus "Oriental (Asiatic) civilization" became the conceptual framework to describe civilization and progress in general history, European history and world history textbooks.

General history textbooks described the early development of nations in the Hamites, the Semites and early China and India. At the end of the description, they invariably generalized the universal characteristics of those peoples under the name of "Oriental" or "Asiatic" Civilization.[25] They pointed out its "contributions" and "defects" and predicted its possibility for future development in evaluative terms. For example, in the general history textbook of Steel and Steel (1883), history began with ancient Egypt, Babylonia, Assyria, Phoenicia, Judea, Media, Persia, India, and China, in the chapter called "Ancient Peoples." At the end of the chapter, they named those nations as "Eastern civilization" in contrast with "Western" civilization of Greece and Rome. They characterized the Eastern civilization as "despotism, caste, and polygamy, absolute monarchism and passive masses." Meanwhile, they celebrated the progress of civilization "transmitted by Greek to the Roman, to the Teuton" by stating that it was "much of the life we live today, with its political, social, and intellectual advantages; its music, painting, oratory, and sculpture; its thirst for knowledge, and its free institution were kindled on the shores of the Aegean sea" (Steel and Steel, 1883, p.113).

General and European history textbook writers credited "Oriental" nations for their contribution to the development of the first civilization and providing Europe with the foundational knowledge and skills to build higher civilization. The writers presented no argument about the fact that Greek civilization absorbed many elements from "the

[25]Steel and Steel (1883) contrasted Eastern and Western Civilization. Fisher in his textbook, *A Brief History of the Nations and of their Progress in Civilization,* used the term, "Oriental Nations" to distinguish China and India from other nations and he separately grouped nations in the Near East such as Egypt, Assyria, Babylonia, the Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Hebrews, and Persians by calling them Asiatic Civilization. In his ancient history textbook, Botsford (1914) also confined Oriental civilization as Egypt and Southwestern Asia and excluded China and India. Willis M. West started off his history with Egypt, the Tigris-Euphrates states, Phoenicians, Hebrews, and Persian Empire and called them "Oriental Civilization." In his textbooks published between the 1875 and the 1930, he offered almost the same general characteristics of Oriental civilization.

Orient" such as Assyrian art, Egyptian science, and the Phoenician alphabet. However, they conceived that Greece, followed by Rome, developed later "an independent and more important culture" and always kept a unique character of its own (West 1904, p.74). The writers summarized the contributions of Oriental civilization as follows: Oriental civilization invented excellent tools of bronze (and later of iron) and practiced many arts and crafts with a skill of hand. It built roads and canals. It built the earliest seagoing ships equipped with sails to carry on trade. It first produced government on a large scale. It learned how to record people's thoughts and doings and inventions in writing. Its thinkers found in their own consciences some of the highest moral truths, and taught the duty of truthfulness, justices, and mercy (Fisher 1898, p.58; Botsford, 1914, p.57; West, 1913, p.92).

"Benefits," however, were "for a few only," concluded West (1913, p.92). The defects of Asiatic or Oriental civilization, they argued, were so enormous as to keep them from more progress. In Fisher's remarks:

> Knowledge was shut up to limited lines of progress. War was full of barbarities. The fine arts were in a rudimental state, as is seen in architecture, where magnitude is more sought than elegance, and buildings are rather monuments of labor than of genius. Literature, except among the Hebrews, is monotonous, and with the same exception, religion is void of an elevating and purifying influence, but is more apt to foster leaving no freedom for individual energy and development. It was on the soil of Europe and among the Greeks that the true idea of liberty and a type of manhood much nearer to the ideal, were to spring up (Fisher, 1898, p.58).

The writers measured defects of "Oriental Civilization" employing the political and cultural progress made in European civilization (Aryan race's civilization) as standards. To them, nations in the Orient had not achieved cultural, intellectual, and political

improvement at a level of the modern state of western Europe. In particular, they never came up with the idea of "freedom." This was marked as the most critical defect of Oriental Civilization. The writers claimed that Oriental civilization was "stationary" or "retrograde" (Colby, 1899, pp.17-18).

The writers saw no diversity of cultural traditions in nations of the Orient. They took it for granted that civilizations in the Orient were virtually the same. If differences existed at all, the writers claimed, they were too little and minor to be compared with the diversities of European nations. The general characteristics of Oriental civilization were "uniformity," "extravagance," "despotism," and "submissive thought"; while the contending marks of European civilization were "diversity," "moderation," "freedom," and "originality" (West, 1903, p.75).

The writers dismissed a possibility for future development of Oriental civilization. The reason was simple: Oriental Civilization progressed little in such a long time since the appearance of this civilization and this made it improbable to anticipate further progress of Oriental civilization in the future (West, 1903, p.71). Its inherent "stationary" nature meant that it needed new actors in order for the civilization to be "crystallized" and the new actors were the "Greeks," "Romans" and the "Teutons" (West, 1913, pp.93-94). Only European civilization was moving toward progress. The logic that Oriental civilization was to be overtaken by European races arose. The only center of the world history was Europe.

The Hegelian notion of world history perpetuated the conception of the writers. In the early nineteenth century, the German philosopher, Hegel, established a discernable goal for humanity, that is, liberty, and defined world history as "the progress of the

consciousness of freedom." He postulated that history began in "the Orient," but "Orientals" have not attained to "the consciousness of freedom." In his view, only Europeans came up with the idea that men were free. In particular, he asserted that the Teutonic race in the Middle Ages was the first to reach the consciousness of freedom. Hegel (1956) defined world history as a history with Europe as the center, excluding non-European cultures and races: Africans, Asians, Arabs, Jews and Native Americans. Hegel referred to Native Americans and Africans as "ahistorical peoples," and therefore they were not worthy of being considered "members of history" (Boubia, 1997, p.417). He declared that India's and Chinas' "stationary" cultures were destined to be overcome by "Aryan race's progressive westward movement" (Federici, 1995, p.67). Hegel presented the history of Europe within a larger, single, self-contained historical evolution and registered in European mind as the history of the world.

In general history textbooks, the Hegelian liberal vision of world progress, which divided world history into two processes, European civilization and Oriental (Asiatic) civilization, and designated European civilization as the only progressive civilization, became a conceptual framework to narrate world history. Almost every world history textbook writer in the following several decades from the 1890s, including Hutton Webster, James Harvey Robinson, Henry Elson, Carlton Hayes, and Tomas Moon, regardless of whether or not they took race as the main organizational theme, adopted the dichotomy of European civilization and Oriental civilization as a conceptual framework for their world history narrative. The European invention of liberty, in their textbooks, gave the fundamental legitimacy to European civilization as the core of world history.

James Harvey Robinson strongly rejected the adoption of racial assumptions in writing history while Hutton Webster, Henry Elson, Carlton Hayes, and Tomas Moon, in their European history and world history textbooks, linked race with progress. Their books including those of Robinson, however, commonly invoked almost the same themes as their predecessors regarding Oriental contributions and defects. They made great effort to elaborate the "great" achievements of the ancient Orient, still they conceived that the history of Near East and Far East had once flourished but fulfilled its development in ancient time. Webster summed up:

> In every field of human activity it [the Oriental period] was an age of beginnings. In government and law, in religion and literature, in art and science, men had made much advance since they had emerged from the darkness of prehistoric times. At the end of the period which for us closes strictly Oriental history, progress had apparently ceased. The Orient, indeed, had done its work (Webster, 1913, p.11).

European history and world history writers in the early twentieth century, even in the 1930s, believed that the most critical defect of the Orient was "lack of freedom," as did their general history predecessors. The writers proclaimed that the Orient neither attained the knowledge that man as such was free, nor consciousness of freedom. Robinson, in the textbook that he wrote in collaboration with James Henry Breasted, stated: " Liberty as we understand it was unknown, and the rule of the people, which we call 'democracy,' was never dreamed of in the Orient" (Robinson and Breasted, 1921, p.46). The Orient was characterized as politically "despotic" and culturally "superstitious," while Europe was pictured as democratic and rationalistic. In Webster's words:

> Nothing like democracy existed in Babylonia or Egypt, or elsewhere in the Near East. The common people never acted as voters or law-makers; they knew only the rule of monarchs, such as an Egyptian Pharaoh and the "Great King," emperor of Persia. Again, social equality did not exist in the Near East. Wide barriers separated the lower classes from the classes above them.... Finally popular education was non-existent in the Near East....They were slow to abandon time-honored superstitions and reluctant to adopt new customs even when clearly better than the old. Consequently, civilization in this part of the world tended to become stereotyped and unchanging. It reached a certain level, but could not pass above that level. The next steps in human progress were to be taken in Europe (Webster, 1930, p.23).

The contrast between "Oriental (Asiatic) civilization" and "European civilization" served to magnify the superiority of European civilization, which escaped from the ancient despotic, superstitious, crude cultural tradition and established a progressive, free, rational, and refined civilization. Freedom, with modern science and art, became the direct reference to address the peculiarity and superiority of European civilization and the "backwardness" of other peoples compared to the European Aryan race. The assumption of political superiority of European civilization to the rest penetrated into world history conceptualization based on its "lack of freedom."

From the Greeks, through the Romans, to the Teutons

The general history textbook writers commonly stated that the expansion of civilized life began in the early Nile and Euphrates river valleys, went over Western Asia, then around the Mediterranean coasts, and finally reached western Europe. The writers acknowledged that the history of humankind began in nations in the East such as Egypt and Mesopotamia. However, they argued that only fragments of their histories were to be

treated by way of introduction to Greek history because they were only "seeds for a new and better growth" of the coming civilization of Greece (Steel and Steel, 1883, p.113). The writers described Oriental civilizations as "a sort of dim anteroom" through which European people passed to European history (West, 1913, p.8).

The writers viewed that the main stream of human history was European civilization, which was the product of the three pre-eminent Aryan races– the Greeks, the Romans and the Teutons.[26] Naturally, in the history of civilization, the central course of progress was visualized to follow these three centers connecting them together in one unbroken line of development. The writers argued that a very large part of the history of the world must be devoted to an account of the contributions that the Aryan nations have made to the common stock of civilization (Swinton, 1876, p.4; Elson, 1921, p.4). In fact, most general history, European history, and world history textbooks between 1875 and 1934 did devote about 90 percent of their pages to narrating the history of the ancient Greeks and Romans and the Teutons (Western Europe in Medieval and modern times). They depicted Ancient civilization as rising and flourishing within the Mediterranean peninsula with the Greeks and Romans as the principal actors for a thousand and six or seven hundred years. The Roman Empire was "the final outcome of ancient history" and its breaking-up resulted in the transfer of the historical setting to western Europe with the

[26]West argued that "When we look for the early peoples who have shaped this European life, we see three-Greeks, Romans, and Teutons- towering above all other" (1902, p.3) Regarding why the three races were the exclusive focus was explained earlier in this chapter. To illustrate again, based on the following two points, West excluded non-Europeans from the picture of world history: first of all, the ancient development in the East, with that of China and India, remained a great degree apart from the rest of the world, having no considerable influences on the main current of history and second, the civilization rose in the Mediterranean and handed down to western Europe, having distinct cultural traits, led human progress and therefore more than any other nations' histories, European civilization was substantial to understand the great civilization of the world (West, 1902, p.3).

emergence of a new race, especially the Teutonic race in the fourth century.[27] This was when the Middle Ages began.

From the Middle Ages until the present, the Teutons undertook "the scepter of world power," playing the main role in human progress (Fisher, 1898, p.199). General history and European history textbook writers argued that in the Middle Ages, a new type of culture and civilization developed. "Latin" was employed as a new universal language. A "new serf organization of labor" came into practice. "Feudalism" arose. Moreover, "Christendom" arose as "a single homogeneous society of peoples" (Fisher, 1885, p.198; West, 1903, pp.52-3). The writers conceived that the new civilization in the Middle Age was a result of the blending of three central elements.[28] Those three elements were "the *classical (Greco-Roman)*," "the *Hebrew (Christianity)*," and "the *Teutonic (Barbaric)*" The fusion of these elements in the Middle Ages, the writers conceived, ultimately resulted in the creation of modern civilization. The Romans transmitted the first two elements –Greco-Roman and Hebrew elements--to the Teutons. By the combination of these elements, the Teutons developed new ideas, institutions and cultures and established European civilization as one unified, historical entity. Some of the modern traits were directly traced to these three elements and some others were driven as results of the mixture of these elements. These three elements are described below.

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[27]Since the recommendation of The Committee of Seven (1899), which suggested closing ancient history at the time of Charlemagne about 800 A.C., the writers revised their history textbooks to modify their divisions of the historical periods. West and Webster followed the guidance of the Committee of Seven and followed its historical periodization. However, this change brought no substantial modification to content. Myers, in his revised editions, ignoring the recommendation of the Committee of Seven, continued to mark the end of ancient history with the fall of the Roman Empire.

[28]The description of three elements depends on Swinton (1876, pp.214-15), Fisher (1885, p.198) Colby (1899, p.204) Myers, (1902, p.3) and West (1904, p.527). Swinton left out the Hebrew element and pointed out just two elements in history of the European people: the Teutonic and the Latin and Celtic element. However, as other writers did, he interpreted that modern society was the result of the blending of

The "Classical" or "Greco-Roman" element meant the civilization of the Greeks and the Romans, representing the whole body of arts, sciences, philosophies, literatures, laws, manners, customs, ideas, social arrangements, and models of imperial and municipal government (Myers, 1905, p.4). The root of intellectual and artistic development in modern civilization was sought in the Greek civilization. Myers stated:

> Especially it was the literary treasures of Greek antiquity, for which, towards the close of the medieval period, the scholars of the West conceived a great admiration that helped vastly to create the intellectual movement of the Renaissance, the herald of the Modern Age (Myers, 1902, p.7).

Modern ideas of law, centralized administration, and idea of empire (or imperial idea) were directly ascribed to the heritage of the Roman civilization (Myers, 1905, p.5). The Roman law was referred to as "the groundwork of all legislation and jurisprudence" and its influence was detected in "statesman and jurist" (Myers, 1902, p.6). The "empire of Charles the Great" and the "Holy Roman Empire" of the later German princes were regarded as simply a "revival of the old Roman empire" (Myers, 1902, p.6). The "Latin language" became a universal medium of learning and communication for centuries. This classical element, largely bridged by the "empire of Constantinople," was handed over to "the new western race," which was henceforth to represent civilization (Myers, 1905, p.4). Rome gave Christianity to western European nations. The Christian Church not only educated the new nations, but also regulated and guided them in secular as well as religious affairs. It also provided European civilization with a cultural unity. The writers

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the two and it derived ingredients from both – "from the barbarians the love of personal liberty and the sense of independence, from the Romans the forms of a long-established civilization."

ascribed to Christianity the western European social, cultural and political life and institutions.

The "Teutonic" element indicated the Teutonic race's capacity for civilization. The emphasis was on its racial capability and heritage. Myers stated:

> The Teutons fortunately belonged to a progressive and civilizable race. They came of good stock. They had back of them the push of a strong and noble ancestry. In the process of time their open and a susceptible nature appropriated whatever was good – and unfortunately much that was not good – in the civilization they had overthrown. It was this quality in the Teutonic conquerors, this boundless capacity for growth, for culture, for civilization, which saved the countries of the West from the sterility and barbarism reserved for those of the East that were destined to be overrun and taken possession of by the Turanian hordes (Myers, 1902, p.9).

Although Teutons did not have a great cultural heritage compared to the Greeks or the Romans and were "barbaric" with a "crude" culture, the writers argued that they possessed a much better quality of character than the Greeks or the Romans. Theirs was a "virtuous and robust manhood" (Myers, 1895, p.8; 1905, p.4). George Burton Adams, medieval history specialist, asserted that the Teutons contributed to world progress by not only bringing with them "a decided racial characteristic" – "a very high idea of personal independence, of the value and importance of the individual man as compared with the state" – but also they contributed their blood – "a young, vigorous, and healthy race" – to the population of every European state (1895, pp.89-92). The writers argued that medieval history opened with the introduction of this new and youthful race upon the stage.

The Teutonic character was, the writers presumed, an essential source that prevented European civilization from falling into despotism similar to that in Oriental

civilization. According to the writers, the Teutonic escape from despotism was first manifested in the establishment of a peculiar form of government known as feudalism in the Middle Ages. A new set of ideas, "liberty" and "personal independence," with the influence of Roman customs and forms, led the Teutons to set up feudalism in all the countries of which they took possession (Myers, 1895, pp.8-10). The feudal system fostered in its members "self-reliance" and "love of personal independence" and, as a result, royalty was prevented from becoming despotic. According to the writers, the Teutonic character, together with its primitive governing system, led to the development of modern, democratic, representative institutions and Protestantism. Myers stated:

> [F]rom the general assemblies of the free Teutonic warriors beneath the forests of Germany may probably be traced the origin of the parliaments of modern Europe. Furthermore, in these characteristics of the Teutonic spirit, in this sentiment of individualism, laid hidden the germ of Protestantism, one main doctrine of which was the right of individual judgment in matters of religion and morals (Myers, 1902, p.10).

It is not an overstatement that almost every history educator, at least in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, claimed that the Teutonic racial character was mainly responsible for the comprehensive evolution of free, democratic, representative government in the modern times.[29] The birth of the modern representative institution and the modern idea of freedom were ascribed to the political genius of Teutons, to their inherent love of liberty and self-government, and to the internal constitution of their minds. General

[29]Most history educators like George Burton Adams explicitly stated that the Germans brought in the elements out of which the intervening centuries have developed modern free constitutional governments (1914, p.93). In a more indirect way than Adams, West referred to the Teutonic character and its tribal system as sources of the development of representative government. In his own words: "It is not correct to say that the Teutons gave us representative government. *What they did was to give another chance to develop it*. The earlier peoples had lost their chances. Some peculiar features in later English history were to develop these Teutonic assemblies in that island into representative bodies"(West, 1904, p.528).

history writers erected the Teutonic race, the last remnant of the Aryan race, as the creator of modern civilization.

"The fusion of Roman and Teuton" laid the foundation for new social and political institutions, laws, universal language, and culture by intermingling of their blood, their languages, and their laws and their usages and customs. The writers characterized the Middle Age as the time when European civilization shaped the distinct characteristics of the modern civilization of Europe. In words of Myers:

> In the Middle Age, the arts, the sciences, the literatures, and the institutions that characterize the modern era took shape, and gave promise of what they were to become; the leading modern nations grew into form, and the future political divisions of Europe were more or less definitely outlined (Myers, 1895, p.4).

The growth of nations was, in particular, the main achievement of the Middle Ages. The writers explained that as the Teutons migrated into western Europe and settled down, mingling with the earlier population, they were divided up by the geographical configurations of the Continent and formed small "feudal" units. Later, they were combined into a few, large states ruled by monarchs and then evolved into nation-states, with more independence.

Historians used to view the Middle Ages as a period not worth studying. They used to characterize it as "the period of ignorance, disorder, and corruption" in contrast to ancient, classical literary civilization and with modern Enlightenment (Worcester, 1835, p.4). They used to presume that the Middle Ages had very little to do with modern times. Now, the Middle Ages began to be recognized as the period when modern ideas and institutions were conceived. The legitimacy of studying the Middle Age arose. Virtually

almost all of the writers, in their European history textbooks, claimed that the modern idea and institutions originated in the Middle Ages. They tried to make it clear that the Middle Ages was not 'dark' in the sense of being stagnant and unproductive (Robinson, 1903, p.6). The writers, in fact, consciously underlined that the Middle Ages was, on the contrary, full of movement and growth. They argued that the present civilization owed to the Middle Ages certain institutions, habits, and ideas that had not derived from Greece and Rome. History educators in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century strongly urged that medieval history should be studied in high schools for its vital relation to the origin of the modern world, for factors and forces of the Middle Ages conditioned modern life (Burr et al., 1907, pp.67-68).[30] In particular, they emphasized that the nature of modern political institutions could not be understood unless they were traced back to their beginnings in the medieval past.

The end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of modern times were generally marked by several religious, intellectual, and political upheavals: The fall of the eastern part of the Roman Empire; the discovery of America by Columbus in 1492; the Reformation; the formation of great independent nations with strong monarchical government leading to the opening of the era of nation-states; three great inventions, which helped on the intellectual and social revolutions, such as the printing press, gunpowder, and the mariner's compass (Myers, 1905, p.276). Beginning in the sixteenth century, there were growing distinctive features of modern times (Fisher, 1898, p.362;

[30]The Committee of Seven also stated "The character of the forces of modern times cannot be understood by one who examined them without reference to their medieval origins" (American Historical Association, 1899, p.36). Charles H. Haskins, of Harvard, also spoke of the importance of the study of medieval history as furnishing a background for the ordinary American student by familiarizing him with a set of institution and ideas which, while widely different from those of his own time, are yet vitally related to them by the course of historical development (Burr, et al., 1907, p.67).

Myers, 1906, p.332). The nations began to acquire a more defined individuality. The influence of the Church in civil affairs was more and more renounced so as to secularize politics. The idea of individualism grew, and competing values systems proliferated. Myers stated that with the increase of commerce and the growing power of the middle classes, there arose the "industrial age" (1906, p. 332). The writers argued that European influence and power were making the world virtually its subject by discovery, colonization, and commerce. They predicted that the bearers of modern civilization would carry their high cultures to every corner of the world and finally open up a new era in the history of the world. European history would be reborn as the history of the world as European nations Europeanized the world (Myers, 1905, p.664).

In this narrative of modern history, the focus was on how the modern European political institution, the nation-state, took shape, opening the age of the nation-states.[31] General history writers in the last quarter of the nineteenth century came to see modern unity in a political form. They argued that the Middle Age's ecclesiastical unity was followed by the political unity of modern times, casting off control of the Church. The political unity of modern times was achieved by "confederacy of nations," which loosely bound nation-states through "treaties or by tacit agreements in certain accepted rules of public law and outlines of policy" (Fisher, 1898, p.362). "The balance of power" was the crucial principle to operate this "political confederation." They believed that the principle of "the balance of power," in the course of modern history, maintained the essential

[31]In most of the textbooks that were reviewed for this chapter, medieval and modern history is focused on the formation of the European nations of today. For example, Colby specifically stated: "In most other general histories, the chief object of attention in the chapters on medieval and modern history has been the European nations" (1899, p.4).

character of European civilization by preventing the hegemony of any one among the Great Powers.

Meanwhile, Myers, Fishers, and West, saw a growing tendency toward modern, liberal democracy. They underscored the development of representative government throughout the Middle Ages and modern times. They recognized the significance of the French Revolution and its ramifications in modern history. Myers (1895) argued that government by the people has taken the place of government by one or the few in European nations. Fisher (1885) accepted a French historian, Victor Duruy's interpretation that the French Revolution tended to become a European revolution, separating the "utterly dead old regime" from "the new regime inaugurated by the grand leaders of the Constitutional Assembly."[32] Fisher argued that the French Revolution contributed to the spread of the democratic idea of equality in political rights. Myers proclaimed that the great conflict between "despotic" and "liberal" principles of government, resulting in the triumph of democratic ideas, was an intriguing characteristic of modern times (1895, p.3). In particular, Myers and West stated that progress was made toward liberal democracy.

With respect to material and industrial progress and problems in modern times, Myers recognized that civilization fairly entered upon "what may be called the Industrial Age or the Age of Material Progress" and that it created problems: "inequitable distribution of wealth, of material well-being," invoking "the most dangerous discontent among the laboring classes" (1905, p.706). However, he believed that it was too early to write about the "Industrial Age" because it was still taking place. In the general history

textbooks of Myers, Fisher, West, technological and scientific inventions and industrial progress were certainly distinct features of modern times but less important than political progress. In the narrative conception of the "Aryan liberal writers," nation-states and democracy were dominant features of modern times. Scientific, technological, and industrial features of modern times were yet to be described in a concrete narrative.

UNDERLYING NOTIONS OF ARYAN SUPREMACY

From the end of the eighteenth century onward, Europeans began to link personal identity with nationalism, which required the development of an elaborate ethnic heritage, even where none had existed before (Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob, 1995, p.63). European writers in comparative philology, ethnology and linguistics traced the origin and affiliation of the customs and institutions of the various nations and tribes using mainly linguistic similarity and physical characteristics as evidence of hereditary connection (Fisher, 1898, p.5; Iriye, 1993. p.9). They believed that their task was to discover "literary and historical forebears" who would give the nation a long lineage (Appleby et al., 1995, p.65). They emphasized the vital importance of racial, ethnic, and national differences in understanding culture, language, and history. Their works generally categorized White men into three racial groups: the Hamites, the Semites, and the Aryans (later called Indo-Europeans), and described differences in capacity and virtue of these three races. They claimed that the Aryans were the primitive ancestors of modern European civilized populations and visualized the progress of civilization as a movement

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[32]Fisher (1885) referred to Duruy's *Histoire du Moyen Age* (eleventh edition., 1882) and also his *Historie des Temps Moderns* (ninth edition), as an "important aid." Duruy's *Historie des Temps*

from East to West across Asia with the Aryan race as the carrier of the civilization (Stocking, 1987, p.25). The doctrine of Aryanism took shape.

The conceptualization of the history of the human race in the last quarter of the nineteenth century in the United States was a product of racial nationalism of which racial doctrines such as "Aryanism," "Teutonism," and "Anglo-Saxonism" as intellectual foundations lay at the heart. The following paragraphs examine the dominant intellectual trend that infused the doctrine of Aryan supremacy into the conceptualization of human history in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The first part is a description of how racial theories imported from Europe after the Civil War provoke the racial doctrine of White supremacy and Aryan supremacy and how those racial theories influenced the conceptualization of world history. The second part is a description of how American general history writers adopted the European concept of European civilization, in particular that of Leopold von Ranke, who conceived European history based on the doctrine of Aryanism. The third part is a description of how the theory of Teutonic origin of democratic institutions, developed in England and the United States, influenced the conceptualization of world history.[33]

Racial Doctrines in the Late Nineteenth Century

Bulwarked by the studies of comparative philology, ethnology, and linguistics on race and culture, European intellectuals explained the rise and fall of civilization by

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Modernes was translated into English by Edwin A. Grosvenor and published in the U.S in 1894.

[33]The scholars who were critical of the racist view during the 1920s and 1930s recognized the two main sources of American racial thinking in the United States: racial theories, particularly that of Gobineau, and the Teutonic democratic institutional theory (Rugg, 1934; Heckel, 1925).

inferring from common cultural elements that they found in the earlier peoples. Many of them construed that the civilizations of ancient Greece, ancient Rome, and western Europe in medieval and modern times were built by one race, the Aryan (Germanic) race. The notion of "Aryan westward movement of civilization" became a major intellectual buttress for the tendency to write the history of civilization in nineteenth century Europe. For example, a French writer, Joseph Arthur, Comte (Count) de Gobineau (1816-82), in his work, *Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races* (1853-5), characterized the White race as the most superior and the Black race as the most inferior.[34] He warned that a nation must be pure in stock if it would establish itself and remain as a great nation (Klass and Hellmann, 1971, p.88).[35] He claimed that only "the Nordics (resided in northern or western Europe)," the last remnants of the Germanic peoples, could build and maintain "great civilization," or at least "great empires." In fact, he insisted that the Nordics were creators of modern civilization (Hofstadter, 1945, p.185).[36] Houston Stewart Chamberlain, a renegade Englishman, following Gobineau's lead, pushed forward the theory by ascribing to "the Teutonic race all virtues and abilities, and to the non-Teutonic all vices and failings" (Heckel, 1925, pp.106-07). By the 1860s, racial theories pictured western European Aryans (British, Germans, French, Italians, Spanish)

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[34]In 1856, an abbreviated translation of this book had been published in the United States as part of the southern campaign to defend slavery. For the American racists during and after World War I. Gobineau was one of the chief sources for anti-immigration arguments (Gossett, 1963, p.352).

[35]There had already been many others who had presented about the same idea as Gobineau did. For example, the Scots physician and anatomist, Robert Knox, published a systematic treatise on race in 1850 entitled *The Races of Man*. Knox argued that racial inter-breeding led to the corruption and collapse of civilizations (Hofstadter, 1945, p.185).

[36]Gobineau attempted to explain why there were mighty civilizations in some parts of the world, but only barbarism in other parts and why some great civilizations crumbled to dust, while others survived and continued (Klass and Hellman, 1971, p.87). Drawing upon the knowledge available in his time in linguistics, archaeology, anthropology, biology and history, he argued that mixing blood between a superior race and an inferior would generally cause the collapse of civilization. Gobineau asserted that ancient Aryan, Greek, and Roman civilizations fell because people made the mistake of intermarrying with Blacks.

with Americans, frequently called the "Teutonics" and "Nordics," as the race of progress with all the best qualities of the Caucasians.

In the United States, racial distinction theories, which postulated autonomous and unchanging characteristics of three racial groups of the human race and diverse racial stocks among White people, increasingly appealed to Americans during the course of the Civil War. In the eighteenth century and early nineteenth century, according to Gossett (1963), Americans had shown little interest in racial theories because the country needed manpower and, in general, was not much concerned with which particular branch of the White race a man came from. The issue of abolition of slavery created tremendous interests in racial theories. The Southern slave-owners who objected to the abolition of slavery commissioned scholars to prove that the Negro was not a human being or at least, less of a human being than a White man so as to justify slavery in the Aristotelian fashion (Hertz, 1970, p.12). About this time, a number of racial theories of Europe were increasingly translated and spread across America, and Americans also produced racial distinction theories. Before massive numbers of immigrants poured into the United States from non-western Europe during the last three decades of the nineteenth century, American educators had been hopeful public education and social assimilation would produce "the hybrid but uniform American" and surpass both native and immigrant stock (Tyack, 1967, p.233). The sharp social tensions of late nineteenth century, including labor violence, economic depression, and class feeling, however, seemed to convince American intellectuals that American society had reached the limit of its capacity to assimilate masses of immigrants (Morris, Greenleaf, and Ferrell, 1971, p.451). They feared a possible degeneration of American civilization caused by the non-Teutonic

stocks (Rugg, 1934; Klass and Hellman, 1977). In this climate of opinion, racial theories increasingly intermingled with nationalism, penetrated American culture. This racial attitude came to be extended to non-Teutonic stock among the White men.

The most favorably accepted foreign racial theory in the United States was Gobineau's theory. According to Hertz (1970), Gobineau's theory was a welcome weapon in the struggle of slave-owners against the abolition of slavery, which raged during the 1860s. Gobineau's theory played a critical role in accentuating American thoughts about the indisputable and comprehensive superiority of the White race and of the Aryan race among White racial groups (Barnes, 1925; Rugg, 1934). Gobineau's race idea propagated the view that only the Aryans, to whom most Americans belonged, could carry on civilization. The Darwinian law of evolution turned a vague notion of race in those racial theories into a scientific idea. The Darwinian theory of the survival of the fittest provided the notion of White race's supremacy, which had already been implicitly accepted in the U.S. popular consciousness, with a scientific basis.

By the 1870s, racial theories had gained sufficient authority in American culture at large to challenge the Biblical orthodoxy of the creation of the human race and the world. The general history writers incorporated racial theories in their writing, disassociating Biblical history from the sacred history of the human race. For example, in his 1882 revised edition, *New Manual of General History with Particular Attention to Ancient and Modern Civilization,* John Anderson discarded the theological view. He excluded the Biblical account of Creation and the dispersion of Babel, with which his first edition (1869) explained the existence of different peoples in different continents. Instead, in his new edition, he took the racial difference theory to explain progress of

civilization. In the introduction, he illustrated characteristics of three branches of the White Race: the Aryans, the Semites and the Hamites. Anderson wrote that history treated these "three great races" because nations of these races had occupied "a prominent place among mankind" and that was made possible by their "energy, enterprise, intelligence, and culture" (Anderson, 1882, pp.17-18).

General history textbooks directly referred to ethnology, archeology, philology, and anthropology as important aides for exploring "humanity in its lower stages" and "the condition of the primeval races" (Swinton, 1976, p.1). History educators argued that the notion of race and the characteristics of the different races should be the first part of history instruction. Lucy M. Seymour, one of the members of the Committee of Seven argued:

> Race must come first in associated ideas of history. Before a student is able to do any individual work (and it is really the individual work which educates him), he must be able to distinguish these race [the Semites, the Hamites, and the Aryans] marks, to properly estimate and be able to say, with some degree of accuracy, what will be the result of the commingling of the races; how the general character of a people will be altered; as well as to recognize the indelible marks which remain so long as there is a drop of the race blood left (Seymour, 1897, p.624).

The History Syllabus for Secondary Schools by the New England History Teachers' Association (1907) also recommended history teachers begin their instruction of ancient history with a classification of races. In almost all schools, the student was generally required to memorize characteristics and the rank of human races in the accepted racial hierarchy. At the same time, through education, educators tried to discourage the mixture of blood between races based on the assumption that a superior race was bound to

degenerate if it did not maintain racial purity. Mary Sheldon Barnes characterized "A distinct American type" as "an Aryan blood, an English speech, and a Christian faith" (1898, p.119). In these elements, she viewed, lay the deep springs of our [American] civilization and of our [American] own individual life." She argued that for this reason, Aryan nationality should be preserved and it should be done by "discouraging mixtures of the blood with inferior races such as African and Oriental" (Barnes, 1898, p.119).[37]

At the turn of the century, a number of academicians began to reject race as an essential driving force of historical development. Franz Boas, in his skeptical address in 1894 as vice-president of the Anthropological Section of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, made a cogent criticism of prevailing racist attitudes toward the colored races. He pointed out: "The unwarranted assumption was commonly made because their state of civilization is higher, racial aptitudes of whites are higher" (Boas, 1894, p.302). William Z. Ripley's substantial study of *The Races of Europe* (1897), which emphasized the complexities of the idea of race, played one of the decisive roles in the fall of the Aryan-Teutonism in professional historians' works. He argued that language, nationality and race were independent of each other. This meant that speaking the same type of language did not imply that, for example, all Aryans (Indo-Europeans) were closely related in blood. Furthermore, nowhere did Ripley find an absolute purity of race. He argued that almost everywhere two, or all three, of the fundamental races came into contact, interpenetrated, crossed, or influenced one another.

Boas and Ripley have shown how the hopeless intermixture of the European races would make it impossible to present a racial interpretation of European history, even if

[37]Barnes also argued that it should be done by the teaching of our mother-tongue in every school, by the adjustment of our laws by the standard of Christian as against that of Mormon, pagan, or atheistic

people could discover determinate differences in capacity between pure examples of races (Barnes, 1925, p.292). Physical anthropology, which had provoked racial determinism, now provided historians grounds to dismiss racial explanations in history. A historian, E. E. Slosson, also attacked the fallacy of the notion of racial characteristics as the dynamic force for the birth and progress of human civilization. His own words were:

> We hear much about races, it is true, but they are considered as unalterable entities, just as species used to be. There are dominant and subordinate races, we hear, and nothing they can do can change their relative positions, just as the old Calvinists used to talk of elect and nonelect individuals. This fatalism of anthropology, which disregards cause and effect, is as illogical as Oriental fatalism (Slosson, 1903, p.1027).

The studies that disclaimed racial inherent distinctions began to create the atmosphere in which evoking the notions of race and racial differences were regarded as unhistorical in the historical society. The textbook writers began to discard the view that race or blood made substantial difference in the rise and fall of civilization. Willis Mason West, European history textbook writer, cautiously suggested in his first ancient history textbook:

> Probably there is such a thing as race character. We need not to deny race as a factor in historical development, but we must be cautious in appealing to it as an explanation. We never know how much is race and how much is something else; and we may be very sure that much of what is lightly called race-character is the result of recent training or merely the mark of a certain stage of culture (West, 1902, pp.9-10).

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morality (1898, p.119).

Although West failed to deny the existence of race character as a dynamic factor in historical development, he strongly suggested that historians should not depend solely on "race character" for historical explanation. He seemingly rejected the employment of race character as a central factor for historical explanation or even as in itself a valid explanation, but he embraced the racial doctrine of White supremacy and Teutonic supremacy in his textbook writings. In his textbooks published between 1900 and 1930, West directly referred to the "Western Romano-Teutonic race" as the only race of progress. He endeavored to describe the Teutonic contribution to world progress, citing George Burton Adams, medieval historian and specialist of Teutonic political institutions:

> The Settlement of the Teutonic tribes was not merely the introduction of a new set of ideas and institutions…It was also the introduction of fresh blood and youthful mind – the muscle and brain which in the future were to do the larger share of the world's work" (West, 1922, p.43).

West declared the Teutons as the main agent of progress since the fall of Roman Empire and that fresh blood of the Teutonic race brought Europe modern civilization and democratic development in particular. He proclaimed that the path of civilization followed Greeks, Romans, and the Teutons.

From the beginning of the twentieth century, historians became increasingly distrustful of anthropological and philological notions of race and civilization. European history textbooks tended to replace the term "race" with "people," and the term, "Aryan" with "Indo-European" to cast off their racist impressions. The textbooks of Myers, whose writing was once deeply steeped in racist descriptions, abandoned direct reference to

racial capacity as an important force of historical development in revised editions after 1904. Although he seemingly abandoned the racial references, in his narrative, race still remained as a clear principle of selection and organization of human history. European history textbook writers who began their writing with racial themes, including Myers, West, and Webster, never abandoned racial themes, assumptions, and perspectives in their revised editions. Racial themes contributed to formulating the notion of the supremacy of European civilization and developing world history exclusively focusing on European history.

European Civilization in Ranke's Concept

European historians in the early nineteenth century wrote their national histories on the basis of the doctrine of Aryanism. In the nineteenth century, Germany was regarded as a source of culture and provided Euro-American academic societies with a model of disciplined inquiry (Stocking, 1987, p.25). In early nineteenth century Germany, Prussia was securing a dominant position in the German Empire and reaching toward European pre-eminence. In this midst of fervid patriotism, German historians like Niebuhr and Ranke began their works, which later profoundly influenced the American historical craft and insight. They wrote patriotic, political, and nationalistic histories, in which their national identity of Aryanism was extolled (Barnes, 1921, p.44). National pride and competition stimulated a similar movement in the European countries, especially France and England, and America. Throughout the nineteenth century, the doctrine of Aryanism provided European and American historians with a basic concept

on which their national histories were developed. Ranke and his school in Germany, Freeman and the English school, and Mignet and Thiers and the French political school produced the great works of national history focusing on the development of liberal democracy during the nineteenth century (Barnes, 1921, p.44). These historians' works became authoritative references of general history in the last quarter of the nineteenth century in the United States (Myers, 1895, pp.v-vi; Fisher, 1885, p.vi and 1898, p.vi). In particular, Leopold von Ranke's concept of European civilization and Edward A. Freeman's theory of Teutonic origin of democratic institutions provided conceptual frameworks for medieval and modern history on behalf of general history and European history writers in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.[38] With racial theories imported from Europe in the latter half of the nineteenth century, Ranke's concept of European civilization and Freeman's theory of democratic institutions, both of which were formulated based on Aryanism, provided American writers of general history and European history in the last quarter of the nineteenth century with the intellectual foundation to proclaim Aryan supremacy.

Ranke referred to the spirit of the Latin and Teutonic nations as the "guardian spirit of Europe." Ranke frequently called Europe the "genius of the Occident" (Masur, 1962, p.600). Ranke believed that the fusion of the Latin and Teutonic nations was the

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[38]Ranke's concept and method dominated German historiography up to World War I. Germany was regarded as the central source of historical scholarship in the nineteenth century and therefore, American historians read German authors and went to Germany to learn their craft in German universities in the latter half of the nineteenth century. In fact, historians who emphasized their adoption of the scientific concept and method in writing history in the last quarter of the nineteenth century referred to Ranke as the authority guiding their works. In 1886, the American Historical Association, founded in 1885, recognized Ranke as the first and only honorary member of the association. Myers and Fisher noted that the works of Ranke were important references in their textbooks.

source of modern European civilization, the leading civilization of all.[39] To Ranke, "the core of all modern history" was the history of great nations of "racially kindred nations either of Germanic or Germanic-Latin descent" - French, Spanish, Italian German, English, and Scandinavian nations (Ranke, 1824, p.1).[40] These nations were always distinct political entities and were never united as one society nor formed an alliance. Rather, they were almost always at conflict among themselves. Nevertheless, Ranke found a "unity" in these countries. Such a unity, he viewed, came from their common "idea," "action," and "development" (Barraclough, 1955, p.169). He believed that their internal histories coincided precisely and this common development was a result of the same ideas among these nations, that is, the fusion of Latin-Germanic races, which was the foundation of the development of European conditions to the most recent times. In his European history, "Turks," "Russian Empires," and a "Latin Christianity [Greek Orthodox Church]" including "Slavic," "Lettic," and "Magyar" were excluded because of their cultural differences. Ranke (1924) asserted that the "Turks" were mostly likely "Asiatic" and the "Russian Empire" included the whole of northern Asia; therefore, without investigating and penetrating the entire range of Asiatic affairs, Russian history could not be fully understood. He geographically confined European history to the Mediterranean Sea and western Europe and racially Greeks, Romans and Germans. In Ranke's scheme, the history of Europe from the late fifteenth century onward was the process of the independent development of each people in its own concept of the state

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[39]He first presented this theme in his 1824 work, *Histories of the Latin and Germanic Nations from 1494-1514*, which later became a famous essay on the *Great Powers*, and set out more fully in his lectures on the *Epochs of Modern History*.

[40]Ranke's preface to the First Edition (1824) of *Histories of the Latin and Germanic Nations from 1494-1514*, which is translated into English, see "Leopold von Ranke: Selections on Universal History," available: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/history/courses/europe1/weeks/ranke.htm.

and the interaction of peoples and nations in political rivalry and economic competition among the constituent nations. The principle of Balance of Power secured the interaction among nations. By preventing the hegemony of any one among the Great Powers, the principle maintained the essential character of European civilization in the course of modern history. In Ranke's scheme, the establishment of great nations in Europe and their interaction in the European confederacy system under the principle of the Balance of Power are the most peculiar features of modern European history (Barraclough, 1955, p.169). Ranke perceived in the European system of states a tendency to guarantee the freedom of the whole while assuring the separate existence of every individual state (Masur, 1962, p.600). In this respect, Ranke explained world history as the progress of the consciousness of liberty.

In American general history textbooks in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Ranke's concept of modern European civilization, resulting from the fusion of the Roman-Teutonic elements, was an important conception for constructing the framework of modern history. From the early twentieth century, the concept of Romano-Teutonic fusion began to cast off its racist elements. European history textbook writers replaced the term, "Teutonic," with a more neutral term, "Germanic." The "Teutonic elements," later called "Germanic elements," came to implicate social and political ideals of the race rather than inherent intellectual and moral dispositions of the race (Robinson, 1903, p. 43). Racist implications were discarded. But the concept of the Romano-Germanic fusion has continuously been the conceptual grounds on which the scope of world history was confined within ancient Greco-Roman civilization and medieval and modern western Europe.

Teutonic Origins of Representative Institutions

The general history and European history textbooks captured liberal democracy developed in western Europe as a central feature of modern civilization. They postulated that the Teutonic race was responsible for the birth of liberal democracy. European as well as American historians throughout the nineteenth century propagated the idea of an organic relationship between the idea of democracy and the Aryan race. Throughout the nineteenth century, American intellectuals sought their cultural and racial roots in the cultural tradition and the history of the Aryan race. Although approaches of American historians were more "literary" than "scientific," they largely wrote their national history with an emphasis on the "Aryan liberal tradition." These approaches served a two-fold purpose: it proclaimed their remote cultural tradition and convinced American people of the indestructible nature of democratic government, because this idea of liberty was a part of the Aryan political heritage.

Before the Civil war, American historians, who prided themselves on their Aryan ancestry, widely adopted the doctrine of Aryanism in writing their national history. They perceived that "national character" had an organic relationship to national institutions and achievements (Hofstadter, 1968, p.14). In particular, they attributed the western European achievement of modern democracy to the special character of the Teutonic race, the descendent of the Aryan race, as it evolved in the Netherlands, England, and America.[41]

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[41]For example, a historian of American history, George Bancroft, emphasized the importance of the Germanic element in understanding American history. He viewed the early history of the United States mainly in terms of Teutonic tradition, i.e., Anglo-Saxon, traditions of freedom – irradiations which had been obscured by European feudalism for centuries. Bancroft portrayed American liberty as the fruit of the Teutonic heritage not only in his direct references to Teutonic origins but also in his whole narrative conception. The story he told was how the seeds of liberty, gathered from the entire world, were implanted in America. "American history, from its beginnings, was the pure fruit of liberty" (Ross, 1984, p.918).

They argued that the love of liberty, with significant "safeguards against arbitrary power," had always been characteristic of their Teutonic forebears (Gossett, 1963, p.87). Before the Civil War, American historians such as Washington Irving, William Hickling Prescott, John Lothrop Motley, and George Bancroft, in one form or another, had treated the evolution of political, religious and intellectual freedom out of "political obscurantism" and "religious despotism" (Krieger, 1965, p. 241). Although their emphasis within this movement varied, in one way or another, they referred to the cultural tradition of the Aryan race and the Anglo-Saxon race to locate America in the continuing development of European history. National greatness at the time was sought in the antiquity of the race and its cultural heritages. American historians sought their national origin in their European ancestors. Many of them found the origin of English and American political ideas and institutions in the Teutonic tradition, and identified their national character with the Aryan cultural heritage. The main purpose of American cultural identification with the Aryan race was to emphasize "the antiquity," the uniqueness" and "the permanence" of their nationality (Higham, 1955, p.9). Furthermore, their cultural identification with the ancient Aryans was useful in defending democratic institutions against the attacks of conservatives – both at home and abroad – who maintained that democracy as a theory of government had not withstood the test of time (Gossett, 1963, p.88).[42]

[42]According to Gossett, Bancroft had little interest in racist explanations of history. His main purpose, Gossett viewed, was to show that the will of God had determined the triumph of democracy. Bancroft declared, "[H]istory yields eternal evidence that tyranny and wrong lead inevitably to decay" but "freedom and right, however hard may be the struggle, always prove resistless" (Gossett, 1963, p.88).

Before the Civil War, to most American historians, Aryanism, however, meant simply those races' unique cultural heritages rather than the race's inherent superiority over other races. Higham argued:

> The concept that the United States belongs in some special sense to the Anglo-Saxon "race" offered an interpretation of the source of national greatness. The idea crystallized in the early nineteenth century as a way of defining American nationality in a positive sense, not as a formula of attack on outsiders (Higham, 1955, p.9)

However, the racial concepts used by American historians in the early nineteenth century were not defined on a physiological basis. They evoked God's will rather than the naturalist logic of racial evolution to explain historical process. When the American historian, Bancroft, declared "history yields eternal evidence that tyranny and wrong lead inevitably to decay" but "freedom and right, however hard may be the struggle, always prove resistless," his main purpose was to show that the will of God had determined the triumph of democracy (Gossett, 1964, p.88). The historians before the Civil War had depended on God's intentions to explain the triumph of the Aryan race in American soil.

The rise of Civil War nationalism shook the image of national unity and America's "immutable political forms" (Ross, 1984, p.925). The political failure that led to the Civil War harmed national pride. In order to restore pride and to strengthen people's loyalties, historians were obliged to prove that although the American republic had not been perfectly formed at its inception, it was in the process of historical creation. The belief that American institutions were superior made it possible to accommodate such an interpretation after the Civil War (Hofstadter, 1968, p.7). Historians adopted themes from the doctrine of Aryanism but explained them through a different set of

intellectual methods and outlook. Freed from the influence of literature and from the notion of "God's will," they focused on the history of political institutions, used critical methods, and explained the evolution of American democratic institutions in the light of naturalistic laws of human progress.[43]

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, scientific historians in American history, based on the doctrines of Aryanism and Teutonism, developed the theory of "Teutonic origin of representative institutions" to explain the origin of modern democratic institutions in biological terms.[44] Edward A. Freeman, the English historian, was the most important propagator of the "Teutonic origin theory." American historians adopted Freeman's comparative method and theory in order to construct their own theories to trace the origin of American political institutions.[45] In Teutonic origin theories developed by Freeman as well as American historians, the doctrine of Aryanism, Teutonism, or Anglo-Saxonism was transformed into what Higham called, "a sharp-cutting nastiest weapon and, ultimately, into a completely racist philosophy" (Higham, 1955, p.134). Teutonic origin theories generally postulated an original pre-historic homeland of the Aryan peoples where they evolved a unique institutional pattern. According to the theories, the Aryans and their descendants scattered from their early

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[43]As explained earlier in this chapter, historians in this time were obliged to free historical study from classical literature and theology and to establish history as a modern form of organized and disciplined inquiry. They needed to perceive history in a more secular and scientific framework and scientific history was their solution for that matter.

[44]According to Edward N. Saveth, some historians who were not Social Darwinists accepted the Teutonic hypothesis, and on the other hand, some who were Social Darwinists declined to accept that hypothesis. Nevertheless, in American historiography of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Saveth concluded, a relationship did exist between the Teutonic hypothesis and certain aspects of Social Darwinist thinking. The idea, exploited by the Teutonists, of a maturing institutional germ was one of several themes borrowed from biology, which found their way into historical writings. Other biological conceptions, exploited by historians, were the Darwinist theories of natural selection and the survival of the fittest (Saveth, 1965, p.10)

[45]The description of the ideas of the "Teutonic theory" relies on Saveth (1939; 1960; 1965), Hofstadter (1945), and Higham (1955).

homeland and settled in Greece, Rome, Germany, England and finally in America; they carried forward their political heritage, which led them to develop a distinct, the most superior of all, political institutions: modern representative governments (Saveth, 1939, p.403). Freeman (1873) argued that the Greek city-state and the Roman Empire resulted from Aryan institutional heritage. He continued that finally, the Teutons, the last Aryan people, opened a new era of the nation-state. However, he believed that it was in England where the Teutonic character was most highly developed, because unlike the European continent, where the German blood had suffered a Romanic infusion, in England the Anglo-Saxon race preserved the Teutonic institutional forms that developed into a parliamentary system (Freeman, 1873, pp.65-7).[46] American historians casually embraced this Teutonic hypothesis, as Charles McLean Andrews wrote: "So wide has been the acceptance to Teutonism and so strongly installed is it in the minds of both students and readers that it might seem more bold than discreet to raise the question regarding the soundness of the theory" (Andrews, 1891, p.41).[47]

According to the Teutonic institutional theory developed by American scholars, the American institutions of the early Massachusetts towns were part of the inheritance of the Teutonic race and the history of the United States was part of the history of the Aryan race. The primitive institutions of the early Aryan race tribes and their ideas of "personal

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[46]During his American lecture tour in 1881-82, Freeman zealously promoted the theory of the Teutonic origin of the American institution with the doctrine of Aryanism and Anglo-Saxonism. Employing Freeman's comparative method and Darwinian evolution terms, American scientific historians wrote how the Aryan institutional "seed" was "transplanted" to Germany, England, and the United States, and "germinated" into the institutions of the New England town, the New England states, and finally, into the Constitution of the United States.

[47]Many promoters of the theory were professional historians who had been trained in Germany and who taught history seminar classes in graduate schools at universities such as Johns Hopkins (Herbert Baxter Adams), Cornell (Andrew D. White and Moses Cost Tyler), Harvard (Albert Bushnell Hart), and Columbia (John W. Burgess). In particular, the Teutonic theory became familiar to general readers through widely read history and lectures of popular historian, John Fiske (Saveth, 1960, p.6).

liberty" and "local self-government" were "transplanted" with renewed vitality in New England, blossoming first through town meetings and later in the creation of New England state government, and the Constitution of the United States. Gradual institutional evolution from the remote past to the present seemed to designate the American republic and democracy as the most advanced and even final outcome of human progress. John W. Burgess, a Teutonic theorist, in his *Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law*, (1890) wrote that the nation-state, the creation of Teutonic political genius, "stamps the Teutonic nations as the political nations *par excellence*, and authorizes them, in the economy of the world, to assume the leadership in the establishment and administration of states" (Pratt, 1935, p.348). The theory, as Saveth assured, reinforced the idea of Gobineau's, "indisputable and comprehensive superiority of the white stock, and of the Aryan race within the white group" (1965, p.31). This theory indicated that the United States, was "the most recent homeland of the Aryo-Teutonic peoples" and the American democratic institution was the "fittest" institution in the world, the culmination of Aryan political evolution (Saveth, 1960, p.6). Teutonic, democratic, institutional theory scientifically supported the belief that American history was wholly a continuation of European history and that the Aryan race of Europe and the United States was the most capable race to develop the most advanced political organization and institutions in the world. Depending heavily on the racial doctrine of Aryanism, the Teutonic theorist wrote the history of democracy.

General history and European history textbooks in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, by direct reference or through narrative conception, embraced the theory of Teutonic origin of democratic institutions. Phillip Van Ness Myers explained

why "Aryan Studies" were important by directly referring to the Teutonic origin theory itself. In his own remarks

> [I]n [the] customs and beliefs of the early Aryans, we discover the germs of many of the institutions of the classical Greeks and Romans, and of the nations of modern Europe. Thus, in the council of elders around the village patriarch, political historians trace the beginnings of the senates of Greece and Rome and the national parliaments of later times (Allen and Myers, 1889, p.12)

Writers like Fisher (1885) and Myers (1895), in their books' prefaces, expressed their indebtednesses to the English historian Edward Freeman whose works provided the theoretical framework for American Teutonic institution theorists. Fisher and Myers noted that Freeman's works such as *General Sketch of European History* (which was published in the United States under the title, *Outlines of History)* and *History of the Norman Conquest* were a constant "guidance" in treating subjects. Adopting the theoretical perspective of the Aryan (Teutonic) origin of democratic institutions, general history and European history writers proclaimed that the Aryan race was the bearer of modern democratic institutions. To them, the history of the Aryan race was the history of democracy. Democracy was conceived in the prehistoric Aryan tribes and fulfilled as the American liberal democracy. As Herbert Baxter Adams (1898, p.8), a theorist of the Teutonic democratic institutions, did, these writers found "some backbone to unite the skeleton of human deeds and historic experiences" in the political institution of the Aryan race. When the general history and European history writers declared that the Aryan race played the main role in the drama of human progress, progress meant the creation of the

idea of freedom and democracy, together with the development of a sense of individual independence.

The Teutonic origin of liberal democratic institutions was immediately challenged, beginning in the 1890s until it gradually disappeared from the American history scholarship in the 1930s. Critics like Edward Channing and Charles Francis Adams were among the first to challenge the theory.[48] From about 1900, the Teutonic theory became gradually distrusted as an explanation for the development of ideas of democracy. General history and European history writers no longer referred to the Teutonic liberal disposition as the source of democratic ideas and institutions. Instead, adopting new developments in the field of modern history, they gave more attention than before to modern democratic revolutions in England, France and the United States and more emphasis than before to the idea of equal political rights that were emphasized in the French Revolution. However, when they referred to the Teutonic (Germanic) element, it frequently implicated the race's inherent moral and intellectual capability and freedom-loving culture.

Nationalism, "Xenophobia," Imperialism, and Bolshevism

American writers' celebration of the Aryan race in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century was accentuated by social and political upheavals. Under the pressure of growing national consciousness and imperialistic

[48]Novick argued that the most important influence leading to the abandonment of the theory was Frederick Jackson Turner's alternative explanation of the expanding frontier and the availability of free land as the foundation of American democratic institutions. He noted that the stock of Turner's frontier thesis, first advanced in 1893, rose as Adams' fell (1988, p.88).

sentiments, and in the spirit of Darwinism, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the vague doctrine of racial nationalism such as Aryanism or Anglo-Saxonism was transformed into a racist doctrine. It was taken for granted that the Aryan race, to which Americans belonged, had inherent intellectual, physical, and moral superiority to other races in the world. In the 1880s and 1890s, American intellectuals including political leaders, journalists, and scholars who were of northwestern European origin, especially of British, German and Scandinavian stock, felt threatened by the massive flow of immigrants with unfamiliar languages and cultures from the regions other than northwestern Europe. The mere presence of these immigrants alarmed education leaders. Newly arrived immigrants looked unmindful and even unappreciative of American political and cultural tradition. In the late 1880s and 1890s, especially after the panic that followed the Haymarket riot, educators worried increasingly about teaching the American ideal of democracy and loyalty to the nation. They grew lyrical over flag rituals and patriotic badges. They held nationalist ceremonies in the schools, inviting parents to attend. Teachers began to pay more and more attention to civics and United States history (Tyack, 1967, p. 232).

Under the rubric of "science," American historians proclaimed the superiority of the Aryan race and urged the preservation of their "precious and sacred" Aryan nationality by discouraging mixtures of the blood with inferior races such as "African" and "Oriental" and by restricting immigration from non-Aryan stocks. Scholars such as the German-American, Hermann von Holst, German-trained law professor John Burgess, and the historian of American history John Fiske promoted radical racism of Aryan superiority and increased distrust of non-Teutons. For example, Burgess, in favor of

immigration restriction laws, argued: "We must preserve our Aryan nationality in the state, and admit to its membership only such non-Aryan race-elements as shall have become Aryanized in spirit and in genius by contact with it" (1895, p.407). [49] Furthermore, the obvious degree of world dominion achieved by the human races seemed to prove that only the Aryan race was "the fittest," the most advanced of all. Only the Aryan race seemed to have sufficient abilities and qualities to develop the perfect political organization that would adjust to political affairs throughout the world and create and spread a high level of refined culture. The political and social climate of the period contributed to the development and persistence of the world history conceptualization of the "Aryan liberal writers." In turn, it reinforced racial distrust in non-Aryan peoples and encouraged social and political leaders to act upon the racial distrust. For example, Teutonic racial history provided a firm ground for the imperialistic impulse to use any means to civilize a "barbaric population" as well as for posing restrictive immigration restriction laws (Herbst, 1965, p.121).

Americans have always been conscious of their so-called traditional mission as the exemplar and the defender of democracy and individual liberty, in carrying out their foreign policy since the early period of the nation (Merk, 1963). It had been the ideological basis for the western territorial expansion to increase the nation's wealth and power in the mid-nineteenth century. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when American imperialists launched imperialistic enterprises, with the Spanish-American war, they referred to their democratic mission as a justification for their imperialistic expansion. They argued that the expansion of the White race, in particular,

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[49]In 1907, speaking at Berlin before the German Emperor, Burgess said of the Slavs, Czechs, Hungarians, and South Italians, "Uncle Sam does not want such rabble for citizens" (Burgess, 1934, p.

the Teutonic or the Anglo-Saxon race, would make for the material betterment and moral and intellectual development of the more backward races (Imperialism, 1903, p.217). The political leaders who thought themselves to be anti-imperialists – for example, Woodrow Wilson and William Jennings Bryan – also supported American effort because they would liberate Cuba and the Philippines from Spanish misgovernment and teach the ways of democracy to the Mexicans and to other unruly breeds to the South (Blake and Barck, 1960, p.352). Yet, in actual practice, the moral fervor of both groups, imperialists and anti-imperialists, was likely to point in the same direction, toward extending American influence beyond the American borders. Missionaries and publicists helped to convince large sections of the public that the European White had a sacred duty to carry Christian civilization and democratic principles of government to backward countries. This imperialistic mental sentiment also reinforced the exclusive celebration of the Aryan racial and democratic expansion in history instruction.

The post-World War I mood, in a way, accentuated racial themes. The Russian Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 came as a shock to Americans as well as Europeans. They watched communism spread abroad. Russian communism was a precarious factor, which might disrupt world peace and cause collapse of western European democracy and capitalism. The Semites were considered responsible for the Russian Revolution and world communism (Bernal, 1995, p.9). This political climate gave enduring popularity to the European history and world history textbooks that proclaimed the supremacy of the Aryan race.

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CONCLUSION

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the conception of world history in high school textbooks demonstrates the diverse influences of the European mode of historical conceptions: the classicist's emphasis on classical civilization of Greece and Rome; Gobineau's racist doctrines of White supremacy among human races and Aryan supremacy among White people; the Darwinian theory of the law of natural progress; the Hegelian liberal vision of world history, which set the goal of humanity as liberty and called upon the Teutonic race as its carrier; Ranke's concept of modern European civilization, in which the growth of liberty was illustrated in the development of political organism, the nation-state system, and the genius of the Teutonic race in establishing modern civilization; and Freeman and his political school's theory, which traced the origins of modern representative government to the pre-historic tribes of the Teutonic race and its inherent "freedom-loving" character.

A complex mixture of those European historical conceptions brought critical changes to the conception of world history in high school textbooks in general history, European history and world history. In selecting subjects and interpreting the meanings of events and movements, the theological and classicist perspectives and purposes eventually gave way to the scientific naturalist perspective and interpretation. Racial character and capability, instead of God's will and Providential power, became an essential driving force of historical development. A "science" of the day, the Darwinian law of the survival of the fittest contributed to the adoption of a doctrine of White supremacy and Aryan supremacy in historical studies. The Darwinian law provided a

scientific logic to explain why European civilization was the most advanced civilization in the world and why Europeans colonized other parts of the world, implying the European race as the fittest race in the world. A pseudo-scientific notion of race became a cornerstone in the conceptualization of general history. Racial doctrine penetrated general history writings in a "scientific" format, which explained that the present world dominance of the Aryan race was a consequence of the natural law of evolution.

Imbued with the notion of the moral and cultural superiority of the White race and the Aryan race, and supported by the Darwinian law of the survival of the fittest, the "Aryan liberal writers" perceived the Aryan race as the single, best-adapted race. They asserted that the Aryans among White peoples played the main role in establishing civilization and making progress. They predicted that high culture of the Aryan race would finally spread over the world, resulting in "the Europeanizing of the world." Defining history as the narrative of civilized nations, they wrote a history of humankind focusing solely on the civilization built by the Aryan race. The history of the human race was visualized as identical to the story of the Aryan race. The path of civilization was confined to the history of the Aryan race: the Greeks, the Romans and the Teutons, binding them together as one grand stream of evolution. European history arose as a coherent and unified single story of humankind. In particular, the Teutons, the last descendent of the Aryans, were called upon as the inventor of modern civilization which was characterized by the system of nation-states and liberal democracy. Progress was made toward liberty under the leadership of the Teutonic race.

Before about 1875, in general history textbooks, the theological and classicist's visions of human progress justified the sole focus on European history as if it were world

history. Progress was generally and consistently made toward liberty, but it implicated "a distinct Protestant bias," which visualized that the path of civilization followed "Christianity," and the classicist's belief in classical culture, which pictured the recovery of classical literature as the most important trait of modern civilization. As European historicism and a naturalistic view of historical explanation gained sufficient authority in American culture, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the liberal vision of human progress penetrated high school textbooks in general history, expounding the European idea of liberty as the ultimate goal of humanity. European ownership of the liberal idea became the vital grounds on which European civilization was imagined as the whole of world progress. The unavailability of liberty in Oriental civilization came to be viewed as the decisive reason for its lack of progress. The Aryan discovery of the idea of liberty legitimated the supremacy of European civilization over other peoples in world history. It became the grounds to defend the conceptualization of world history from a Eurocentric perspective.

In Aryan liberal writers' conceptualization, racial themes determined the scope of human history. Employing racial themes, they celebrated the distinct western-European idea of "liberty." The classicist's view of nineteenth-century European culture persistently defended ancient Greek and Roman civilization as essential knowledge in general history and European history and placed an emphasis on the study of ancient history. Meanwhile, the newly emerged history scholarship, "scientific history," directed the focus of medieval and modern history to the development of political organizations of nation-state and democratic institutions.

From the early twentieth century, in European history textbooks, racial doctrine became a less obvious assertion; racist terms and descriptions disappeared; and racial character no longer explained historical change. However, with few exceptions, most general and European history textbook writers, including "Aryan liberal writers" between 1875 and 1934, wrote the history of the world on the basis of the racist assumption that different human races made different progress. They depicted the history of humankind as if progress were made only by the White race. After the craft of history scholarship widely disclaimed the notion of races, the conception of world history cast off its racist appearance. However, no changes in perspective or content accompanied this shift in appearance.

Beginning in the 1890s, American historians sought the origin of modern democratic institutions in different sources than the Teutonic political genius.[50] European history writers cautiously withdrew their direct reference to the inherent Teutonic character as the source of democratic institutions. The aspiration for liberal democratic progress, however, continued to influence the conceptualization of world history. In particular, after World War I, there arose a group of history educators who saw the need to reinforce knowledge of democratic ideas and institutions as the central component of citizenship education. These history educators adopted the theme, the growth of democracy, as the central theme of world history. In their conception, the emphasis shifted from the medieval origin of representative institutions to the democratic ideas that were highlighted in political revolutions in England, America, and France. However,

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[50]Although the Teutonic origin theory began to be criticized at the end of the nineteenth century, by the mid-1930s, American historians and political scientists continued to debate whether modern democratic institutions originated in the Teutonic racial character of inherent love of liberty and self-government (Beard, 1932, p.30).

their contention that the world was progressing toward liberal democracy had the same purpose as the Aryan liberal writers' emphasis on the Aryan virtue of liberty: that is, to celebrate and expand American ideals of liberty and democracy.

An intensely nationalistic and imperialistic spirit pervaded the "Aryan liberal history." A pseudo-scientific notion of race gave their history less accuracy in method and concepts. However, there is no dispute that under the inspiration and guidance of "Aryan liberal writers" in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, history writing and teaching were transformed from exciting and morally-valued but unreliable stories and memoirs into scientifically organized, fact-emphasized historical works. Furthermore, few historians would deny the critical contribution that the "Aryan liberal writers" made to the conceptualization of European history and world history today: the justification of Eurocentric world history based on the ideas of liberty and liberal democracy. Even after racial themes became distrusted, those ideas continued to be the fundamental standards to measure the progress made by a nation or a race. The European discovery of the idea of liberty remained as the pillar of world history conceptualization, perpetuating deeply held beliefs about Western superiority or uniqueness. Histories of non-White races among human races and of the non-Aryan races among Whites were excluded from the domain of civilization on the ground that the non-White races have not created the idea of liberty. The dichotomy of European civilization versus Oriental civilization also became firmly entrenched as a conceptual framework in American high school world history textbooks.

Chapter 3

Modern European Civilization

The popularity of the general history and European history textbooks of "Aryan liberal writers" lasted until the mid-1930s. However, at the turn of the twentieth century, "a new school" emerged, calling for a revision of high school European history. Gathany characterized "the older school," as "the conservative, reactionary, stand-pat school," and the new school as "the insurgent, progressive, radical school"(1914, p.233). This chapter is mainly concerned with the world history conceptualization of the "radical," "new school," during roughly the first three and a half decades of the twentieth century. When Gathany spoke of "the older school," it included the group of "Aryan liberal writers," who were mainly interested in the evolution of political institutions. While it is not fair to say that all the Aryan liberal writers adopted the Aryan racial theme, it is probably safe to say that the Aryan liberal writers absorbed ideas of scientific history -- the evolutionary outlook, the institutional focus, and the political orientation.

The "new school," generally called "New History," arose in the 1900s.[1] Before World War I, ideas of New History came into prominence in rewriting history and decisively asserted its influence over the revision of high school history courses. New

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[1]Scholars argue the idea of New History originated in Europe. Henry Elmer Barnes (1927, p.202), a student of Robinson, as the chief figures in New History, presented Karl Lamprecht in Germany, Henri Berr in France, James Harvey Robinson in the United States, Frederick John Teggart, and Francis Sydney Marvin in England. According to Eugen Weber (1998), Karl Lamprecht was the authority in the American school of New History. Weber stated: "[American] New Historians echoed the *historikerstreit* unfolding in fin-de-siecle Germany around the work of Karl Lamprecht, with its insistence on what would later be called mentalities: plumbing collective consciousness; systemizing cultural enterprise at a time when music and art, like politics and the economy, were treated as separate entities; trying to interpret how we got here from there" (1998, p.210). Weber argued that "Lamprecht's most comprehensive statements of his belief in history as primarily a socio-psychological science" would be delivered in the United States, where he was invited to speak at the St. Louis World's Fair of 1904.

History demanded the selection and interpretation of the useful past in order to explain contemporary life and to direct human progress. This idea of New History became largely unfolded in the following three ideas. New History first proposed "a deliberate subordination of the past to the present" by selecting, emphasizing, and organizing the aspects of the past that were most relevant to present needs (Robinson and Beard, 1907, p.iii). Second, New History urged that history should immensely widen its scope by embracing all fields of human endeavor- political, economic, social, cultural, and intellectual (Gathany, 1914, p.233). Third, the reconstruction of the inclusive civilization encompassing multiple aspects of life could be achieved by associating historical study with other social sciences such as psychology, sociology, and anthropology (Robinson, 1912, p.20). Based on these ideas, historians in New History, widely called "New Historians," criticized existing trends of teaching and writing European history and attempted to reconceptualize European history and world history. James Harvey Robinson and Charles A. Beard played an important role in introducing the ideas of New History to high school European history instruction, before World War I. After the war, Carlton Hayes, Thomas Moon, Lynn Thorndike, Harry Elmer Barnes, and Carl Becker began to write high school world history textbooks based on the ideas of New History.[2]

Robinson (1899) initially perceived that the aims and purposes of historical instruction should primarily be concerned with presenting objectively the permanent achievements of mankind in the numerous fields of human endeavor. Until that time, Ranke's idea of "scientific history," the purpose of which was to discover just what actually occurred, had influenced Robinson's perception of historical study as it had those of most historians of the last quarter of the nineteenth century. In 1904, at a meeting

[2]This chapter mainly analyzes those New Historians' textbooks in Appendix B.

of the Association of History Teachers of the Middle States and Maryland, Robinson suggested, for the first time, a new basis for selecting, organizing and interpreting historical facts – that is, utilization of the past for the need of present society. The progressive movement in the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century gave enormous attention to the contemporary life. Coping with such movement, Robinson redefined the use of history as a means for understanding contemporary life and constructed the high school European history course to help students understand contemporary life. In this process, a new rationale for organizing world history around the history of western Europe and the United States appeared in the high school history instruction: the European origin of modernity. To New Historians, "modern" meant the most advanced and the most desirable. "Modern civilization" became the organizational theme in their reconceptualization of world history. To identify their view, this study refers to their vision of world history as the " modernist vision."

Racial terms and perspectives, which were obvious in the world historical conception of Aryan liberal writers, almost disappeared in the world history conceptualized by New Historians. Their conceptualization was, however, also based on assumptions that correlated different races with different degrees of progress. As did the Aryan liberal writers, New Historians also marginalized civilizations elsewhere while picturing the growth of Western civilization and its expansion as if this were the whole process of world history. This time, the ground for the exclusion of nations of non-Western civilization was reinforced by pointing out their lack of modernity, together with lack of liberty.

THE RISE OF MODERNIST VISION OF WORLD HISTORY

Emphasis on "Contemporary" History

The Committee of Seven, in its 1899 report, recommended a three-year sequence of non-American history: a one-year course in "Ancient History until Charlemagne," a one-year course in "Medieval and Modern history since the death of Charlemagne" and a one-year course in "English history."[3] For about two decades, this three-year sequence of non-American history program served to guide high school history course developers and textbook writers. In the 1920s, the dominance of this three-year scheme over the high school history curriculum confronted a challenge from a two-year sequence European history recommended by the Social Studies Committee in 1916. This Social Studies Committee was a sub-committee of the Commission on the Reorganization of Secondary Education established by the director of the NEA in 1913. The Social Studies Committee recommended a modified version of a two-year European history course: "European history until the end of the seventeenth century" and "European history since the end of the seventeenth century" (Nelson, 1994).

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[3]The Committee of Seven recommended English history as a part of American history. In the beginning of the twentieth century, American institutions were derived from the seventeenth-century English parish rather than the prehistoric Aryan tribes (Higham, 1955, p.27). Instead of emphasizing the close relationship between Aryan and American institutions, American historians focused on either "the Norman contribution" or "the Anglo-Saxon contribution," but in similar racial terms (Gossett, 1963, p.111). Many specialists turned from the remote Teutonic period to the immediate English background of American history to investigate European origins. History educators underscored the study of English history as the pre-history of American history (Hull, 1905; Wolfson, 1910). They argued that American history students should know the origins and development of the idea of liberty; the growth of the common law system, which contributed to encouraging and maintaining the idea of liberty; the growth of the forms and spirit of the English Constitution; and the struggle for the progress of democracy in English history (Plum, 1924).

Figure 3-1: The High School European History Schema of the Report of the Social Studies Commission, 1916*

Semester	Two-year Program	One and a Half-year Program**
First	*Civics*	*Civics*
Second	*Civics*	European history to approximately the end of the 17th century; this would include ancient and oriental civilization, English history to the end of the period mentioned, and the period of American exploration
Third	European history to approximately the end of the 17th century; this would include ancient and oriental civilization, English history to the end of the period mentioned, and the period of American exploration	Continues
Fourth	Continues	European history (including English history) since approximately the end of the seventeenth century
Fifth	European history (including English history) since approximately the end of the seventeenth century	*American History since the Seventeenth century*
Sixth	Continues	*Problems of American Democracy*
Seventh	*American History since the Seventeenth century*	
Eighth	*Problems of American Democracy*	

*In this figure, shaded parts indicate the courses in "Civics," "American History," and "Problems of American democracy."

**The Commission suggested that, depending on the needs of the particular pupil or group of pupils, a pupil could take a half year of American history and a half year of European history or a half year of American history and a half year of the twelfth-year study of social problems.

In this scheme, the time devoted to non-American history was decreased from three years to two years. English history, losing its status as a separate course, was integrated into European history. Instead, a new one-year course called "Problems of American Democracy" took the place of the English history course. In the European history course, the dividing point between the first and the second year shifted from the "eighth century" to the "seventeenth century." In order to increase the time to teach

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"modern history since the end of seventeenth century," the Committee proposed the reduction of the time to be spent on ancient history. The Committee showed its preference for the contemporary history of Europe.

This two-year, European history scheme with an emphasis on recent history, however, was not a new invention of the Social Studies Committee in 1916, but a result of accumulated efforts by educators and historians to meet the social demand for the contemporary relevance of the school curriculum that had existed since the late nineteenth century. The first and most important person who responded to the contemporary social demand by calling for a revision of the American high school European history course in a way to make it relevant to the contemporary world was James Harvey Robinson, leading proponent of New History. Robinson perceived that contemporary life and most current problems were, in large part, shaped in the course of development in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Therefore, these two centuries should be given more attention than any other period in order to understand the contemporary world. He also urged that the history of civilization should be reconstructed by embracing not only political affairs but also elements of economics, geography, and applied science. As he was actively involved in revising the high school history and social studies curriculum through membership in the following three committees: a special committee of the Association of History Teachers of the Middle States and Maryland in 1903, the Committee of Five, appointed in 1907, and the NEA Social Studies Committee, appointed in 1913, his ideas became very influential in constructing the high school European history course.

In 1903, the Association of History Teachers of the Middle States and Maryland established a special committee to study and report on college entrance requirements in history (*Minutes*, 1904).[4] This committee recommended a four-year European history program. As an alternative plan for the schools that could not afford the four-year program, the committee suggested that at least two years should be devoted to the study of European history. The following Figure 3-2 shows the committee's recommended programs.

Figure 3-2: The Recommendation of the Special Committee of the Association of History Teachers of the Middle States and Maryland, 1904.

Semester	A Four-year Program	A Two-Year Program
First	Ancient history-to Charlemagne	Reformed Ancient history*
Second		
Third	Medieval history to the Treaty of Utrecht or the demise of Louis XIV	Recent history of the world
Fourth		
Fifth	Combination English and American History	
Sixth		
Seventh	World history since the middle of the eighteenth century, from a European standpoint	
Eighth		

*The Committee used the words, "a reformed ancient history course," but did not specifically explain how the ancient history course should be reformed.

[4]The committee members consisted of A. Scott, of Rutgers College, chairman, E. P. Cheney of the

This committee recommended the following changes from the prior recommendation of the Committee of Seven (*Minutes*, 1904, pp.30-37). First, less attention should be given to the mass of details in the course in ancient history. Second, medieval and modern history should be separated because the course that taught medieval history and modern history altogether gave students no clear notion of their own times. Third, the courses in English history and in American history, to which the Committee of Seven had assigned one year each, should be merged into a general account of "the English-speaking people" from the time of their settlement on English soil to their current occupation and control of the earth.[5] Fourth, the course in "A History of the World from a European Standpoint" should be offered with the purpose of explaining the great problems of the present. Lastly, the committee proposed that, when the study of history for four years was inexpedient, a two year-course based upon the "recent history of the world" could properly follow "a revised course on ancient history" (*Minutes*, 1904, p.37).

The committee recommended teaching English and American history as one course and called the course the history of "English-speaking people," which had previously known as "the history of the Anglo-Saxon race." Its intention for the change of name was to minimize a racial view. What was distinctive about this committee is that for the first time, a history committee gave priority to studying the present rather than the remote past in the high school study of European history. Its devotion of a whole year to recent history since the middle of the eighteenth century became a crucial guide for later revisions of the European history course. Behind these recommendations lay Robinson's

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University of Pennsylvania, J. H. Robinson of Columbia University, W. C. Morey, of the University of Rochester, C. H. Hull of Cornell University, and E. H. Castle of Teachers College, Columbia.

(1905) belief that history should serve to help students understand the present and that the present world could be made comprehensible without explaining history prior to the middle of the eighteenth century. Robinson was the key person who originally presented the plan for reorganizing the secondary school history program. Therefore, in this committee's discussions, the proposal was referred to as "Robinson's scheme" (*Minutes*, 1904, p.51). At the Third Annual Convention of the Association of History Teachers of the Middle States and Maryland held at New York University, March 10 and 11, 1905,

Figure 3-3: The High School European History Schema of James Harvey Robinson, 1905*

Semester	Three-Year Program	Two-Year Program
First	Ancient History	Ancient history
Second	Continues	Medieval history to the opening of The 14th century
Third	Medieval history to the opening of The 14th century	Europe from 15th to 18th century
Fourth	Europe from 15th to 18th century	Modern history from Utrecht to the Congress of Vienna
Fifth	Modern history from Utrecht to the Congress of Vienna**	Europe since 1815
Sixth	Europe since 1815**	*American history*
Seventh	*American history*	*American history continues*
Eighth	*American history continues*	*Civil government or political economy*

*James Harvey Robinson also designed a history program for a four-year high school curriculum, in which he devoted the first three years to European history and the last year to American history.
** Shaded parts indicate courses in "American History" and Civil Government and Political Economy.

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[1]In its report, Madison Conference, a sub-committee of the Committee of Ten, called American history and American history altogether "the history of the Anglo-Saxon race" (American Historical Association, 1893).

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Robinson presented a final version of these recommendations in his work, "the General Scheme for a High School Curriculum in History." In this version, several changes were made from the original recommendations. Figure 3-3 shows the 1905 recommendations of programs.

The special committee passed most of the original recommendations that were made in 1904, except for one regarding English history. The 1905 scheme incorporated English history into European history. The committee believed that teaching English history in the context of European history would give students a better understanding of English history as well as of American history (Hull, 1905; Robinson, 1905). By putting English history into European history, the chief peculiarities of English development and the particular contributions of England to the progress of western Europe would be explained in more general terms than in a course that only taught the history of the "English speaking race." In this plan, there would be no danger of losing sight of England's dependence on and close connection to the continent. Robinson expected that in the second year of the European history course, England could be treated as prominently as France or Germany were (Robinson, 1905, p.11). English history had been taught in a separate course in order to explain English origins and the continuous development of the American state institutions. In the scheme of the special committee (1905), English history was incorporated into European history. In European history courses, history teachers were expected to teach American historical background.

For teaching ancient history, Robinson believed that if ancient history were to focus on the great salient facts in the civilization of Greece and Rome, one semester should be sufficient for the course (1905, p.9). Nevertheless, in his actual scheme, he

assigned one year for ancient history. The persistent influence of the classicists, who believed the study of ancient Greece and Rome must be the core of history instruction over European history, was hard to resist. Meanwhile, Robinson (1905) kept his original plan to create a separate, one-year course in "Recent history since the mid- eighteenth century," arguing that an understanding of today's world and its problems was, after all, "the consummation of all historical study." These courses, as in the original 1904 scheme, had been called "World history from a European standpoint," and these courses began to be developed on the basis of the assumption that modern civilization was the civilization of European peoples. The vision of the Europeanizing world became clear in Robinson's collaborated textbook with Charles A. Beard, *The Development of Modern Europe*. They understood that European history since the mid-eighteenth century was merged into world history (Robinson and Beard, 1907, p.80). To make sense of the contemporary way of life, therefore, they argued, required explanations of economic, social and intellectual development as well as problems created by scientific and technological invention and industrialization in the eighteenth century in Europe. From this understanding, Robinson pointed out that in treating history since the mid-eighteenth century, the democratic revolution, the advent of constitutional government, industrial changes, the progress of transportation, the vast colonial and commercial enterprises of today – all these must find a place within political history because they furnished the keys to understanding today's world (1905, p.10).

The trend toward emphasizing recent history was finally recognized in the nation-wide revision of the high school history curriculum by the American Historical Association's Committee of Five, in which Robinson served as one of its members. Other

members were C. McLaughlin, of University of Michigan, chairman, C. H. Haskins of University of Wisconsin, C. W. Mann of Lewis Institute, Chicago, J. H. Robinson of Columbia University, and J. Sullivan, High School of Commerce, New York City. The American Historical Association established the Committee of Five in 1907 to review the current situation of history instruction and to propose possible modification of the recommendations of the Committee of Seven. The Committee of Five, after reviewing the current situation of the "world's history," reported that the vast majority of schools had adopted the period-plan of organizing the history course recommended by the Committee of Seven (American Historical Association, 1912).[6] It advised that the recommendations of the Committee of Seven be retained except for one modification; they proposed increasing the time allotted to modern history. Recognizing the growing demand for modern history, the Committee of Five (1912) recommended that schools emphasize the study of "modern history since Louis VIX" by devoting one year to it. The committee made space for modern history by combining medieval and English history into one year. The Committee of Five believed that the modern history course would naturally include not only the history of Europe but of England as well, at least from 1760." The result was a rearrangement of the scheme of the Committee of Seven into the following three-year course.

- Ancient history to 800 A.D. for one year
- English history to about 1760 for one year
- Modern history from Louis VIX for one year.

[6]The Committee of Five used the word "world's history" rather than European history.

The Committee of Five argued that for knowledge of present social and political conditions, students need to have a reasonable familiarity with the great changes of the past century, and that history courses should be so arranged as to allow ample opportunity for the study of the development progress of modern Europe (American Historical Association, 1912, p.53). The committee clarified that the aim of history instruction was to help students gain insight into issues and problems in the present world. The committee also urged that "suitable attention" should be given not only to the rise of the modern states, European expansion and the development of free institutions, but also to economic progress and social change.

As Carlton Hayes (1913), a history professor at Columbia University, testified, before World War I, recent history was becoming a compelling part of European history. In this line of development, the NEA Social Studies Committee (1916) recommended a two-year European history course shown in the Figure 3-1. This NEA Committee's two-year European history course began to challenge the two-year European history course of the Committee of Seven.

Emphasis on Socio-economic History

The three decades before the end of the World War I were a time of great change in American life. This is the period generally called "the Progressive Era." While American society was surrounded by numerous economic, political, and social problems produced by the continuing industrialization and urbanization since the early nineteenth

century, Americans were confident that society would march toward progress, resolving those problems by economic, political, and social reforms.

Owing to the development of the social sciences and the growth of "pedagogy" as an independent, "scientific" discipline, educational reformers, along with other reformers in this era, attempted to provide solutions for social problems and visions for social improvements through educational reforms. According to David Tyack (1974), educational progressivism took two reform paths: administrative progressivism and pedagogical progressivism. Administrative progressivism sought changes in school organization and management under "scientific" principles and professionally trained leadership. Pedagogical progressivism was concerned with a child-centered curriculum, instructional reform, and the democratization of the school. As part of pedagogical reform, progressive educators called for the diversification of the school curriculum to satisfy different children's needs. The contemporary industrial and commercial society made it necessary for schools to reflect a new, economic purpose. Progressive educators believed that the commercial-and-industrial-oriented contemporary society demanded that schools prepare students for differentiated roles in the economy. In order to promote the economic betterment of students and provide them equal opportunity to develop to the fullest of their abilities, educational reformers urged the school curriculum to include subjects that were practical and relevant to the contemporary world of economic growth (Urban and Wagoner, 1996, p.198).

A majority of educators in the late nineteenth century, including Charles Eliot, the chair of the NEA Committee of Ten (1893) and William T. Harris, U.S. Commissioner of Education, however, envisioned the revision of education in the continuing "classical

humanistic tradition," with little concern for the economic purpose of school. The foremost purpose of education for all students at all levels, regardless of their social classes and vocational destinations, was to transmit to students the American cultural and political heritages that originated in western Europe. Educators in humanistic tradition argued that social assimilation by cultural transmission would be the solution for social problems and cultural confusion caused by class struggle and massive immigration. This line of thought dominated the membership of the Committee of Ten, whose main task was to bring some uniformity in college admission requirements. In its general review of the school curriculum, the Committee of Ten underscored the uniform purpose of citizenship education regardless of students' different future directions, preparation for life and preparation for college. Rejecting the demand to diversify the high school curriculum, the Committee of Ten adopted a uniform curriculum with a little flexibility brought by the elective principle, under which individual students, depending on their needs, were able to select some courses. In the report of the history sub-committee of the Committee of Ten (1893), the Madison Conference, citizenship education was to fulfill its purpose by teaching cultural and political traditions and institutions of the Euro-American community.[7] The American Historical Association's Committee of Seven, extending the ideas of the Committee of Ten, provided an outline for secondary history and civic programs. Courses of study and textbooks in European history were also developed according to the same assumption, bulwarked by the "classical humanistic

[7]The Madison conference was responsible for the development of programs in history, civil government and political economy. In this conference, James Harvey Robinson, with notable "scientific" historians such as Charles Kendall Adams, Albert Bushnell Hart, and Woodrow Wilson, served as members. In this conference, Robinson's ideas of New History were not in shape to influence the development of history courses. Adams and Hart played the central role to make a blueprint for the secondary courses in history, civil government, and political economy.

traditions" and "scientific history scholarship." Educators holding the "classical humanistic perspective" believed that European history courses should focus on ancient Greco-Roman culture and European political development.

The progressive reform impulse, however, was a growing tendency even before World War I. The progressive educational reformers campaigned for the doctrine of social efficiency to reorganize rapidly expanding school systems and to revise the school curriculum. Holding a utilitarian perspective, the reformers, mostly school administrators, superintendents, teachers, educational officials, and educational specialists, envisioned that the aim of high schools was to produce diligent, intelligent, and responsible members of society. In order to meet this aim, they suggested, the high school curriculum should include subjects concerned with current political, social, and economic life, issues, and problems. Under the influence of progressivism and particularly under the spur of criticism from social scientists, subjects little concerned with present society fell into disrepute. Increasingly, educators found no merit in a history course that was indifferent to the present social reality and problems. Educators who were discontented with history that seemed isolated from contemporary life proposed reducing time allotted to history and replacing history with courses from the social sciences. This reform impulse was crystallized in the 1916 report of the Social Studies Committee. Responding to social demands, the NEA developed an interest in socialization and social reform through education; as a result, the Commission on the Reorganization of Secondary Education was established in 1913 (Nelson, 1994, p.83). Unlike previous national history committees, whose members were composed mainly of historians, the membership of the Social Studies Committee in 1916 consisted of educators from many sections of

education, including superintendents, principals, teachers, social scientists, and historians.[8] Therefore, the direction that its Social Studies Committee would take was predictable.

The Social Studies Committee adopted the educational doctrine of "social efficiency," and replaced the course name "History, Civil government, and Political Economy" with "social studies" (Nelson, 1994). In the introduction of its report in 1916, the committee declared, "instruction in all subjects should contribute to this end, social efficiency." In order to meet this end, the committee called for some radical changes. The results were the reduction of time devoted to history, the introduction of a new course in "Problems of American Democracy," and an emphasis on contemporary history. The committee found little useful in ancient and medieval history for the purpose of social efficiency. The committee argued that "the traditional type of history" was in danger because it failed to meet "the new demands for efficiency." To meet these demands, borrowing the remarks in Robinson's book, *New History* (1912), the committee argued, the history course must serve us "best in understanding the most vital problems of the present" (Nelson, 1994, p.39). The ideas of New History became embodied in the committee's recommendations for European history courses.

In the first decade of the twentieth century, there was a growing demand for schools to revise their curricula in ways intended to help students understand the

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[8]T. J. Jones of United States Bureau of Education, formerly of the Hampton Institute, chairman, A. W. Dunn of United States Bureau of Education, secretary, J. L. Barnard of School of Pedagogy, Philadelphia, G. G. Bechtel, Principal, of Northwestern High School, Detroit, Mich., F. L. Boyden, Principal of High School Deerfield, Mass., E. C. Branson of University of North Carolina, H. R. Burch of West Philadelphia high School, F. W. Carrier of Somerville High School, J. C. Evans of William Penn High School for Girls, W. J. Hamilton, Superintendent of Schools, Two Rivers, Wis., B. C. Hazard of Cornell University, S. B. Howe of High School, Newark, N.J., C. D. Kingsley, State High School Inspector, Boston, Mass., J. H. Low of Manual Training High School, Brooklyn, N.Y., W. T. Morrey of

contemporary world. Subjects in the social sciences gained popularity because of their explanations of the present life. The full-blown pragmatic and progressive reform impulse threatened history courses that were indifferent to the contemporary world. Instead of reacting defensively to the threat to history's status, New Historians embraced a utilitarian outlook and embarked on a campaign to reform history. They convinced educators and historians that history could explain current life and problems.

Completely committed to the promotion of contemporary history in high schools through his addresses, writings, textbooks and, particularly the development of the school history curriculum, James Harvey Robinson revitalized the high school European history course for the purpose of contemporary needs. Charles A. Beard, following Robinson's footsteps, pleaded for the study of contemporary history as the core subject of history instruction. In his own words:

> I believe the time has now come for laying decided stress on the great and fundamental achievements of the last two centuries with special reference to those which have specially contributed to the making of the world about us (Beard, 1908, p.15).

Tracing the origins and development of some aspects of modern life, such as religious life, art and architecture, and certain constitutional matters, required the study of ancient and medieval history of Europe (Sullivan, 1905, p.461). But the study of the recent two or three centuries with great thoroughness was vital in order to understand the contemporary world because it was in recent times and not in the remote past, that

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Bushwick High School, Brooklyn, N.Y., J. Pettibone of High School, New Milford, Conn., J. H. Robinson of Columbia University, and W. A. Wheatley, Superintendent of Schools, Middletown, Conn.

students were to find the original forces of contemporary progress and problems (Robinson 1905, p. 10; Sullivan, 1905, p. 461).

Robinson and Beard also claimed the significance of the explanation of intellectual, economic, and social aspects of life in order to understand contemporary world complexities. History, Beard stated, has always served the interests of men and illuminated their problems (1908, p.64). The task of each generation of history teachers was to emancipate themselves from the inherited routine and readjust themselves to their own problems. According to Beard (1908), after the great Protestant Revolution, histories were written to justify the ideas and practices of the contending religious parties; and when the still more revolutionary constitutional insurrection came throughout Europe, the interests of historians shifted to politics. For three centuries since the seventeenth century, the main concern of mankind in the western world has been the attainment and maintenance of popular government. Therefore, history principally served to illuminate political matters. The great problems of the present time, however, Beard argued, were not political as such in "the fashioning of representative institutions," but "primarily social and economic" (1908, p.64) The task of historians today, therefore, ought to be to provide a clear understanding of the economic and social character of the contemporary world.

At the turn of the twentieth century, the United States, together with European nations, excelled in science, medicine, and technology, and enjoyed better health care and sanitation than elsewhere. In America, such products of modern technology as electricity, automobiles, and telephones, which most countries did not enjoy in large quantities until after the Great War, had become commonplace before the war (Iriye, 1993, p.112). In

housing, in infrastructure or in recreational and cultural activities, Americans believed that they had the highest quality of life in the world. The American people enjoyed their rich natural resources and growing wealth and witnessed growing availability of political liberty, education, and unlimited opportunity of the common man. They were confident in their growing power and wealth parallel with, or even greater than, European nations. Above all, the American nation as well as the European states developed modern systems of government, including legal frameworks, conceptions of citizenship with specified rights and duties, and community services. The World's Columbian Exposition, which opened in Chicago on May 1, 1893, demonstrated the great American scientific, technological, and economic achievements and thereby made millions of visitors proud of the fact that the American nation had become a master of "modernity's powerful forces" (Breisach, 1993, p.7). The United States seemed to represent modern civilization with material prosperity, comfort, and the highest standard of living. Increasingly young students came from all over the world to America to learn and returned to their home Americanized. American missionaries spread Western science, medicine, technology, Christianity and even Western political and social ideals, contributing to the Americanization of the world. The impact of American goods and ways of life became pervasive throughout the world. Although there were growing concerns for the sharp social tensions prompted by labor strikes, mass immigration from non-northwestern Europe, radical anarchism, and signs of class struggles, social and political reformers in the Progressive Era boasted their optimism that those problems would pose no fatal challenges to their country of ever-increasing developments in science, industries, popular education, and democracy.

Outside the country, owing to its modern achievements, the United States, at the turn of the twentieth century, awoke from isolation and began to assert its presence in the world arena. An American victory in their imperialistic war with Spain in 1898 and the annexation of Puerto Rico and the Philippines demonstrated American superior military power and its success in colonial control. The United States was elevated to equal status with the historically dominant European states in world politics and began the twentieth century as a global power as powerful as European states. Active American involvement in the world system began to change the historians' conception of the American position. They perceived that the United States could assert the same level of power as European states to create world order. Americans felt comfortable in calling themselves a world power (Washburn, 1904, pp.1901-02).

All of these modern scientific, technological, social, and political developments made the New Historians define the idea of progress from a perspective of scientific and economic developments. They believed that the progress of science and the application of science and technology to the industrial world would assure both the material and intellectual progress of the world. They perceived that eventually every corner of the globe would benefit from this advance. They wanted to explain the evolution of modern scientific, technological, and industrial civilization. In their view, the United States was playing a critical part in making it. They shifted away from the traditional emphasis on their European political and religious heritages and proposed a new emphasis on the contemporary political, economic, social, and intellectual progress and aspiration. They began to conceive the vital connection between Europe and America based on the concept of one civilization that rested on science and technology.

Emphasis on Scientific and Industrial Civilization

New Historians criticized that history had been, so far, concerned with what happened in the past and had explained the past itself with little interest in changes in the contemporary world. History just revealed the past as it was and thereby failed to make clear the dynamic changes that brought about the present world. They called it the "old view" as opposed to their "New History." Robinson asserted that the "old view" of history had hitherto made the present "a willing victim of the past" (1912, p. 24). The past that did not live in the present was useless from "the standpoint of public need" (Beard, 1908, p. 13). John Dewey, a professor of philosophy and an advocate of New History in his book, *Democracy and Education* stated:

> The segregation which kills the vitality of history is divorce[d] from present modes and concerns of social life. The past just as past is no longer our affairs. If it were wholly gone and done with, there would be only one reasonable attitude toward it. Let the dead bury their dead. But the knowledge of the past is the key to understanding the present. History deals with the past, but this past is the history of the present (Dewey, 1968, p.213-14).

New Historians argued that the past should be utilized and history should serve a pragmatic use; it should explain the present and concurrently direct "social betterment." For that purpose, the present needs should determine what to teach about the past. This principle undermined "all that was exceptional and abnormal" (Robinson, 1903, p.2). Instead, it highlighted certain aspects of life that were essentially the same today, emphasized particular events, institutions, and ideas that had a long-lasting influence on the present and explained certain permanent conditions in and progress by the western

world from one state to another (Robinson 1903, p.2; Sullivan, 1905, p. 461). New Historians rejected the doctrine of the famous English Teutonic theorist and political institutional historian, Edward A. Freeman: that is, "history is past politics," which had been the foremost guidance for Aryan liberal writers who comprised the "older school" (Shortwell, 1911, p. 4). They complained that this "old view" would not allow students to be exposed to any of the other equally important phases of social, cultural, and economic activity, development, and institutions such as the development of the Church, commerce, art and material progress. Without treating these subjects, Robinson insisted, history would remain "a poor, inadequate, ill-understood theme" (1899, p. 61).

In the light of these two principles, Robinson and Beard wrote their collaborative book, *Development of Modern Europe* (1907). The effort to explain the contemporary economic and social complexities, however, is first found in Robinson's first textbook, *Introduction to the History of Western Europe,* published in 1903(Robinson, 1903). In this book, the section called "Europe Today" explored the scientific and economic development of Europe and its ramifications in the contemporary world. He pictured the contemporary conditions and problems in Europe as a result of modern science. Scientific and technological inventions in the eighteenth century made the Industrial Revolution possible and it, in turn, reinforced democratic movements in the nineteenth century. Scientific and technological inventions in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with the development of new energy for machine production and transportation, brought on the development of machinery. This created mass production, produced a new labor division, and finally led to the Industrial Revolution. Industrialization demanded less regulation of government in trade and industry and more commitment of government to

the protection of laborers than ever before. Meanwhile, industrialization encouraged the growth of towns and cities, where the working classes struggled to find ways to survive under the cruel conditions of "the factory system." In the course of industrialization, the lower classes were compelled to promote their interests by direct participation in government affairs. As a result, constitutions were introduced into all of the Western European states in the nineteenth century. While these constitutions differed from one another in detail, they were all virtually the same in establishing a house of representatives, whose members were chosen by the people at large. Gradually the franchise had been extended to the poorest laborer. The principle that all citizens were equal before the law and were equally eligible to run for all public offices and positions of honor and trust, according to their capacity and without any distinction except that of their character and ability, came to be recognized as the core of modern constitutions. In Robinson's view, science, together with constitutional government systems in the eighteenth century in western Europe, were the fundamental forces of the European transition from the Middle Ages to modern times. The modern ascendancy of western European states was a consequence of both their scientific and technological innovation and capitalistic activities supported by their free governments. In his conception, science, together with democratic government, was the most important dependent variable of modern progress.

In *The Development of Modern Europe: An Introduction to the Study of Current History*, Robinson and Beard (1907) concentrated on the two most recent centuries, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, to illuminate how contemporary political, economic, and social life came to be. Although still locked in the conventional political framework,

this book was successful, to a degree, in describing modern progress that would go beyond political history. They explained that the contemporary way of life was a ramification of political, economic, social, and intellectual developments in the eighteenth century. The nineteenth century, they stated, had been often too arrogant to recognize its dependence upon the eighteenth, from which it had derived most of its inspirations as well as its aversions (Robinson and Beard, 1907, p.vi). However, they continued, it was the eighteenth century that "set the problems of progress and suggested their solutions, leaving to its successor the comparatively simple task of working them out in detail and making fuller application of them" (Robinson and Beard, 1907, p.iv). They were convinced that modern civilization was largely a product of the three developments in the eighteenth century in western Europe: "the Enlightenment," "the French Revolution," and "the Industrial Revolution" – intellectual, political and economic upsurges. In this course of historical development, they argued, science became the fundamental outlook and the method in every branch of the disciplines and the middle class obtained power, establishing the popular government of today. Robinson and Beard attempted to explain the development of the modern mode of life characterized by a scientific outlook, industrial and commercial developments, and popular democratic government. Aryan liberal writers characterized modern civilization only with political developments, the nation-state and democratic institutions. In the conception of New Historians, modern civilization came to embrace scientific and industrial characteristics. In their view, modern civilization was a product of European civilization. They declared that as the European powers expanded over Asia and Africa, European history became merged with world history since the eighteenth century. They perceived that European

influence would finally make the world a unified whole. Before World War I, American and European history educators established the essence of modern world civilization, which was a fulfillment of modern science invented only in European civilization. After the war, New Historians assumed responsibility for writing a concrete, extended narrative of modern world civilization.

EXTENSION AND ADAPTATION OF THE MODERNIST VISION

World War I surprised the American people. History educators realized that they failed to explain the real character and certain features of the existing social order that were dangerous to the maintenance of peace (Anderson, 1916, p.238). World War I magnified the ferment, emphasizing current problems and issues as the focus of history as well as social studies. What people read in newspapers and what they talked about in everyday life could not be made rational without knowing the key issues and problems of the current world. Every political, social and economic affair of the current world required the school to prepare informed and intelligently opinionated citizens. The history curriculum in practice was inadequate to equip a responsible electorate against the throng of tangled international and national problems that were crowding in upon American citizens (Bassett et al., 1927, p. 112). Educators cried out for a school curriculum revision in social studies and history to make the curriculum relevant to the contemporary needs.

Social studies educators who were trained in the science of education proposed the creation of an interdisciplinary course in "current events" or "current problems" with

the purpose of understanding the contemporary world. Such an issue-centered approach had been more or less discussed for several decades since the 1890s. However, as World War I cried for the contemporary understanding, the issue-centered approach gained a good deal of currency. David Snedden, Ernest Horn, and Harold Rugg made considerable efforts to apply this radical approach to school practice. In their plans, conventional distinction of subjects – history, economics government, sociology, or geography – disappeared. Instead, social studies became "one unified curriculum," in which the subjects were integrated around themes and topics. In social studies courses, history was not to be taught but to be used when particular topics or themes required historical background (Packard, 1919, p.529; Gambrill 1924, p. 87).

While schools were compelled to teach current issues and problems, they could not reject the deep-rooted humanistic tradition of education, which put history at the center of the social studies curriculum.[9] American intellectuals widely believed that the study of history was vital for understanding contemporary life and problems (Zook, 1919, p.36). School administrators had to find a way to accommodate those two demands.[10] The result was the invention of world history courses with an emphasis on modern history, which aimed to analyze and explain modern characteristics so as to help students have a clear picture of the modern world and their places in it. In this course,

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[9]Schools, therefore, sought a less radical way than the issue-centered rearrangement of social studies. These schools designed a course that treated current issues with newspapers and magazines as resources one period a week while mainly teaching history and civics (Gambrill, 1924, p.88). In such courses, as Gambrill in 1924 reported, world history often became the basis for an integration of the several social studies.

[10]Tryon observed that in order to satisfy these two demands, school administrators invented a one-year course in world history. In his own words: " [The world history course] seems to be the 'Topsy' of the present day high school history course. It has had its strongest supporters among school administrators, who, in their efforts to 'hold fast to that which was good,' when so many new subjects were clamoring for a hearing, found a way to keep history other than American in the program of studies by encompassing in one year what had been included in two or even three years"(Tryon, 1935, pp.221-22).

understanding modern features of the world stood out as the key purpose of history courses.

After the war, high schools taught modern history either as a part of a two-year sequence or in a one-year survey course in world history. In 1924, Montgomery Gambrill examined fourteen courses of study of modern European and modern world history and reported that only three courses were one-year surveys. In Gambirll's 1927 report, however, the one-year world history courses were increasing in number and world history textbooks were also "multiplying impressively." Subjects in social sciences and industrial training pushed into the high school curriculum for their spaces. Gambrill stated:

> [A]ny one who has the opportunity of visiting schools and making inquiries will soon learn that very often the new [world history] course is introduced simply to cover as much ground as possible in the one year of history other than American which is offered, and the exigencies of a commercial or technical curriculum or the conflicting demands of other social studies are the real explanation, rather than any recognition of a World Community of the need for a new world history (1927, p.267).

For practical purposes, school administrators reduced the time allotted to European history or world history from two years to one year. By 1930, a one-year course in world history became firmly entrenched in the high school history curriculum. The one-year world history course generally put its weight on the modern period.

Exploring "Salient Traits" of Modern History

Before the war, the principle of excerpting those segments of the past that were directly useful in explaining the present had already been circulated. After the war,

almost every history educator invariably proclaimed his or her intention, in developing courses and writing textbooks, to stress recent happenings or at least those events of the past that have had a direct bearing upon the present. For the application of this principle, this time, New Historians began their works with a preliminary analysis of the present, drawing manly on social sciences. The growth of social sciences not only called for the rearrangement of the social studies curriculum, but also the reorganization of world history content in a way to directly explain the contemporary life. The penetration of the thematic and issue-centered approaches in the social studies had a critical impact on the construction of modern history in an analytical and explanatory format. Modern history textbooks invariably began by pointing out "salient characteristics" of modern civilization before they began their narrative of modern history. Then, they traced the origins of the modern features to the beginning of modern times around the sixteenth century and explained how such modern elements were created in Europe and became global experiences.

According to New Historians, "salient modern traits" were "scientific knowledge," "industrialism," "nationalism," "democracy," and " Europeanization.[11] World War I accelerated those modern developments in science, technology, and economy in the United States. There was no doubt that science was responsible for the creation of modern civilization. As he had before the war, Robinson stressed "science" as the key dynamic that brought out the distinctive trait of contemporary civilization (1921, p.6). Science made modern times distinctive from medieval times and at the same time

[11]The description of the modern characteristics depend on Anderson (1916, p.238); Knowlton and Howe (1917, p.iii); Hayes and Moon (1923, pp.5-10); Robinson and Beard (1916, p.1; 1929, pp.4-7); Thorndike (1927, p. 378); and Becker (1931, pp.2-3).

distinguished Western civilization from the rest. Due to the development of a scientific outlook, the supremacy of the Church was broken and business became the chief concern of large classes, and the attention of the world was directed more and more to secular, or worldly affairs. Although religious writings and religious inquiries continued to be important, an ever-increasing proportion of mankind's intellectual interest went to science, invention, exploration and research (Robinson and Beard, 1929, p.5). Triumphing over "the older views of the supernatural" – "the providence of God and the operations of the devil," science undertook an investigation of the world (Robinson and Beard, 1929, p.5). Over time, the State and the Church were separated, and industrialization became a central fact of modern times.

The contemporary world is an age of industrial machinery. Unlike pre-modern societies, modern society utilizes scientific observation and speculation for practical purposes. Using the forces of nature, modern society creates more comfortable conditions of life. Capitalism is another feature that dominates the modern economic world (Hayes and Moon, 1923, pp.9-10). Before modern times, worldwide trade seldom took place and agriculture and manufacturing were conducted on a small-scale and by simple methods compared with modern times. The most important social class today is made up of bankers, manufacturers, lawyers, and businessmen – the "middle" class, "bourgeois" – whereas in earlier times the "clergy" and "landowners" were relatively more influential.

The nation-state used to be recognized as the most important modern feature of all in modern European history. There was no doubt that since the eighteenth century, the nation-state has been the main unit of political action in international affairs and its role

has become stronger and stronger; it clearly plays a large part in managing peace and in carrying out war (Hayes and Moon 1923, p.615). However, until the Great War, people did not realize the precarious power of nationalism for world conflicts. Exaggerated feelings and a desire to pursue national interests could create great world pain and loss as manifested in World War I. In the post-war decade, the principle of national self-determinism, which Woodrow Wilson emphasized, directed world politics. The colonial states in Asia and Latin America, clamoring for their independence to order to govern themselves, created a surge of nationalistic movements. These events and movements testified to the growth of nationalism in molding the modern world. Today, although the countries of the world are becoming more interdependent with respect to trade and industry, nations remain independent with respect to government (Becker, 1931, p. 8). This fact, for a while, would not change.

The most significant factor of all in the contemporary world is democracy. The growth of liberty in every aspect of life including the intellectual, the political, and the religious, is the striking feature of modern times. Government by the people has prevailed, triumphing over the rule by one or a few. The principle of political and civil equality directs public affairs. Free speech, free opinion, and free discussion in a public press have become fundamental human rights. Liberal democracy has been the critical theme of world history since the French Revolution.

By the late 1920s, European civilization had become a world-wide phenomenon, spreading Western commerce and manufacturing and other forms of civilization all over the globe, argued Robinson and Beard (1929, p.7). European civilization in the Middle Ages was confined to a small and fairly homogeneous region. In modern times,

Europeans discovered and planted their people in every continent on the globe. Non-European societies, adopting European ways of living and thinking, have transformed their societies into modern states.

Becker (1931) emphasized internationalism over Europeanization of the world and marked the economic changes of modern times as "economic interdependence." According to Becker (1931), in modern times, owing to modern technological inventions in telecommunication and transportation, exchange and trade are taking place on a world-scale. As a result, countries in the world have become economically interdependent whereas in pre-modern times, the communities would have to be economically sufficient unto themselves. During the nineteenth century, according to Becker, nations were trying to work together to prevent war as well as promote the common good in other ways, and in times of peace by forming a great many international associations for all sorts of purposes (1931, pp. 10-11). He saw that, in the twentieth century, the international associations tended to become more and more global in their organization and in their goals. Therefore, Becker argued, internationalism should also be noted as an important fact of modern civilization. The intellectual trend of the post-war decade emphasized internationalism with an aspiration for world peace and cried out for international understanding and cooperation to prevent further pain and loss.

Having presented the modern characteristics, in their textbooks, New Historians researched into the past in order to trace how those modern characteristics came to be. They employed an approach, called a "genetic method," one of the chief scientific achievements of the latter half of the nineteenth century, in order to reveal the development of modern factors through the successive stages of their growth (Dewey

1916, p.90; Barnes, 1927, p.202). American historians who accepted the idea of scientific history used the genetic method to trace the origins of their political institutions. Because New Historians also were familiar with this approach, they attempted to benefit from it by tracing the evolution of significant contemporary features.

Before World War I, Robinson and Beard gave sole focus to the most recent two centuries: the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. They had stressed that an understanding of the contemporary world was largely dependent upon an appreciation of socio-economic changes brought about by the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth century. After the war, they continued to emphasize the most recent two or three centuries as the most important period for understanding the modern world. As they extended their outlook beyond political history and the history of modern science, they argued that modern history began in the sixteenth century. Robinson and Beard argued that, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the rise of the middle classes to power, the establishment of self-government, and the rise of modern science marked a new epoch (1916, pp.2-3). However, in other fields, such as culture, religion, and business, they believed the new era began earlier in the sixteenth century. They marked the period of modern times as including four centuries from the sixteenth forward, and they stated that men who live during these centuries have had, more or less, a modern outlook in politics, literature, philosophy, business methods, ideas of progress and of national, political organization (Robinson and Beard 1916, p. 1).

Generally, historians marked the beginning of modern times from the sixteenth century on the basis of the same understanding of modern transformation as Robinson

and Beard.[12] In the 1920s, owing to new socio-economic interpretations in contemporary studies, Hayes (1928) argued that the "bourgeoisie," the new middle class, had done more than all of the other social classes combined to influence the progress of the several countries of modern Europe and to create the life and thought of the present generation throughout the world. The commercial revolution of the sixteenth century gave rise to "the powerful middle class, the bourgeoisie" (Hayes, 1928, p.28). The developments of towns and the middle class and commercial revolution in the sixteenth century, therefore, should go into the picture of modern history. Carl Becker (1931) argued that between 1300 and 1600, the Renaissance and the Reformation led up to modern history and modern characteristics became clearly discernible by the seventeenth century.

Conventionally, "Aryan liberal" writers marked the beginning of modern history by a series of events that took place in the sixteenth century: the fall of the eastern part of the Roman Empire; the discovery of America by Columbus in 1492; the Reformation; the formation of nation-states; three great inventions, which helped on the mental and social revolutions — the new printing press, gunpowder, and the mariner's compass. To "Aryan liberal" writers, those events, however, had been just a series of events. They had failed to explain the ramifications of such events in relation to modern transformation and eschewed coherent interpretation, overwhelmingly focusing on political history. Modernity had been largely defined by political changes such as the rise of nation-states and democratic representative institutions. Now, New Historians went backward from the present to the Renaissance, the Reformation, and European discoveries and reinterpreted

[12]It should be noted that every modern history writer recognized the impossibility to present a sharp date of beginning and ending of modern history (Robinson and Smith, 1929, p.147; Becker, 1931, p.13).

them in the light of their contemporary social, economic, and intellectual results. They gave a fresh emphasis to developments in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In the conception of New Historians, modern characteristics came to be discernable in developments of towns and the middle class, commercial revolution, the rise of nations, and the Renaissance and Reformation in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries (Hayes and Moon, 1923, p.vi; Becker 1931, p.13). The main factors that stimulated industrialization were sought in the rise of bourgeoisie and the Commercial revolution in the sixteenth century. These events served as new foundations for the modern transformation.

Modern European Civilization as "Standards"

Before World War I, Robinson and Beard had already asserted that "modern characteristics" became world-wide as European expansion made European history merge with world history since the eighteenth century. However, it was after the war that New Historians began to describe the dynamic process of Europeanization of the world. They emphasized that European nations, not other countries, created modernity, the "modern way of thinking and doing" and spread it over the world. Hayes and Moon stated in their modern history textbook:

> It was in Europe that the common people first dared wrest the scepter of government from crowned autocrats; that nations leaned patriotism; that inventors harnessed nature's forces to drive machines and ships; that scientists explored the heavens with telescopes and learned the secrets of chemistry, biology, and medicine; that public schools and power-driven

> printing presses opened the kingdoms of knowledge (Hayes and Moon, 1923, p. 615).

They defined the modern way of doing and thinking with distinct western European ideas and systems -- democracy, nationalism, industrialism, and science-- which they regarded as the standards to measure the progress of a nation or society. A Eurocentric perspective of modernity assumed that the rest of the world remained satisfied with a rudimentary level of civilization. Again, Hayes and Moon stated:

> [In Egypt] There were blacksmiths, stonecutters, … but manufactures and commerce played no such important role as they do in modern life and the social position of the people who engaged in industry and trade was very low indeed. When civilization began, the common people, the working people were found in a position of inferiority; Democracy was a thing of the distant future (Hayes and Moon, 1923, pp. 14-15).

Since the last quarter of the nineteenth century, "lack of freedom" in "Oriental civilization" was the grounding thesis to justify the conceptualization of world history solely around "the superior" European civilization. After the war, along with "lack of freedom," "lack of modernity" doomed Oriental civilization to failure. Robinson and Breasted stated: "Liberty as we understand it was unknown, and the rule of the people, which we call 'democracy,' was never dreamed of in the Orient"(1921, p.46). According to Robinson and Breasted, "lack of liberty" was the main reason why the Orient did not achieve modern science, which allowed Europe to achieve modernity. They argued that because the Orientals generally suffered from "a lack of freedom of the mind – a kind of intellectual bondage to religion and to old ideas," they could not go far to invent natural

science and their religion was filled with "darkened superstitions" (Robinson and Breasted, 1921, p.46).

They interpreted Oriental civilization as "backward" (Becker 1931, p.608). Although to some degree the countries in the Orient demonstrated different levels of development, they commonly lacked the medieval period. The Orient completed its evolution in ancient times without further progress in government or science. Webster directly stated that only Europe experienced the medieval period and that neither "the Near East" nor "the Far East" had a medieval period (1930, p.69). Therefore, to New Historians, it was logical that those civilizations in China, India, Africa and Central America, in spite of their early start, were destined to be "overtaken" and "outstripped" by "the younger civilization which sprang up in Europe" (Hayes and Moon 1923, pp. 15-16; Robinson and Breasted 1921, p.45-46). Thus, "future progress," was to be made by "our forefathers in Europe," argued Robinson and Breasted (1921, p.46). As Aryan liberal writers did, New Historians predicted little possibility of progress in Oriental civilization. They perceived that nations in China, India, Africa and Central America were doomed to failure in achieving modernity on their own. Their modern transformation needed a force from outside.

New Historians generally conceived that throughout history, no culture or no civilization grew in isolation. There have always been cultural exchanges through "wanderers and conquerors," both by land and by sea; but in the scope of their adventures, none can compare with modern European peoples and their colonial offspring in their world-embracing range (Robinson and Beard, 1929, p. 162). Europeans invented modern telecommunication and transportation technology, through which all humanity

became connected to each other in a single network. They developed modern commerce, unlimited in its enterprise, which has converted the whole globe into a single market place where all nations, peoples, and tribes can conveniently traffic, exchange their wares, and supply their needs.

From the sixteenth century on, the European nations have been spreading their civilization, little by little, throughout the world. At first, Europeans established "a New Europe" in the lands that they discovered and conquered and made them "new homes for the people and the culture of Europe" (Hayes and Moon, 1923, p.615). In the second half of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, "the European white man" began to teach "his yellow and brown and black brother to adopt the ways of Europeans" (Hayes and Moon, 1923, pp.651-52; Knwolton and Howe, 1917, p.295). In this process of European expansion, almost every society in the world has been transformed under European influences. The world has become a unified whole by the dynamics of European civilization, which was unprecedented. Robinson and Breasted stated in their Introduction to *General History of Europe*:

> This volume is not merely a sketch of the history of western Europe, but rather the background of contemporaneous ways of doing and thinking not only in Europe, but in North and South America, Australia, latterly, even in India, Japan, western Asia, and Africa. For during the past two or three centuries the knowledge and devices of western Europe have disseminated themselves over the whole globe, as no other civilization in the history of mankind has done (Robinson and Breasted, 1921, pp.4-5)

They perceived that because western-European civilization was filled with such a high quality of culture, ideas, and systems, every "backward" nation in the world was destined to come under the influence of modern European enterprises, inventions, and culture.

Modernity created in Europe diffused all over the world and made a global experience. From this logic arose the justification of the sole emphasis on the civilization of western Europe in understanding the contemporary world. The Europeanization of the world was, indeed, another distinguishing feature of the modern era.

The conception that modernity was the product of western Europe justified the omission of the medieval dimension of other parts of the world. Meanwhile, ancient histories of "the Near East," "the Far East," and "India" demonstrated their unprogressive, low-grade civilization that was logically transformed into modern states under European influences. In order to describe the unparalleled dynamism of European civilization as it made its peculiar way of life a global trend, the non-European dimension had to be added into modern world history from a Eurocentric perspective. Modern world history became the story of western-European diffusion.

The Notion of "the West"

After World War I, the American people were confident that they attained "the highest place among the peoples" and that American influences had now became undisputed as European prestige declined (Gibbs, 1919, p.96). Politically, economically and even culturally, the United States played a key role in bringing all parts of the world into the international system in the post-war decade. However, after the war, there arose new powers in the "Far East" and "Russia" challenging the European White domination of the world.

After the war, the Americans, as well as Europeans, recognized the threat posed by the growth of Japan's power in world politics, China's potential as a future world power, and the ideological challenge from Russian Communism. Before the war, Japan had already shown its growing, potential, international power as it won the war against Russia and penetrated into Korea, China, and Manchuria. After World War I, Japan, with China, participated in the Paris Peace Conference as one of the world leaders. When the League of Nations set up a council consisting of representatives of five major powers, Japan was one of them, along with the United States, England, France, and Italy. Japan was arising as a powerful force in world politics. China, although it had been torn apart by European world powers, had great potential to become more powerful among the nations of the world in the future (Latourette, 1929, p.109; Smith, 1929, p.209). Non-European nations seemed to catch up with Europeans in industrialization and trade. The Europeans became defensive against those growing nations in "Far East." Europe was no longer considered as the center of civilization. The European-dominated world order was weathering partly because of European weakness and partly because of the spread of nationalism to Asia and Africa after the war. Furthermore, anti-imperialist movements gained strength in East Asia and similar movements were taking place in India, the Middle East, and Africa. They gave rise to books with such titles as "The Revolt of Asia" and "The Twilight of the White Races" (Latourette, 1929, p. 112).

Bolshevik Russia had been allied with Britain and America during the war. However, after the war, Russian Bolsheviks launched an ideological offensive not only against traditional European power politics but also against the emerging American leadership. When Russian leaders declared the birth of an international communist

movement in 1919, Russian communism became a target for American concerns about dangerous foreign ideas (Urban and Wagoner, 1996, p.217). Communism was suspected as the major force in various labor strikes of the postwar era. When Boston's policemen struck in 1919, many saw the influence of Russian communism; ideological radicals were invading the most sacred institutions of the United States. This climate of crisis, characterized as the "red scare," ran through most of the post-war decade in the United States.

The ideological division of the world into Euro-American liberal democracy at one end and Russian communism and the growth of Asian nations revolting against European domination at the other reinforced the alliance among democratic nations in Europe and the United States. The cause of democracy underscored the vital connections between Europe and the United States. American historians believed that their task was to write the history of Europe and American as a unified one under the name of democracy (Haskins, 1923). Political ideology, democracy, and the central force of modern progress, science and technology, bound western Europe and the United States under the rubric of Western civilization, in contrast with the rest of the world, "the East." The differences between European civilization and "Oriental" civilization were extended into the differences between "the West" and "the East." The line was clearly drawn between the West and the East. Lynn Thorndike specified in his world history textbook:

> Too much is often made of the distinction between east and west and the difference between Orientals and Europeans. If, however, one had to draw a line between east and west, the best meridian to select would perhaps be that thirty degrees east of Greenwich. West of this line lie the entire Baltic basin, the valley of the Danube, the Aegean Sea and its surrounding shores which were the cradle of ancient Greek civilization. East of the line lie

> practically all of Russia, whose past history has been connected with Oriental rather than European civilization, and all Asia except the west coastal region of Asia Minor which, as part of the Aegean area, has been connected rather with European history, of Mediterranean islands Cyprus would be Oriental; Rhodes and Crete western. In Africa, Egypt lies just east of the line, as do the Indian Ocean and even its westernmost shore. (Thorndike, 1927, p.11)

Although the line was drawn in geographical terms, the common historical tradition and cultural and ideological characteristics tied those countries in the West as a unified whole. The upsurge of Russian communism could be explained as a logical development of its cultural affiliation with the "Orient," which never developed the idea of liberty on its own. Before the war, the history of "Oriental civilization" used to have no value for its elaboration because the development of European civilization overwhelmed "Oriental civilization." The absence of liberty in the Orient had been regarded as an evidence of the Orient's inferiority to European civilization. After the war, the lack of liberal tradition in the Orient began to be recognized as a critical threat to democratic nations. The terms, "the West" and "the East" came to connote not only their differences in cultural tradition and their different historical paths, but also their ideological differences.

The American recognition of the growing "East" motivated history and social studies educators to expand the study of non-European nations. Scholars, politicians, journalists, and educators recognized the need to teach students histories of seemingly, powerful, modernized, non-European nations such as China, Japan, and Russia. The source of this recognition came from both the realistic understanding of the importance of foreign relations for peace and idealistic propagators of internationalism.[13] The former

[13]The following remark of a high school history teacher in Eugene, Oregon, represents this view: "Unless we familiarize ourselves with condition[s] in the East, we may at some time in the near future be very suddenly and unpleasantly awakened to the fact that there is a virile race of people in the Orient who

recognized "the East" as a dangerous force threatening to destroy the West's world hegemony in the post-war decade and emphasized the study of some of important nations in the "East" particularly nations in the "Far East." The "Far East" was evoked as a dangerous place capable of causing possible conflict. The latter underscored the study of non-European nations including China, Japan, Russia, and nations in Latin America, claiming that only understanding of their distinct culture and institutions would create "intelligent and cosmopolitan hospitality" which would prevent a great war (Griffin, 1921, pp. 78-80).[14]

Before World War I, few historians undertook the study of the histories of non-Western countries. The growth of Russian, Japanese and Chinese international potential in the post-war decade encouraged historians to explain their sudden growth. The spectrum of American historical scholarship became gradually widened to embrace the studies of those countries that were pressing upon the United States (Higham et al., 1965, p.43). Until about the mid-1930s, world history textbooks, however, generally incorporated non-Western histories only in their discussions of ancient civilization and of the European expansion over the world. The main thesis was the Westernization of those countries. Writers of world history textbooks described China, Japan, India and other parts of the world as if they were isolated for a long time with no significant progress until the West appeared at the door of those countries. The West was the central force to stimulate the industrial transformation and the rationalization of political and social institutions in non-Western countries such as China, Japan, Russia, Turkey, Southeast

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have recently become progressive and one that gives promise of becoming more powerful in the future" (Smith, 1929, p.208).

Asian countries. Writers of world history textbooks explained that Japan's success in modernization was due to its embrace of Western ideas and institutions, compared to the failure of China, which was too arrogant and stubborn to open its door to Western influence. They wrote as if Western civilization were the only exemplar that made progress and Westernization were the best path for modern developments in non-Western nations. They perceived that non-Western nations ultimately had no choice but to receive the high culture of Western civilization in order to catch up with modern developments in Western countries.

Tracing Back to Premodern History

New Historians believed that reconstructing the civilization of a certain period or an age was a separate task from explaining contemporary civilization and required adopting a different approach with different criteria to determine historical significance. In other words, according to Harry Elmer Barnes (1927), New History recognized two different tasks: the first task was to trace the genesis of contemporary culture and institutions and the second task was to reconstruct as a totality the civilizations of the leading eras in the past. The first task required a selection of historical significance in terms of "the cogency and relevance of the past facts with regard to the present age," while the second task was to be fulfilled by the selection of the relative importance determined from the perspective of the age to be reconstructed (Barnes, 1927, p.204). For example, in reference to contemporary civilization, the history of science in the Middle

[14]Internationalism promoted international understanding and cooperation for world peace and called for world understanding and the celebration of cultural and political diversity in the world. The

Ages is more significant than the study of medieval religious life. However, in order to understand characteristics of the Middle Ages, religion is a more important element than science (Barnes, 1927, p.204). In most world history textbooks, both of the criteria determined the selection of the facts from the past.

The war made history educators prefer the former criteria – historical importance in the light of contemporary relevance. After the war, for the purpose of high school instruction, New Historians frequently claimed that they deliberately employed the selective approach to pick up those past events directly related to the present. Robinson, Smith, and Breasted wrote *Our World Today and Yesterday: A Story of Modern Civilization* (1924), with a strategy of going back to the past to explain the conditions of the world today. In their preface, they proclaimed that their book was really about the present since they have included only those events and achievements of the past that explained aspects of contemporary life. In Hayes, Moon and Wayland's world history textbook, they also stated: "We have sought rather to bring into clear and informing vision the main forces and especially the large movements which, in our opinion, have contributed most to the world civilization of the present day" (1932, p.vi). After World War I, writers of world history textbooks, in their prefaces, made it clear that they gave priority to the contemporary relevance in reconstructing world history.

In order to show how outmoded ideas and institutions had been overthrown in modern times, it was necessary to undertake an exploration into more remote times. Frequently, the study of pre-modern history was justified by claiming that it furnished the background of modern life. World War I, however, forced few differences in the conceptualization of the pre-modern history. Political history was still the backbone of

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impact of internationalism on world history conceptualization is described in detail in Chapter 4.

ancient and medieval history, taking a large portion of world history, although economic, social, and intellectual developments gained a more expanded treatment than before the war.

Before World War I, Robinson and Beard had concentrated on the conceptualization of modern history and had given little attention to pre-modern history. Robinson's book, *Introduction to History of Western Europe* (1903) had treated medieval Europe, and his writings had made some suggestions about course structure and key topics in pre-modern European history. Robinson pointed out that those aspects of Oriental civilization upon which Western civilization had relied for its early development needed attention, and permanent contributions of ancient civilization of Greece and Rome to world history should be briefly explained. Before World War I, Robinson argued that in order to make room for a satisfactory discussion of the great debt in art and literature the present world owed to Egypt, Greece and Rome, many details regarding political and military matters should be excluded (1905, p.9). However, because Robinson and Beard were modern history specialists, they never made concrete suggestions for key topics in ancient history.

In 1921, Robinson collaborated with James Breasted who was a specialist in pre-historic times and ancient history; together they wrote *Outlines of General European History*. In this book, they recognized the achievements of early peoples in the Near East, to which Western civilization owed a debt. Robinson and Breasted proclaimed: "The so-called 'pre-historic' period and the story of the ancient Orient are now full of absorbing interest and can no longer be dismissed in a few introductory pages" (1921, p.iii). They attempted to recognize the significant economic and technological contributions of the

ancient Oriental civilization to world civilization.[15] Other New Historians also, in their textbooks, briefly summarized the early achievements of the ancient Orient and celebrated its contributions to world civilization. However, as occurred in the textbooks of Aryan liberal writers, in New Historians' textbooks, Oriental fatalism that the Orient was doom to failure permeated the conception of world history. New Historians presumed that. They confined the history of nations in "the Orient" within the ancient times as if those nations, since then, had not existed at all. Modern features, drawn from European life, were employed as criteria to measure progress made in the nations of "the Orient."

The thesis, absence of the idea of liberty, modernity, and democracy in Oriental civilization, was used as the fundamental rationale for the sole focus on European civilization after the early ancient civilization. In their conception, world history was to trace the growth of the idea of liberty, science, and democracy. In every stage of European development, the New Historians made great efforts to search for signs of modern democratic and scientific development in Europe. The progress in science was always traced back to the Middle Ages and sometimes even to ancient times (Robinson and Breasted, 1921; Robinson and Smith, and Breasted 1924; Becker, 1931; Hayes, Moon, and Wayland 1932).[16] The post-war patriotic mood stressed the Western

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[15] For example, Robinson and Breasted presented a brief illustration of the achievements of Oriental civilization as follows: "It [ancient orient] gave the world the first highly developed practical arts, like metal work, glass-making, paper-making and many other similar industries. To distribute the products of these industries among other peoples and carry on commerce, it built the earliest seagoing ships equipped with sails. It first was able to move great weights and undertake large building enterprises –large even for us of today. The early Orient, therefore, brought forth the first great group of inventions, surpassed in importance only by those of the modern world.... It made a beginning in mathematics, astronomy, and medicine. It first produced government on a large scale, whether of a single great nation or of an empire made up of a group of nations" (1921, p.45).

[16] The books of Robinson and other authors always treated ancient and medieval scientific development as an important topic. Becker's textbook (1931), in the review of "What led up to modern

democratic tradition as it faced the totalitarian and socialist challenges. Although quite different from modern forms of democracy, Athenian democracy was appealing because it proved the remoteness and the persistence of the democratic tradition in the Euro-American political history. The war drove many world history textbook authors to adopt "the growth of democracy" as the central organizational theme. The Committee of History and Education for Citizenship (1921), established immediately after the end of the war, in fact, strongly recommended the "growth of democracy" as the interpretive theme of modern world history. Although different in emphasis, most world history textbooks of New Historians illustrated Greek democracy for its contemporary relevance. In their modern history textbook, Hayes and Moon stated:

> In many respects Athenian democracy was quite different from modern forms of democracy. Nevertheless, the idea that democratic government had once been tried successfully by the most civilized people of ancient times was a powerful inspiration to men in modern times in the struggle for liberty (Hayes and Moon, 1923, p. 19).

Gradually, world history textbooks referred to the democracy of ancient Greek city-states as the origin of modern democracy, which came to be emphasized in modern democratic revolutions in England, America, and France (Webster, 1921, p. 411).

Except science and democracy, the central topics of ancient history were chosen on the same criteria as those of Aryan liberal writers: that is, the contribution of ancient Greeks and Romans to the modern world. It was summarized as "*Greek ideas and Roman law*" (Becker, 1931, p. 24). Greek contributions to modern civilization in art, philosophy,

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history" also treated ancient and medieval scientific development in link with modern scientific development. With few exceptions, in the textbooks of New Historians, modern science was preceded by the development of medieval science.

literature, and architecture and the critical contribution of Roman law and government to modern business and politics were, as a rule, eloquently celebrated. Becker pointed out: "The Greeks taught the later Europeans what to think about the world; the Romans taught them how to master it" (1931, p. 18). The Ancient Greek and Roman civilization was depicted as the foundational period of European civilization.

New Historians described the feudal-manorial-Christian order as institutional characteristics of the Middle Ages. They described medieval political history, recognizing the general significance of such events as the conflict between the Holy Roman Empire and the papacy, the Crusades, and the Hundred Years' War. They also saved space for descriptions of the cultural, intellectual, and economic development of the period. The significance of the Middle Ages gained the same as or more emphasis in textbooks of New Historians than those of Aryan liberal writers. As Aryan liberal writers sought the origin of certain aspects of modern life in Middle Ages, New Historians also saw that a large number of the present institutions, ideas, and problems originated in the medieval world. Robinson and Breasted asserted:

> Without some knowledge of medieval culture no sure grasp on conditions today is possible whether it be a question of perpetuating its moral religious, and artistic ideals, or of supplanting them, they underlay the great issues of modern times (Robinson and Breasted, 1921, p.10).

New Historians also appreciated the contribution of Aryan liberal writers in locating the origins of two modern features, representative government and nation-states. Aryan liberal writers narrated the development of the nation-state in England, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Germany and more of Europe since medieval times, although

sometimes so much detail caused problems for a clear understanding of the concept of the nation-state. New Historians undertook the job of Aryan liberal writers and gave a clearer picture of their growth in the Middle Ages and furthermore made clear the role of nation-states and representative government in forming modern civilization. Thus, the picture of the world characterized by those two institutions became clearer. In particular, World War I elevated the importance of the feeling of nationalism in creating world peace and provoking war and the significant value of representative government as "the safeguard of the liberty and right of people to rebel against tyranny" (Becker, 1931, p. 9; Hayes and Moon stated: 1923, p. 36).

New Historians absorbed the idea of the genetic development of the Euro-American political and religious community, which had been emphasized by Aryan liberal writers. After World War I, they extended the conception of the Euro-American community to one that decisively embraced common intellectual and cultural heritages and that contemporarily faced common political, economic and social enterprise and problems. The war changed the contemporary world situation and the American conception of its place and role in it. Americans would want to celebrate their contribution toward establishing modern civilization. Their analysis of modern features assured that Europe and the United States shared common political, economic, and social challenges and enterprises today. The genetic method of New Historians directly took them to the Middle Ages of Western Europe to identify the beginning of their common cultural tradition, which directly explained contemporary ideas, institutions, and problems. New Historians agreed with Aryan liberal writers that there was no sharp dividing line between medieval and modern history, but their grounds for this

interpretation embraced economic, social and intellectual heritages as well as political and religious heritages. Hayes and Moon argued: " The modern world is veritably the child of the medieval world" (1923, p. 35).

New Historians saw a new beginning of civilization in the Middle Ages in western Europe and its successive development to modern times. In words of Thorndike:

> During the centuries, usually described as medieval,...there came a time when decay and stagnation began to yield to vigor and enterprise, when the old was transformed into the new, and when a distinct, western civilization began to develop, of which our present civilization, whether European or American, although altered for it in many ways, is nevertheless a direct outgrowth (Thorndike, 1927, p. 295).

The term, Western civilization, had already been circulated before World War I. Robinson, in the beginning of the twentieth century, had already employed the term Western civilization when he suggested that an introduction to medieval and modern European history be "the description and explanation of the most signal achievements of western civilization during the past thousand years"(1900, p.62; 1903, p.2). This plan was unfolded in a concrete narrative in his book, *An Introduction to the History of Western Europe* (1903). In his narrative conception, Western civilization was fashioned in western Europe in the Middle Ages from "the union of two great elements," "the ancient civilization" and "the vigor and the political and social ideals of the Germans" (Robinson, 1903, p.43). Robinson (1903) referred to Western civilization as the heir of the cultural and political heritages that had been accumulated through Egypt, Phoenicia, Greece, and the Roman Empire and the creator of modern civilization.

After the war, the concept of Western civilization became clearer as Thorndike (1927) directly referred to Western civilization as the civilization developed in western Europe in the Middle Ages and spread to North America. When historians spoke of Western civilization, they included cultural heritages of ancient Greek and Roman civilization as foundational elements, but emphasized "the fundamentally new and distinctively north-western character of the true development" (Thorndike 1927, p. 297). Modern civilization was the fulfillment of the logical development of western Europe in the Middle Ages. The United States, together with western Europe, was an heir of the Middle Ages as well as a creator of modern civilization. With the establishment of the American nation, the United States entered into the drama of world history as a major actor. New Historians celebrated the unique characteristics of Western civilization developed in western Europe in the Middle Ages as a new force for the further development of civilization going beyond the scale of ancient Greece, Rome, and other parts of the world. New Historians perceived that because Western civilization embraced new elements in western Europe in the Middle Ages, it could go a different path from Oriental civilization characterized by despotism, and finally create modern civilization. The new forces were "Christianity" and "Germanic cultural and political heritages."[17]

New Historians analyzed modern features and traced their direct origins. They made it clear that because the leading modern states in Europe and the United States commonly had the distinctive cultural tradition grown in medieval western Europe, they could invent modernity. Accordingly, when they referred to Western civilization, they

[17]Hayes, Moon, and Wayland stated: "If the Greco-Roman world had remained pagan, we may be certain that our social inheritance would have been very different from what it has been. Perhaps the history of Europe would be more like that of Asiatic nations and the story of our ancestors much like that of the Chinese and Hindus" (1932. p. 222).

underscored the transformation of Western civilization in the Middle Ages around the tenth century. Thorndike suggested that "the tenth century" was "the best day for the first stirring of this new civilization" (1927, p. 297). Along with Thorndike, New Historians generally saw that around the tenth century, western Europe rose from the turmoil created by the fall of Roman Empire, completed the process of absorption from classical civilization and entered a new age of civilization (Webster 1930, p. 70; Hayes, Moon, and Wayland 1932, p. 220). The Middle Ages was treated as an integral part of Western development.

CONCLUSION

High school general and European history textbooks of the Aryan liberal writers had been trapped within political history under the influence of the European notion of "scientific history," which in content, mostly traced the evolution of political institutions, in method, emphasized critical methods, and in concept, employed philological and biological notions of races. The remote past, rather than recent past, was the main concern of the Aryan liberal writers because in the ancient, medieval and early modern times rather than in the recent past, they found the origin of modern characteristics. They argued that modern art, literature, and architecture originated in ancient civilizations of Greece and Rome. They sought the origin of democratic, representative institutions in Teutonic virtues in the Middle Ages, and the development of nation-states in early modern times. In Aryan liberal writers' textbooks, modernity was defined mainly in terms of political ideas and institutions. American history was organically connected with

the European past on the ground of genetic evolution of democratic political institutions. The idea of intellectual and political freedom arrogantly distinguished the unique development of European civilization from the rest of the nations and peoples. The Euro-American past, as one story, was read as the political history of the humankind.

In the era of progressivism, a new generation of historians, generally called New Historians, arose. They presented a new plan for the high school European history course. Rapid changes in American society during the time of progressive reforms demanded a direct explanation of contemporary social, economic, and political developments as well as predicaments. In order to cope with the contemporary growth of industrial and commercial society, American educators wanted to introduce subjects relevant to the present need. It was a growing assertion that schools must rearrange the social studies curriculum in a way to help students live in a society in which industrialism and commercialism represented the strongest interests of the people and directed their choices of life. A utilitarian view came into prominence in developing school curricula. In accordance with a development in pragmatism, New Historians redefined the value of history and revised the history of humankind. They urged that history must serve social betterment and declared that the task of historians today was to explain how the contemporary world came to be as it was.

Inspired by modern scientific and technological developments, New Historians were convinced of the potency of science and technology in promoting social change and human welfare. They argued that science, which was discovered in western Europe and blossomed in the United States, was the central force in creating modern civilization. In the early twentieth century, New Historians began to tell a different version of modern

history from the Aryan liberal writers. In the modern history of New Historians, although still locked in a political framework, intellectual and economic developments stimulated by a scientific outlook and technological innovation, together with western-European democratic political culture, emerged as the main story.

World War I accelerated the infusion of contemporary interests into the high school social studies curriculum. Educators believed that without knowledge of current world affairs and problems students could not play a suitable role as informed and responsible citizens in a society where domestic problems and issues became increasingly entangled with those of the world. Modern history was expected to serve as a course to teach modern world affairs. Responding to this social demand, New Historians, in their modern history textbooks, immediately provided their analysis of modern characteristics, which were crucial to understanding contemporary world affairs and to explaining the evolution of those modern features.

New Historians after the war observed that European powers, which had been the foundation of wisdom and the center of cultural creation and diffusion before World War I, now had to depend upon others, above all the United States, for their own economic and social reconstruction and entrust the task of world peace to the leadership of the United States. They also had to confront the fact that European White people no longer dominated the world. Far Eastern countries such as Japan and China had demonstrated their potency to create world order. Nationalistic movements in Latin America and Asia challenged the European order of world relations. Furthermore, communism emerged in Russia, provoking anti-imperialism and demonstrating the oppressive, undemocratic nature of European colonists over the people in the world, in particular, those countries

under European powers. This world situation gave prominence to the term, Western civilization, with emphasis on the common cause of liberal democracy and capitalism and, in contrast to the "East" of non-democracy, anti-democracy, and anti-capitalism.

New Historians characterized modern civilization with developments in Western civilization, such as the increase of scientific knowledge, nation-state, democracy, industrialization, and Europeanization. They conceived that science and technology transmitted by Westerners stimulated the development of a European-style industrial and commercial life in non-Western countries and the rationalization of social and political institutions. The world was, they perceived, becoming Europeanized.

In the conception of New historians, "Europeanization" meant progress. They argued that it was Europeans' duty to benefit the rest of the world by helping it Europeanize. Other countries could be modernized, if they followed the footsteps of the leading European states. Although they used the term, European modern history, what they told was a story of western European peoples in the world. The common developments and common enterprise in western European states and the United States were summed up as Europeanization.

The New Historians shared with their scientific predecessors and peers the assumption of a fundamental and continuous historical process between European and American civilization. As did the Aryan liberal writers, New Historians believed that European civilization was formulated in ancient Greece and Rome and reborn as a new civilization in medieval western Europe by the intermingling of Romano-Germanic cultural and political heritages within the framework of Christianity. New Historians continued to underscore the modern features of nation-states and representative

government common in western European nations and the United States, proclaiming a common historical heritage and destiny of the countries in Western civilization. New Historians implicitly, sometimes explicitly, accepted the notion of White supremacy that general and European history textbooks writers widely proclaimed and employed to justify the sole focus on the White race in the history of humankind. They believed that only the White race made progress and accordingly history must be the story of the White race. This was proved by European creation of the idea of liberty and modernity. New Historians inherited their scientific predecessors' idea of modernity saliently defined by the nation-state system and democratic institutions, the embodiments of Western liberal, democratic tradition. They extended the conception of modernity by describing modern scientific, technological, and economic ways of life. In their view, the scientific and industrial civilization that originated in western Europe and the United States was the most critical factor in creating modern world civilization as a unified entity. New Historians ascribed modern prosperity to scientific and technological revolutions in Western civilization. They believed that nations in the non-West would adopt scientific, technological, and industrial developments of Western civilization in order to catch up with modern developments in Western countries because Western civilization was the only exemplar that made progress. In their view, modernization in non-European nations meant "Europeanization."

New Historians highlighted the superiority of a scientific and democratic culture, which was unique to western Europe, in order to explain why the world became dominated by Europe. They boasted of the dynamism of European civilization as they visualized the Europeanization process of the world. They described the European

colonization in Asia, Africa, and America, and the European cultural and political assertiveness in Russia, China, Japan and the rest. They conceived that European history since the eighteenth century was identical to world history. In narrative conception and direct reference, New Historians gave the concept of modernity an aura of absolute validity in conceptualizing high school world history. The conception of Europeanization of the world saved some space for histories of non-Western nations in order to describe how Europeans directly or indirectly influenced the "backward" modern transformation of the non-Western nations. Histories of the non-Western nations came to be added into world history courses in a way to assist the conceptualization of world history in Western terms and, from the Western perspective, putting Western civilization at the center.

Chapter 4

Ideals of Democracy and Humanity

World War I highlighted two, quite different, intellectual tendencies in the United States: intensive nationalism called Americanism and internationalism calling for international understanding and peace. From these different intellectual trends, two extremely different educational movements – the Americanization movement and the international education movement – exerted their influences over social studies and history curriculum revision. This chapter is concerned with these two streams of thought in world history conceptualization.

"The growth of democracy" became an essential theme in organizing modern world history in the political climate of the post-war decade. The climate of the "red scare" in the 1920s vexed and frightened the American people. Although the United States won its democratic crusade toward autocratic menace in World War I, the "red scare" proved that there was more to do to keep the world safe for democracy. Within a couple of years after the end of the war, the intense campaign for Americanism, which underscored the American democratic ideal and spirit, reached its zenith. School subjects such as history and English gained tremendous attention as vehicles to inculcate Americanism in students' minds. In keeping with the Americanization movement, politicians and educators emphasized a better understanding and appreciation of democracy as it has evolved in modern times. Many educators and politicians in the post-war decade fervently believed that democracy would continue to flourish once their children understood and appreciated the struggles against aristocracy and autocracy that

had been necessary to achieve modern democracy. They argued that armed with this knowledge, students would become more willing to take responsibility for the future growth and direction of American democracy. From this line of thought, The Committee of History and Education for Citizenship, appointed by the American Board of Historical Service in 1919, produced concrete ideas for revising high school world history courses. Deeply concerned with Americanism in the post-war political climate, a group of educators proclaimed democracy as the most important factor in molding modern civilization and presented a scheme for a modern world history course whose scope was narrowed down so as to deal with only "the growth of democracy."

The other stream of history revision came from the internationalists who attempted to create "world brotherhood" through education. After the war, the United States played an important role in the peace process. President Woodrow Wilson strongly suggested, as a peace-maintaining device, the creation of a League of Nations that would monitor world affairs and prevent world conflict that might lead to another world war. Many American political leaders, however, saw the League as a dangerous vehicle through which the United States would be drawn into the quarrels of distant nations. After a long debate, the American Senate rejected American participation in the League. But American internationalists saw that many nations participated in the League and the aspiration for peace and determination to avoid another wasteful war stimulated international efforts to establish governmental and non-governmental organizations on an international scale. For example, in order to deal with economic, social, medical, and intellectual concerns and cooperation in the postwar world, international organizations

such as the International Labor Organization, the World Health Organization, and the Permanent Court of International Justice, or the so-called World Court, were established.

These international bodies, even more than the League itself, emphasized world peace and promoted cooperation across national boundaries. Domestic order was considered to be dependent on a peaceful world order and vice versa. The calamity brought by the war seemed to accentuate a normative value of peace in the discussion of political as well as non-political affairs. In particular, to peace-aspiring intellectuals in America as well as Europe, the idea of peace directed their intellectual inquiry and their social participation. James T. Shotwell (1932), a Columbia University historian and a major figure in the postwar peace movement, believed that the search for peace was at bottom an intellectual enterprise, requiring a conscious effort to turn from "the narrower conceptions of the past to a worldwide view."[1] In this intellectual trend, internationalism, peace through international cooperation, became a significant object of education and scholarly works. International education aimed to inculcate in students a higher good than national ideals and ambitions for world peace in a growing "world community." With these purposes, social studies educators such as Clarence D. Kingsley and Harold Rugg, designed courses or wrote textbooks to teach about nations in the West as well as in the non-West. H. G. Wells and J. Montegomery Gambrill presented the organizing ideas of world history as "the story of humanity" and "a story of growing community."

[1]Shotwell memorandum, May 31, (1932), ED25/25, Board of Education Archives, Public Record office: London. Cited from Iriye (1993) p.105.

WORLD HISTORY FOR IDEALS OF DEMOCRACY

Democracy as the Organizational Theme

The Committee of History and Education for Citizenship and its Recommendations

Upon the American entry into the war in 1917, demonstrating the growth of its leadership in the American educational arena, the National Education Association (NEA) immediately took action to vitalize the social studies curriculum under wartime conditions. Although two years before the NEA had approved the recommendations of the Social Studies Committee for the revision of the secondary social studies programs, the NEA was convinced that American participation in the war made necessary a reconsideration of the school social studies programs. In particular, the NEA recognized that the war powerfully increased public interest in history and its instruction. Finally, in 1918, it requested that the American Historical Association (AHA) review and possibly modify the school social studies curriculum. The task of the review and revision was undertaken by the wartime organ of the AHA, the National Board for Historical Service. The AHA's National Board for Historical Service was set forth in 1917 to provide the public and the government with historical knowledge to understand the war and resolve for peace (Historical News, 1917, p.918).[2]

The National Board for Historical Service, in October, 1918, established the Committee of History and Education for Citizenship with the following members:

[2]The National Board for Historical Service, which was headquartered in Washington, was an entirely voluntary and unofficial organization. One of its purposes was to preserve war materials that might be useful for subsequent historical studies, but patriotic motives came into play in using historical and

Samuel B. Harding, former history professor at Indiana University, was selected as the chairman and Daniel C. Knowlton, Central High School, Newark, New Jersey, as secretary. Other members were William C. Bagley, professor at Teachers' College of Columbia University, Frank S. Bogardus, Indiana State Normal School, Terre Haute, and Julian A. C. Chandler, Superintendent of Schools, Richmond Virginia. At their meeting in January, 1919, the Council of the American Historical Association added three more members: Andrew C. McLaughlin, history professor at University of Chicago and the former Chairman of the Committee of Five, Guy S. Ford, history professor at University of Minnesota and member of the Committee on Public Information, and Joseph Schafer, history professor at a University of Oregon, Massachusetts (Committee on History and Education for Citizenship in the Schools, 1919). In February 1919, Chairman Harding resigned because he had moved from Washington to Chicago, whereupon Schafer, who was in Washington for the year as Vice Chairman and executive head of the National Board for Historical Service, was chosen as the chairman of the committee (Committee on History and Education for Citizenship in the Schools, 1919; Schafer, 1920). This committee was, sometimes, called "a new Committee of Eight" for its composition of eight members but to distinguish it from the original Committee of Eight (1908) (*Historical Outlook*, 1919). It was also referred to as "the Schafer Committee" after its chairman, Joseph Schafer (Schafer, 1920, p.90).

It hardly needs to be pointed out that the establishment of the Schafer Committee was one of the direct results of the war. The American experience of the war brought home forcibly to many the need for better adjustment of the school curriculum to cope

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current war records for war propaganda and in planning memorial volumes as states and local tributes to those who had served their country (Cappon, 1943, p.743).

with the changed conditions of the nation and the world. Educators generally recognized that to be a fully equipped American citizen in post-war conditions, children needed some definite knowledge of world affairs as well as of strictly national affairs. School history that was widely taught at that time displayed a critical gap between what history courses taught children and what children needed to know when they entered society after leaving school. History courses taught too little about the current world, while encouraging the study of the remote past with little immediate value for understanding the contemporary world. World War I demanded a remaking of the history curriculum in a way to incorporate the issues and problems that were emphasized by the war. The purpose of the Committee was to respond to this post-war situation.

The fact that the National Board of Historical Service established the Schafer Committee made it predictable the direction that the committee would take. The Board was one of the organizations created for war propaganda. The Board sought to place historical scholarship at the service of government by adopting educational and research efforts to support war needs throughout the country. Therefore, when the Board established the Schafer Committee, it probably expected the Committee to reflect some of the war and post-war concerns that the government felt with regard to education. These concerns centered mostly around the notion of Americanization under the American ideal of democracy.

The committee designed history programs on the basis of the 6-3-3 plan (grades 1-6 as the elementary level; grades 7-9 as the junior high level, and grade 10-12 as the senior high level), but provided alternative history programs for the schools that adopted

the 6-2-4 plan. As a general plan, the committee recommended the following history programs for the high schools (Shafer, 1921, p.91).

- Grade 10: Progress toward world democracy since 1650
- Grade 11: Progress toward democracy in the United States
- Grade 12: Social, economic, and political problems.

Among these programs, the tenth-grade course and the eleventh-grade course were required for graduation. Daniel Knowlton was responsible for developing the syllabus for the tenth-grade world history course. Knowlton (1921) proposed two alternatives for the tenth-year history course, depending on the field of history that students had studied in junior high schools.

Junior high school programs in grades 7-9 basically aimed to teach "American History in its world setting" (Schafer, 1921, p.90). According to Schafer, a few facts of primary significance in the development of human civilization were selected and so arranged as to form a simple but connected story (1921, p. 90). The United States was, in these junior high school programs, treated as a part of the world but with special emphasis upon American contributions and problems. This work was divided into three parts:

- Grade 7: The world before 1607, and the beginnings of American history, including the building of the Spanish Empire in the New World, the basis of the present group of Latin-American Republics.
- Grade 8: The world since 1607, viewed in relation to the evolution and expanding world influence of the United States, with emphasis upon the economic and social history of the United States.
- Grade 9: Community and nation activities, recent economic and social history and commercial geography and civics (the ninth-grade, alternate course, for those pupils of the ninth grade who expect to complete the senior high school,

the committee recommends as an alternative to the above, a course in the progress of civilization from earliest times to about 1650)[3]

The main purpose in the junior high school history programs was to teach the European background of American history and American history in relationship to world history. The intention of the committee was to teach American history in a larger context of world history. In these programs, world history was constructed in a way to assist teaching American history. But the committee believed that these junior high history courses were broad enough to give a preliminary survey of world history to the high school modern history course that narrowed its focus down to democratic progress in the modern world. The committee suggested that if the school offered at least the two-year course in world history in seventh and eighth grades or its equivalent, the tenth-grade course in modern world history would begin with the "Rise of autocratic government and their predominance in the early eighteenth century." This plan was developed based on the assumption that because the students in the tenth grade were presumed to have already studied world history before taking this course, students were ready to take a course whose scope was narrowed to a consideration of the modern world, noting especially its progress toward democracy.

The alternative plan was designed especially for the four-year high school or for school systems that could provide only a year or two of history. This plan was to devote three to four weeks for a preliminary survey of world progress to about the eighteenth century. In this plan, it was assumed that the student in the tenth grade would not have

[3]The committee proposed two alternative plans for the ninth grade. For students who would finish their study at the ninth grade, the committee recommended a course in "Community and nation activities, recent economic and social history and commercial geography and civics." For students who would pursue

chances to study world history before taking this course, and therefore, the tenth-year course should offer a background and a basis for the more intensive study of modern times.[4]

"The Growth of Democracy" as the Interpretive Idea

Knowlton (1921) adopted "growth of democracy" as the "interpretative idea" in modern world history. The key puzzle in modern history was to be solved by tracing the evolution of this new and essentially modern idea of democracy from the point where it began to be a patent factor in shaping human progress to the present day. In short, the course aimed to teach the history of modern democracy. As an "outline or general plan" Knowlton presented the following units (1921, pp.178-188):

1. Rise of Autocratic Governments and Their Predominance in the Early Eighteenth Century
2. The Growth of Trade and the Expansion of Europe, 1500-1715
3. The Development of Representative Government in England (1603-1750) and the Founding of the British Empire
4. The French Revolution and Its Political Consequences to 1815
5. The Industrial Revolution in England
6. The Spread of the Economic Revolution to the Continent and the Struggle Against Reaction, 1815-1848
7. The Growth of Nationality and Its Effects upon Europe, 1848-1871.
8. The Penetration of Asia and Africa and Its Resultant Changes, 1870-1914
9. The Internal Struggle between Advancing Democracy and Autocracy, 1870-1914
10. Imperialism and the World War
11. Democracy Since the War and its Problems, 1914

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their study throughout the senior high school years, the committee proposed a course in "the progress of civilization from earliest times to about 1650."

[4]Daniel C. Knowlton, the developer of the tenth-year course, recommended the following topics as the basis of the classroom discussion in the introductory survey: 1) The Oriental World, 2) The Greek World, 3) The Roman World, 4) The Medieval World and Its Institutions, 5) The Protestant and Catholic World (1520-1648), and 6) The Rise of National States (1921, p.170). These topics demonstrate that this committee made no significant recommendations for the revision of pre-modern history. The critical recommendation of this committee was in the modern world history course in the tenth grade.

The study of modern democracy began with the first unit, which aimed at understanding autocratic governments in France and Russia in the eighteenth century and their reform movements toward "Enlightened Despotism," influenced by English ideas. In order to trace these English ideas back to their origin, the next unit explored English social, political, and economic conditions, in which the middle class took form. Knowlton was convinced that democracy began to be a real political force as the result of the emergence of the middle class and their influence upon the English government following "the Puritan Revolution"(1921, p 171). Since then, there have been other democratic movements paving the way for far-reaching changes in government. Based on this conception, he designed the syllabus in a way to help students trace the origin of democracy in England and then explore the modern political and economic transformation of Europe represented by a series of democratic revolutions in England, America, and France, and the spread of democratic ideas over the world.

The committee attempted to design this modern history course primarily to be political history, but the committee recommended that the course should take full account of economic, industrial and social factors that explained political movements (Schafer, 1920, p. 111). In accordance with this purpose, Knowlton gave consideration to the process of industrialization in England, France, and Germany and its influence on political and social matters such as the creation of class distinctions, the employment of women and children, and the formation of socialism. He also suggested a consideration of the influence of industrialization on international relations. In particular, his outline gave notice to how English industrialization influenced the industrial revolution in other

countries and how industrialization made Germany eager for colonial expansion and dissatisfied with the British and French colonial domination.

In Unit 8, "The Penetration of Asia and Africa and its Resultant Changes, 1870-1914," students were asked to study the geographical and historical background of nations in Asia and Africa, such as their resources and population, their "ancient character" and their contributions to world progress (Knowlton, 1921, pp.179-180). The focus in this unit, however, was on European influence over the economic and political reform movement of nations in Asia and Africa. The actors in this unit were European nations. The main questions that this unit asked students to answer were how European nations divided the continent of Africa and opened up Asian nations and to what extent they shaped the spread and growth of democracy throughout the world.

The remaining units suggest an exploration of the struggle between advancing democracy and autocracy before World War I and the democratic expansion in Europe after the war. In these units, students were expected to appreciate general movements towards a more advanced democratic order by the overthrow of autocracy in European nations and the foundation of a republic along constitutional lines. They were also to study the "menacing" nature and influence of Bolshevism and the Russian "backward" conditions responsible for the Bolshevik revolution (Knowlton, 1921, p.182-3). The Russian Bolshevik Revolution was interpreted as a result of the Russian lack of commercial and industrial revolutions, which conditioned the growth of the middle class in western Europe. In this scheme, democratic expansion throughout the world was characterized as the overwhelming tendency of modern times and the ideology of Bolshevism as a threatening factor in world progress toward democracy.

The Nationalistic Movement of "Americanization"

Wartime conditions motivated the government to initiate a deliberate push for unity among America's rather heterogeneous populations. A response of educators was the national campaign for Americanization (Krug, 1964, p.417). They took part with enthusiasm in the "National Conferences on Americanization through Education," held in 1917 and 1918 under the auspices of the U.S. Bureau of Education and Commissioner Philander P. Claxton,

Americanization had been an educational catchphrase for the American educators who were greatly intimidated by the great surge of immigrants of non-English derivation and their descendents in the late nineteenth century. They feared a breakdown of national unity as a result of the massive inflow of non-northwestern European immigrants. Both inside and outside the school, they called for inculcating Americanism in those immigrants, adults as well as children. The main goal of Americanization in the late nineteenth century was the stamping out of illiteracy and the conversion of foreigners to the use of the English tongue.

World War I extended the notion of Americanization. The National Conferences on Americanization in 1917 and 1918 reflected the apprehensions, whether justified or not, about the so-called "new immigration" from countries with ideals supposedly in conflict with those of the United States. It was Germany whom the United States fought against in World War I, but the Germans in the United States had been part of the "old immigration" largely presumably responsive to American ideals. The "new immigration"

represented countries with different political ideologies and governmental systems (Krug, 1964, p.417). In fact, Americanism after the war was called upon as a solution for the turmoil caused by the war and foreign ideas such as socialism and Russian Bolshevism. The subjects for indoctrination of Americanism were not only immigrants but also native-born American citizens. "Foreign-born residents are not the only ones who seriously need to be quicken with the true spirit of America and of Americanism," pointed out Calvin O. Davis, professor of the University of Michigan (1920, p.263). Educators worried that too many native-born citizens lacked a full appreciation of the privileges and benefits that they have inherited and that they today enjoyed. Furthermore, citizens seemed to be negligent in the exercise of the duties and obligations that society in general rightfully expected from them (Davis, 1920). At the time of invasion of foreign ideology, citizens who were ill equipped with national ideals and careless of their responsibilities to keep and practice the ideals were no less a threat than the foreign ideology itself. Senator William E. Borah from Idaho addressed the United States Senate on March 18, 1918:

> What we need in this country, Sir, is the fostering and strengthening of the national spirit, a rebaptism of national pride, a reconsecration to the purposes for which we organized our government. Preach the doctrines of the fathers for a while and see how the American people like it. Tell our people anew how we are distinguished from all the peoples of the nations of the earth, the liberty, the prosperity, the independence, the initiative, the individuality, which we enjoy as compared with other nations or peoples. When you have done that you will plant in the hearts of the American people again and anew that which Bolshevism cannot uproot (Ross, 1919, p.614)

Governmental officials and school officials proclaimed that in order to fight against the development of anti-American doctrines and to avoid a division of national allegiances,

American schools now needed to exclusively strengthen "American ideals" and "spirit" not by teaching history and civics but by using them (Lane, 1918, p.106; Rose, 1919, p.616). Superintendent C. E. Rose of Boise, Idaho denounced the supposedly sterile and ineffective work in social studies, particularly in history, which had paid too much attention to the history of Greece and Rome and Europe and too little to that of the American Republic (1919, p.614). Rose stated that high school pupils spent too much time upon "Punic Wars" and "some pope of eleventh century," when they knew nothing and cared less of the important events and characters in America's own history.

During the wartime, inculcating American spirit and ideals was one of the most important educational goals in schools. The government made sure that Americanism became the main purpose of wartime education. Governmental and non-governmental organizations claimed their places in the Americanization movement. Guy Stanton Ford of the Committee on Public Information, which was established by the President Wilson to help the public understand the war, later a member of the Committee of History and Education for Citizenship, stated that his agency stood ready to join the schools in their common wartime task of making "an Americanized, nationalized American nation" (1918, p. 208). World War I, together with the Russian Revolutions in 1905 and 1917, highlighted Americanism as the essential component of American citizenship education. This mood of adamant Americanism reached a peak in the years immediately after the end of the war. "A demand for full-blooded Americanism" echoed and re-echoed all over the country, said Calvin O. Davis (1920, p.263).

Democratic Ideals in Citizenship Education

Americanism used to be more like patriotic sentiments and feelings in the late nineteenth century when American educators evoked it to Americanize immigrants. It virtually meant a consciousness of belonging, which would inspire people of foreign birth to march under the American flag and to recognize English as their language and American history as their history. For the purposes of cultivating Americanism, schools grew lyrical over flag rituals and patriotic badges and held nationalistic ceremonies. American history, together with English and civics, served as the essential vehicles for developing Americanism.

After the Great War, Americanism placed the foremost importance on democratic ideas and ideals. The primary aim of Americanization was to indoctrinate children as well as adults with the principles of democracy as these were set forth in the American Declaration of Independence and in the Constitution of the United States (Davis, 1920, p. 263). The war made educators realize that Americanism needed to be based upon systematic instruction in American ideals, the American Spirit, and patriotism. Educators argued that schools must inculcate ideas and ideals that would filter into everyday life and citizenship, that would apply in the crises of peace as well as in those of war, and that would make American citizens conscious of the rights of other nations as well as of their own (Monroe and Miller, 1918, pp.vi-v). They found those ideas and ideals for citizenship education in their long-cherished tradition of democracy.

Upon the American entry into the war, Woodrow Wilson (April 1917) proclaimed that the United States intervened in the European war in order to make the world safe for democracy and to safeguard the ideals of our common civilization:

> It is a fearful thing to lead this great peaceful people into war, into the most terrible and disastrous of all war, civilization itself seeming to be in the balance. But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest to our hearts, --for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments, of the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free.[5]

Evoking the American belief in the nation's fundamental moral excellence, which had justified warfare with Indians, intervention in Cuba and Puerto Rica, and the annexation of Philippines before, Wilson officially defended the American entry into the European struggle for power. The European war was redefined as democratic defense against the enemy of freedom. Wilson's definition of the war as a crusade sheds light on American democratic ideals and the American mission for humanity and morality. Wilson's claim to make the world safe for democracy echoed everywhere. Howard C. Hills, historian, pronounced that the United States came to be engaged in "a world war to determine which is to survive – autocracy or democracy" (1918, p.13). While the socialists declared at St. Louis in spring in 1917, the war was "the most unjustifiable war" in modern history, except for radical pacifists and socialists, American intellectuals, including governmental officials, journalists, scholars, and educators preached to the public that the American entry into the war was "the most holy and unselfish" action ever to keep democracy in the world (Hills, 1918, p.13; Knowlton, 1921, p.166).

After the war, when Russian leaders declared the birth of an international communist movement in 1919, Americans greatly feared communism as the most

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[5]W. Wilson's speech for a declaration of war against Germany (April 2, 1917). Printed in Syrett, H.C. *American Historical Documents* (1969) p.342.

dangerous of foreign ideas threatening American democracy. American anti-communism was intensified to a fever pitch creating a surge of the "red scare." Inside and outside the country, in American eyes, democracy was at stake. World War I and the establishment of international communism inevitably invigorated the nationalistic complex based on American ideals of democracy. The American democratic spirit and ideal, which had been taken for granted, became regarded as a universal solution for problems in the world (Eriskine, 1921). No government was assessed as more perfect than democratic government (Jordan, 1918). Ellwood P. Cubberley, dean of the School of Education, Leland Stanford University, in his address given at the Teachers College Alumni Conferences, February 10, 1922, confirmed that one of the most important outcomes of the World War was that it proved that democracy would, in time, become the ruling type of government for the leading peoples of the earth (1922, p.101).

Liberal democracy was evoked as the fundamental ideal that American people must live by. Liberal democracy determined what really mattered to the peoples in the contemporary world. Democracy became a key American guiding principle for a new domestic and world political order. For the safety of democracy, democratic governments must fight "antidemocratic" or "nondemocratic" governments. Democracy implied a rational and responsible public opinion that would reject irrational, selfish pursuits of power and that would desire a more rational, orderly, harmonious world. Liberal, bourgeois democracy gained the foremost emphasis as the end of citizenship education.

The Great War helped to clarify the fact that one of the fundamental needs of American citizenship was a better conception of the democracy of which so much had been said and written (Knowlton 1921, p.166). The war underscored that the survival of democratic ideas and institutions was dependent on democratic education to produce citizens who were willing to commit themselves to strengthening democratic development. The school curriculum, particularly the social studies curriculum, needed revision corresponding to American democratic ideals that were emphasized by the war. In the Conference upon Desirable Adjustments Between History and the other Social Studies in Elementary and Secondary Schools, held at St. Louis, December 27, 1921, Rolla M. Tryon of the University of Chicago argued:

> [S]ocial studies would throw new light upon the meaning of democracy and democratic institutions and contribute much toward an appreciation on the part of our youth of American institutions and a willingness to cooperate in every reasonable way to defend and maintain them (Conference upon desirable adjustments, 1921, p.79).

Citizenship preparation, educators perceived, must be firmly grounded on the belief that the contemporary democratic achievement was the product of people's struggle against autocracy. They argued that world history courses must cultivate this belief in students' minds by showing that many people in history gave their lives in revolutions and wars for centuries for the idea of freedom. In this line of development, the report of the Committee of History and Education for Citizenship came to present its recommendation for world

history. The committee's central concern was Americanization.[6] This drove every history course in its recommendation, in one way or another, to relate with American democratic issues and problems. In fact, the committee believed that one end of the school social sciences as a whole was "a justified faith in the principles of American democracy" (Schafer, 1920, p.111). In accordance with this goal of American democracy, Knowlton organized the high school modern history course with great stress upon the theme, "how democracy has come to be such a potent factor in the modern world"(1921, p.166). The committee intentionally narrowed the scope of the high school modern world course to teach a "limited, restricted view of world development" excluding "a great many of the details that would ordinarily figure in a course in modern history" (Knowlton, 1921, p. 167). In its view, democracy was "common basis for mankind everywhere" The committee intended to foster "sympathetic attitudes" toward nations that made contributions to the world's progress towards "a common democratic goal" by teaching this modern world history course (Knowlton, 1921, p.168).

Before the committee published its report in 1921, Herbert D. Foster, a professor at Dartmouth College, sent out a questionnaire to all the members of the New England History Teachers' Association, asking whether they approved the courses recommended by this committee. Foster doubted that the committee's recommendation would develop sound citizenship. He argued that if the sort of citizenship to be developed under this report was likely to be "narrow," "self-centered," and "unhistorical," "based on propaganda," then the committee and educators would guard against the report as "a most dangerous, reactionary movement" (Schafer, 1920, p.112). The responses of the teachers

[6]Bruce Wesley also confirmed: "The changed situation [after the war] is reflected in the committee's concern with Americanization, education for citizenship, and with the work of committees in

were largely expected. A critic, after his review of this report, put it that the committee aimed at "good Americanism" (Schafer 1920, p.114).

Many objected to the history program recommend by the Committee of History and Education for Citizenship, criticizing its characteristics as "too narrow, centering far too much on America." With regard to junior high school programs, critics mainly pointed to the world history courses in the seventh and the eighth grades, and senior high school programs to "Progress toward world democracy, 1650 to the present" at the tenth grade and the "Social, economic, and political principles and problems," at the twelfth grade, in which American democracy was the central theme. A teacher criticized:

> I am afraid of those courses which treat the history of the world in relation to one's own particular state. In general it seems to me you would not only get a very warped viewpoint as regards the relative importance of various states. One would also tend to take up other states only when they come into contact-- and usually offensive contact --with one's own country, the result being that the student will get the notion that his country is always right and the other country always wrong (Schafer, 1920, p.114).

In later discussions, the committee member, Guy Stanton Ford pointed out that the intention of the committee was not to foster "any narrow provincialism or chauvinistic nationalism," but to enrich the courses in American history by injecting a larger European content and to draw the attention of students to the larger world (Knowlton, 1920, p. 74). Indeed, in this scheme, as it was intended, America came in for her crucial part in the world democratic development. However, it was a much too narrow study of the world.[7]

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the other social studies" (1938, p. 101).

[7]Samuel Harding officially resigned his chair position because he moved from Washington to Chicago. Probably, that was the primary reason that he resigned. But two months after he resigned (February 1919), Harding published his article, "What the war should do for our history methods," in

In this respect, the American Historical Association (AHA) rejected the final report and disbanded the committee, although it allowed the committee to publish its report.

History educators and social studies educators generally objected to the general scheme of secondary history programs and the interpretive idea of modern history, but the theme, "the growth of democracy," frequently appeared in state and school courses of study. Social studies and history educators in the post-war decade generally reported that many state courses of study and high schools adopted "Age of Autocracy versus the Age of Democracy" or "the rise of democracy" as central organizational themes of modern history, with emphasis on political history (Gambrill 1924, p. 44; Knowlton, 1926, pp.74-5; Kimmel, 1933, p.43). Hutton Webster (1921) and Henry Elson (1921) gave the most significance to democracy prior to other modern developments and adopted democracy as the central theme of their modern history organization. Elson, in his world history textbook, stated:

> The greatest fact in modern history consists, not in the discoveries of science, nor in the invention of machinery, not even in the development of our own great republic, but in the mighty wave of constitutional, representative democracy that has swept over Europe (Elson, 1921, p. 638).

New historians, such as Carlton Hayes and Thomas Moon, James Harvey Robinson, and Carl Becker, also eloquently argued that democracy was a critical factor in molding modern civilization. In their modern history, democratic struggles against autocracy and

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Historical Outlook. In this article, he denounced parochial nationalism and urged educating the rising generation to "a sense of world citizenship" from an internationalist perspective. It is possible that Harding disagreed with other committee members regarding the Committee's excessive focus on Americanism.

aristocracy, together with nations' battles for liberty and unity and industrial progress, marked the progress of modern times.

The political climate in the post-war decade emphasized a better understanding and appreciation of democracy. Building up democracy depended on children's understanding of the forces behind emerging democracy and their willingness to take part in its growth and direction. American intellectuals generally perceived that the Great War demonstrated that the democratic movement was universal – a world movement – in some places struggling through different political forms from the United States, but everywhere working toward the same ends. They argued that the United States, which had been the leading nation in realizing democratic ideals in the world, should take a greater obligation to make it true for other people in the world and should consider all other peoples who aspired to democratic control of their governments as "brothers and friends" of the American democratic nation (Monroe and Miller, 1918, p. v). Historians, as Charles H. Haskins (1923) argued, perceived that their jobs in the post-war decade of political and social turmoil, seemingly caused by socialism and by ideological conflict in the world political arena, were to tie nations in Europe and America together in the popular mind under the common goal of democratic progress. They believed that under the rubric of history of democracy, the history of Europe and America should be read ultimately as one story.[8] The imaginary dichotomy of the democratic West and the

[8]Before the war, England had been pictured mostly as a cruel tyrant, from which the American nation was emancipated through the American revolution. The historians who had pictured the establishment of the American nation as the continuous process of Anglo-Saxon expansion, had urged to correct this kind of popular prejudice and misconception of England (Hart, 1911). World War I decidedly served as a remedy for the misconception. As the United States and England stood on the same side against an anti-democratic enemy, people openly stressed that England and other European nations had the same heritage of liberty, justice, humanity, and democracy as the United States (Hills, 1918). The Committee of History and Education for Citizenship traced the origin of American democracy to Anglo-Saxon ideas in England and proclaimed they were ultimately responsible for the modern democratic transformation

non-democratic rest became the prominent conception of the high school world history course.

WORLD HISTORY FOR IDEALS OF HUMANITY

Internationalist Visions of Education

One line of thought in the revision of the high school world history course in the post-war decade was grounded on the movement of international education. The international education movement was one of the important forces to bring out more inclusiveness in the social studies curriculum after the war. In Europe and America, the aspiration for peace had already been developed in various strands of "pacifism" before World War I, ranging from "traditional Christian conceptions" to the more recent "socialist formulations" (Iriye, 1993, p.103). In fact, the interest in world peace through cultural exchange and educational development was as old as the nation itself (Scanlon, 1960, p.1). However, it was during the period from the late nineteenth century to the beginning of the World War I that the peace movement, through international cooperation, became a general phenomenon in the international arena. In this period, the idea that cultural exchanges would promote mutual understanding among nations and thereby lead to world peace was supported with concrete plans. Leading states in Europe and the United States organized international organizations to facilitate cooperation for non-political purposes as well as for political ones. A number of peace societies were

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throughout the world. In the same context, historians emphasized that English history should be taught in correlation with American history (Plum, 1924).

organized with a belief that general arbitration treaties would allow countries to avoid war by submitting their differences to peaceful settlement. This ideal was embodied in the establishment of a series of international organizations and peace conferences such as the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907; the establishment of the Nobel Institute in 1904; the creation of a Central American Court of Justice in 1908; and the foundation of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 1910 with the purposes of preventing international conflicts.

Educators and scholars in the United States as well as in Europe embraced this intellectual aspiration for world peace. In fact, in the early twentieth century, many educators believed that education, on the college and secondary school levels, was an important vehicle to create international harmony. On the secondary level, American educators who had participated in the National Peace Congress in 1907 formed the American School Peace League in the following year to promote "international justice and fraternity" through schools and the educational public. In 1912, the National Education Association, encouraging the activities of the League, passed a resolution that "the very material advance made in the cause of world peace during the past year encouraged the National Education Association to urge a more widespread dissemination of knowledge upon this vital subject" (Anderson, 1916, p.11). American scholars in history and social sciences also actively participated in international scholarly conferences such as "The International Congress of Historical Studies," which was first held at the Hague in 1898, then at Paris in 1900, and at London in 1913, with a purpose of building "international friendship and international achievement" (Jameson, 1913, p.691).

Between 1900 and 1915, increasing groups of students from diverse backgrounds established peace organizations, such as the Intercollegiate Socialist Society, the Young People's Socialist League, and the Christian Students. World peace through international cooperation seemed to be very attainable before World War I. Therefore, when the world was dragged into the Great War of waste, it was deeply disappointing and abhorrent to millions of people who were confident that international cooperation would preserve peace. When the United States entered World War I in April 1917, different approaches by the peace movement became prominent. Charles Debenedetti, in *Origins of the Modern American Peace Movement, 1915-1929* (1978), explained two different approaches within the peace movement: "internationalist" and "pacifist." Commonly, both internationalists and pacifists viewed nationalism in terms of cultural diversity rather than as some form of exclusive racial unity such as Anglo-Saxonism or Teutonism; they saw war as a by-product of militarism, nationalism and imperialism; and they sought a reformed and democratized international system by which political leaders in the world would facilitate peace through applied social justice and world agencies (Howlett and Zeitzer, 1985).

Internationalists and pacifists, however, held different views regarding war and the nation-state system. When America entered the Great War, internationalists soon expressed their support for the war. They were hopeful that a democratized and reformed postwar world order would develop from the war. In their view, war was sometimes unavoidable for national security. However, they believed in the ability of a people to change conditions and achieve a stable world order, based on cooperation rather than force; through the establishment of world agencies in supporting the Great War, these

advocates of peace did not abandon their international vision. They believed that peace could be achieved through international mechanisms based upon the voluntary cooperation of nation-states. For them, the principle of national autonomy remained intact. They formed organizations such as the Carnegie Endowment and the League to Enforce Peace. Leaders like Raymond Fosdick and James T. Shotwell were famous in this form of internationalism.

Meanwhile, the pacifists immediately and adamantly objected to the Great War. They favored antimilitarism, complete disarmament, and rejected the "war spirit." They would never be satisfied with merely prevention of a war. Their ultimate goal was to eliminate war. Pacifists were more receptive to a socialist analysis of the nature of capitalism's failings and were more radical than internationalists, although not violent. They viewed peace as a process based on individual and group cooperation sustained through common values and institutional and cultural mores. Therefore they opposed all forms of organized violence. Domestic social reform was, from their perspective, the primary vehicle for enduring peace. Pacifists organized such groups as the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, the National Council for Prevention of War, the Committee on Militarism in Education, the War Resisters League, and the Fellowship of Reconsolidation. A. J. Muste, John Nevin Sayre, Norman Thomas and Jane Adams were among the famous leaders.

A pacifist viewpoint exerted its influence over school textbooks. William Herbert Hobbs (1921), a professor at the University of Michigan, criticized a textbook written from a pacifist perspective, without giving the name of the author or the title of the book. In that book, according to Hobbs (1921), "the cult of Pacifism" colored Bolshevism in a

distinctly sympathetic manner. The pacifist, radical, and seemingly sympathetic view toward socialism and Russian Bolshevism was always the target of criticism and made them fail to gain popularity in the post-war era.

Meanwhile, an internationalist's plan for high school social studies revision achieved, to a degree, successful attention and had an enduring impact on high school courses in world history and world studies. Therefore, this study explores the internationalist view about social studies and history content and organization after World War I.

After the war, internationalists underscored national education as a critical factor for world peace. They argued that the Great War was in large measure due to the distorted national ideals and the contribution of national education to instilling exclusive nationalism in its children. They also painstakingly accepted that the failure to promote mutual understanding and international good will resulted in incalculable waste and suffering. Watson argued: "The absorptive danger of national education was never fully realized till the Great War through which we have just passed"(1919, p.363). Education was the principal means of propagating nationalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

National patriotism, one of the modern characteristics, stems from a sense of loyalty, man's gregarious nature. Throughout history, Hayes (1923) analyzed, people have simultaneously applied their sense of loyalty, quite naturally and with little discrimination, to ideas, places, and persons. Unlike other forms of loyalty, Hayes argued, nationalism, "educate[s]" the nation's people "to make their natural loyalties to their several hearthstones or social classes or traditional religions strictly subordinate to

an artificially stimulated loyalty to the nation," by using a state-regulated, large-scale school system and large-scale communication means such as newspapers and radio broadcasting (1923, p. 23). In an extreme case, Hayes (1923) showed, ardent groups of parochial nationalists impose upon people within a nation a single language and a single set of political institutions and compel all their fellow citizens to conform to their own special standards of culture and to adopt their own interpretations of history.

Advocates of international education argued that if national education proceeded unchecked and intolerant, it was likely to exaggerate differences and even to encourage hatred toward people with different cultures or different nationalities. Its exclusive glorification of a nation was, in turn, likely to implant the notion that the nation was superior to all other nations and that it ought to supersede and dominate over all other nations both in a military and in a spiritual sense (Watson, 1919). The most critical example of exclusive national education, scholars agued, was German education. German education, which the United States had admired so much, was one of the forces that created the state of mind that invited the world crisis of 1914 (Barnes, 1922). Watson stated that German education was the "embodiment of its chauvinistic ideals" and its schools had become "propaganda centers of Pan-Germanism" (1919, p. 363).

Advocates of international education also warned against the cultivation of Americanism in American schools. They attacked "right-thinking" people for their defense of Americanism as things supremely desirable for the American people to accept and foster and for their admonishment to schools to cultivate and cherish "Americanism," "nationalism," "patriotism," "loyalty" (Gambrill, 1922, p.109). Advocates of international education perceived that if education were used as the means to inculcate

such parochial national patriotism, it could be a fatal step toward producing arrogant nationalism, leading to another world war. However, if education were designed to help people understand each other better and to refrain from chauvinistic excesses in their school curricula, education would be one of the best steps toward for world peace. A year before the American entry into the war, Clarence D. Kingsley, Chairman of the NEA Commission on the Reorganization of Secondary Education argued:

> There can be little doubt that the present world conflict is in large measure due to the distorted ideas that certain nations have had of their neighbors, together with the failure to inculcate good will and respect, coupled in many cases with the teaching of false doctrines of nationality (Kingsley, 1916, p.38).

As to remedies, Kingsley suggested infusing "genuine internationalism" by teaching about "other nations than our own"(1916, p. 38). He agreed with Felix Adler, the professor of ethics in Columbia University, when Adler said, "Familiarity will breed respect. Good will toward other people depends upon our knowing more about them than we do" (Kingsley, 1916, 0.38). The war gave far more educational importance than ever before to "international understanding" as one of the most important qualities that intelligent citizens should possess. Internationalism provided a foundational idea for a curriculum reform in colleges and schools in the post-war era. Internationalism sought to harmonize the relations of nationalities on the basis of peace rather than of war (Price, 1929, p.133). The assumption was that through international cooperation, the world would learn to live in peace and harmony with one another. Internationalism became a vital component of the peace movement.

World Citizenship in a World Community

Advocates of international education envisioned themselves as peacekeepers in the post-war era. They believed that their primary role was to create the intellectual and educational climate needed to overcome national differences and to strive for peace. They argued that formal education would promote world peace, if the school curriculum were designed to enhance international understanding and create brotherhood for humanity while deprecating a chauvinistic, narrow-minded tribalism. Generally, they urged schools to teach a "higher good" that transcends national ambitions and national ideals in order to direct world peace and progress. For example, during the war, Carl Conrad Eckhardt, a historian, argued: "The nations must learn to feel that national ambitions, national ideals are not the highest good, that there is a still higher good, the rights of humanity" (1917, p.45). Samuel B. Harding, member of National Board of Historical Service, in his article "What the war should do for our history methods," urged that American education should teach "a sense of world citizenship" without lessening the emphasis on "national ideals and duties"(1919, pp.189-90). The director of the Bureau of Cooperative Research at the School of Education at Indiana University, Henry Lester Smith, in his work with Leo Martin Chamberlain, also claimed "the really important task before the world today is the creation of a new state of mind which will transcend national boundaries" (1929, p. 13). Advocates of international education began to assign the same importance to "a world citizenship" as to national citizenship as a purpose of formal education (Evans, 1923; Carr, 1928; Smith and Chamberlain, 1929).

The concept of world citizenship stemmed from the recognition of a growing "world community." Jessie Evans stated:

> In 1918, and even in 1920, interest in international relations seemed confined to a few, but the developments of the post-war period have convinced all but the most hard-headed advocates of "normalcy" of the existence of a world community (Evans, 1923, p.251).

Even before the war, intellectuals recognized that every sphere of life in the world was proving that the world had become one entity. James Bryce, British historian, in his presidential address to the International Congress of Historical Studies (April 1913), drew the attention of his audience to "the world that was becoming one in an altogether new sense." Bryce (1913) argued that movements of politics, of economics and finance, and of thought, in each region of the world, became more closely interwoven with those of every other (Jameson, 1913, p.684). Whatever happens in any part of the globe, he continued, now had significance for every other part.

After the war, internationalists perceived that the intense nationalism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was just "a phase of development" and "no surer of permanency than any other phase of human history" (Evans, 1923, p.251). Gambrill (1923; 1927) explained that owing to the modern revolutionary "science" and "the expansion of Europe over-seas" the world had become more and more "narrowed." A strike of miners or dockworkers in England may cause instant hardship in the heart of America and a squabble of nationalist extremists in eastern Europe may have its definite influences in England or Japan. Problems, events, decisions, and activities in one part of the world came to have radical consequences for individuals and communities in quite

distant parts of the globe. The present world was characterized by the growth of "interdependence" among individuals, societies, and nations. The people in the world would become the "victims" of the growing global interdependence, unless they would recognize and use it for world progress and peace (Gambrill, 1923, p. 19; Evans 1923, p.251).

In order to prepare students to live in the world community, advocates of international education insisted that schools should develop in students a concept of world citizenship. World citizenship never connoted the establishment of a "super-government of the world" or minimized national importance (Smith and Chamberlain, 1929, p. 14). In this sense, advocates of international education distinguished themselves from advocates of "cosmopolitanism," who claimed: "[I]nterests of mankind requires the overthrow of national states and the erection of a super-state" (Price, 1929, p. 134). World citizenship implied an extended conception of citizenship. It required education to include the international realm in its subject matter and to embrace "humanity" or "brotherhood" transcending national boundaries in its purpose. In this conception of international education, citizenship education and world citizenship education were coexisting concepts and held parallel educational values. "Double loyalty," that is, loyalty at the same time to both the nation and mankind as a whole was plausible (Evans, 1923; Carr 1928; Smith and Chamberlain, 1929). They claimed that nationality and internationality were not opposing notions but rather the one involved the other and, without the one, the other was meaningless (Watson, 1919, p. 365). They believed that it was possible to develop in individuals "world understanding" and "international-mindedness" without loss of national interest and loyalty. They argued that as people

simultaneously held multiple loyalties to their family, city, and nation, they could hold loyalty to both nation and the world community. "The world community," as a common theme of international education, and "world citizenship," as an important purpose of citizenship education, ran throughout the post-war decade.

International education pursued peace through international cooperation. Therefore, as the main object of world citizenship training, advocates of international education generally presented "cooperation" for human improvement. To meet this goal, the essence of world citizenship training should be, in Kingsley's term (1916), "human brotherhood" and in the suggestion of Smith and Chamberlain (1929), "world-mindedness" or "world friendship." Although they employed different terms, they connoted the same idea: Regardless of cultural, racial, or national differences, the people of the world should realize their common interests, predicaments, and enterprises. True brotherhood or world-mindedness should be founded on intellectual knowledge free from sentiment (Kingsley 1916; Smith and Chamberlain, 1929). Knowledge of the nations of the world, including similarities among peoples and the evolution of humanity throughout history, was regarded as a central component of the intellectual training of world citizenship, while differences among people were considered as supplementary knowledge. In other words, in the social studies curriculum with internationalist outlook, "the similarities" and the "humanity" should be the essential part of world citizenship training.

For the purpose of preparing students for world citizenship, few educators suggested that schools offer new separates courses. Advocates of international education generally agreed that it was not necessary to introduce new courses into an already crowded curriculum. Instead, they made great efforts to provide teachers effective strategies to infuse internationalism into existing courses. They acknowledged the value of the study of current events. In fact, since the outbreak of the war, current issues and affairs drew increasing interest from educators as well as students, as newspapers and periodicals were filled with European news. Advocates of international education believed that a well-organized course in current issues could impress students with the importance of international questions and international cooperation to solve them (Evans, 1923, p. 251).

Consistent with this strain of thought, Clarence D. Kingsley, Harriet Tuell, and Harold Rugg, who would define themselves as social studies educators rather than historians, presented their plans and textbooks. They adopted an interdisciplinary approach, in which world history was the backbone of the course. In their approach, the nation became a unit of study and the focus was put on each nation's modern political and economic institutions and system. Kingsley, Tuell, and Rugg wanted to expand attention to the world beyond western Europe and the United States. They gave increased attention to people who had been neglected previously in world history courses, such peoples as Russian, Turks, Chinese, Japanese, and Latin Americans. Kingsley (1916) presented his ideas for a course called "The Study of Nations," as a supplementary course

to European history courses.[9] Kingsley (1916) suggested that a course in "The Study of Nations" deal with "typical advanced nations," such as "England," "France," "Germany," "Russia" and "Japan," but it should not omit "a study of typical backward peoples."

One of the purposes in studying "the history of nations other than our own," Kingsley argued, should be "a cultivation of a sympathetic understanding of such nations and their peoples, of an intelligent appreciation of their contributions to civilization, and of a just attitude toward them" (1916, p.38). The basic assumption behind his scheme of "The Study of Nations" was that every nation has or may have something of worth to contribute to other nations and to humanity as a whole; therefore, the history of a nation in the world should include a study of the contributions of the nation. As a concrete plan to carry out those ideas, Kingsley suggested that a world history class could begin with the study of people today, "their social institutions, their industrial and agricultural organization, their manners and customs, and their national characteristics as revealed in their present day contributions to the arts and sciences"(1916, p.38). Then, history, with the assistance of geographical explanation, would explain how those people came to be "what they are today." "The really fruitful part" of this study would be the discussion about the desirable relations among nations. This would help students gain some "conception of the possible development of a nation in the family of nations" (Kingsley, 1916, p.39).

Tuell (1920), a teacher of Somerville High School in Massachusetts, developed Kingsley's scheme into a concrete outline. In her outline, Tuell categorized nations into three types: "European nations," "Oriental nations," and "a nation in the making." The

[9]In its report (1916), the Social Studies Committee also acknowledged the value of Kingsley's suggestion in providing students fruitful understanding of non-European nations (Nelson, 1994, p.37).

"European nations" included France, England, Germany, Russia, Italy and Austro-Hungarian Empire, Turkey and the Balkan States; the "Oriental nations" were China and Japan; and "the nation in the making" indicated the Philippines. Tuell attempted to treat nations beyond western Europe by assigning separate chapters to such countries as Russia, Turkey, China, Japan, and the Philippines.

Harold Rugg's textbook (1931) was an embodiment of those ideas of social studies educators with an internationalist outlook. Harold Rugg advocated, "living together" as the significant purpose of the social studies course. His books generally treated western European nations as well as non-western European nations such as Russia, China, Japan, and Latin American nations, as did one of his books, *Changing Civilization in the Modern world: A Textbook in World Geography with Historical Backgrounds* (1931).

In his textbooks, world history and world geography, government, and economics were incorporated without the separation of subject areas so as to create social studies as the study of modern way of life and problems. He believed that "an appreciation of the significant contemporary problems of living together" was the most important purpose of social studies (Rugg, 1931, p. v). To satisfy this purpose, his textbooks focused on "the basic modes of living and the problems of modern life," "the great movements through which institutions and problems have evolved," and "the chief concepts and principles which lie at the roots of living together" (Rugg, 1931, p. vi).

In Rugg's textbooks, the main theme was modern economic development. Industrial countries and agricultural countries became largely a frame of reference. France, England, and Germany represented the industrial countries; the rest of the world

was generally referred to as "agricultural" or "ancient civilizations." The units were composed of "industrial countries of Europe – England, France, and Germany," "agricultural countries of Europe – Russia," "a changing agricultural civilization – China," "an ancient island country that was becoming a modern industrial nation – Japan," and "an ancient civilization that became modern – Latin America." Rugg first described political, economic, and cultural institutions and characteristics of each country. Then, he put a direct question of "why Europe has become the manufacturing and trading center of the world," and gave four answers: "location in a stimulating and productive climate"; "size and varied natural resources"; "large population ready to work"; and "inventiveness in controlling nature" (Rugg, 1931, pp. 322-30).

In discussing Asian countries, he asked a question of why, despite such advancement, Asia countries had not been the first to create the industrial revolution. Rugg answered that although Asian people were ready to work and they were advanced in scientific knowledge, their environment was unfavorable to stimulate them to "think up easier, labor-saving ways of doing things" and they made relatively little use of scientific knowledge (1931, pp. 513-17). His explanation denounced the prevalent notion that Oriental civilization inherently lacked freedom and scientific application. Instead, he used environmental factors to explain the "backwardness" of Oriental civilization. Regarding the future development of non-European nations, he predicted that they would eventually make progress, adopting the ways of the West.

In his conception of modern civilization, the West was the center of modern economic development and the non-West became Westernized by adopting the Western industrial system. Westernization virtually meant progress. To him, Westernization was a

universal process among non-Western nations. As a result of Westernization, Japan had become one of the powerful industrial countries, and China and countries in Latin America were becoming modernized. In his view, the most powerful factor of modern industrial civilization was science, which made the industrial revolution possible in western European countries. The dynamism of modern industrial countries contributed to modern industrialization of the rest of the world.

Kingsley, Tuell, and Rugg attempted to be less morally judgmental of non-European customs, religions, and political ideals and institutions than had other world history textbook authors. While recognizing the "backwardness" of those nations, they attempted to stress the potentialities of future progress, correcting the misconception of the inherent defects dooming them to failure.

There is no denying their tremendous endeavors to correct the discriminatory view that prevailed toward nations other than Western nations and to expand the treatment accorded to non-Western nations in world history. In the background lay the belief that the claim of "a sweeping superiority" of one nation over others was "a sure cause of irreconcilable hatred" (Kingsley, 1916, p.39). However, there is also no doubt that their schemes employed European developments as the model for progress that non-Europeans should follow. Their themes highlighted the European creation of modernity, picturing Westernization of the world as the contemporary process of world progress. In this respect, they embraced the New Historians' modernist vision of world history. The essential knowledge that the world citizen should learn in this scheme of world history was the Western model of modernization and its adoption by the non-Western nations.

The common interest and aspiration of all humankind, in this view, was the Western way of modern living and thinking.

Among social studies courses, advocates of international education asserted, the world history course was the best means to inculcate world citizenship. They claimed that just as United States history and civics were fundamental to the teaching of national citizenship, so world history was fundamental to the understanding of world citizenship (Smith and Chamberlain, 1929; Evans 1923). World history, sympathetically taught, was the most vital subject to provide students with an opportunity to view the growing "international interests," "humanity" and "human progress" throughout history and to appreciate the contributions of other nations to human progress. Advocates of international education insisted that world history courses should explain the factors and movements that have led to "a new internationalism" or a more interdependent world (Harding, 1919, p.189). They also argued that the courses should give more adequate attention to the history, aspirations, and institutions of other people than Europeans. For those purposes, G. Montgomery Gambrill suggested constructing world history with "the growth of humanity," or "the growth of community" as an interpretive theme. As an exemplar of this world history conceptualization, he presented the universal history textbook of H. G. Wells, a British novelist (Gambrill, 1927). [10] Wells wrote a universal

[10]William G. Carr suggested adopting the ideas of Francis S. Marvin, the British historian, to teach students the concept of progress through cooperation and presented the following six topics that Marvin suggested in his article, History and the League of Nations, in *The Study and Teaching of International Relations*, 3 (11). 1.Early civilization in Mesopotamia and Egypt; 2. Greek culture stressing the Greek love of science, art, and philosophy; 3. Roman culture stressing the elements of that culture which have endured and made permanent contributions, particularly the idea of codified law; 4. The Middle Ages, stressing the spiritual control of the church; 5. The period of revolutions, emphasizing the rise of liberty of thought and research as an ideal, the beginnings of international law, and the first modern signs of scientific methods and achievement; 6. The period of world unification, with stress on the industrial revolution, the "shrinkage" of the earth due to increased facilities for communication and transportation, the rapid growth

history textbook called *Outlines of History* (1920), which was an attempt to write a common history of all humankind. In the background existed his recognition of a growing world community.

Wells (1920; 1921) observed that the rapid development of communications technology brought all men closer to one another for good or for evil. As a result, economically, intellectually, and in many other ways the world had become one community. World War I, a universal disaster, was proof for Wells that humankind had to face a common destiny, which meant that unless people worked together for a common peace and a general prosperity for all the people in the world, there would be no peace or prosperity at all. In order to hold all the people in the world together in harmonious cooperation, Wells believed that historians should write the history of humankind with stress upon "the single origin" and "common adventure" of all mankind. This history, he expected, would bring "human brotherhood," with the result that the peoples in separate national and cultural boundaries could be united for world peace and cooperation (Wells, 1920, p.vi; Mr. Wells now..., 1920, p. 526). Wells argued that it was the historian's duty to write universal history, in which all peoples in the world could find their own adventures. In Wells' conception, this kind of universal history was "something more and something less than the aggregate of the national histories" (1920, p.v). His two-volume book, *Outline of History,* was an attempt to sketch a framework for universal history, which people might have in common, and into which everyone might fit his own particular reading and historical interests.

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of international commerce and cultures, the extension of man's control over Nature, and the beginnings of international arbitration (Carr, 1928, pp. 160-61).

His book devoted more than 250 pages to tracing the common origin of humankind in Prehistoric Times and it's branching out, first in civilizations in Assyria, Egypt, China, and India. Western civilization is the central trunk for the integration of other parts of the world. Western civilization determined the division of historical periods and the major themes to be treated in a given period. In other words, while he described the development of Western civilization in different periods, he briefly evoked what was happening at the same time in China, India, and the Middle East. For example, Greek and Roman civilization occupied most of ancient history while brief histories of ancient China and India, focusing on some parallel developments of ancient Greece and Roman Empire, were added to ancient history. Ancient thought and religions of China and India were briefly described, while Greek thought and literature were the central attention of the period. Islam was treated in a comparison to the development of Christianity in Europe.

Wells' attempt to make space for the histories of the non-European nations provoked discussions. History educators who set American democratic ideals as the foremost goal of American citizenship education disclaimed Wells' idea of universal history (Knowlton, 1921, p.167). Nevertheless, American high schools often used Wells' book in their world history courses with an internationalist aspiration for common humanity. To a degree, Wells gave an impression that without shaking off the place of Western civilization, the histories of non-Western nations could be effectively put into world history. Historian, Carl Becker commented on Wells' universal history:

> I have a renewed sense of history as "the common adventure of all mankind," and more than ever before it seems to me likely that mankind

> may safely be taken to include the "backward" peoples of Asia as well as the forward peoples of Europe (Becker, 1921, p.646).

It is true that Wells made space for histories of non-European civilizations. The numbers of pages devoted to each description of Western civilization and the non-Western civilizations, however, demonstrated the tremendous weight given to Western civilization in world history.[11] Although Wells treated Islamic and the Mongol empires, those developments were depicted as isolated from developments in other regions and times. Their influences were never given importance in a worldwide sense. From the twelfth century, Wells' description of modern times shifted its focus to the story of western European expansion throughout the world. Western Europeans escaped from their medieval restraints and transformed their institutions into modern forms. Arising as military and industrial states, European states and the United States extended their economic and political power throughout the world. Wells aimed at the history of mankind by including histories of non-European world, but he never minimized the place of Europe and America in world history.

Wells' book did not contribute to new knowledge. Because Wells was a novelist, not a historian, as the reviewers frequently pointed out, his knowledge of the past was, sometimes, even incorrect (Becker, 1921). His contribution was giving meaning to previously accepted knowledge about events of non-European civilizations. By assigning separate units to those events of non-European civilizations, he attempted to create a domain of non-European histories in the common adventure of all the people in the world. In a sense, it was successful. Wells demonstrated a way to integrate non-Western

history into world history. More history educators began to assert the need to add some phases of non-European histories into world history.

Inspired by Wells' approach to world history as a story of all human beings, G. Montgomery Gambrill (1923, 1927) presented his own ideas for a world history course organized with "the gradual enlargement of community interest and organization" as the central theme. In Gambrill's view, the world community was virtually a result of the modern scientific revolution of Europe and its over-sea expansion. Therefore, in order for "high school pupils" to see "this world community evolving," their study of history must focus on Western civilization. Gambrill suggested:

> Such a story [history of humanity] would include the teamwork of primitive men, from the hunting pact to the tribal unit; the growth of city states, and kingdoms; the rise of great empires, culminating in the West with Rome and the Pax Romana; the political disintegration and social decay of Western civilization, followed by a gradual recovery; the building of the modern states east and west and of such striking groups as American Union, the British Empire, and the German Republic; and the various international agencies, of which the League of Nations is the most conspicuous(Gambrill, 1927, p. 265).

Although he urged that world history for a world community should seek to be fundamentally different in certain respects from the older, general or universal history, his conception of world history was not different from the older general history of the Aryan liberal writers in that both views conceived the evolution of political organization as the main process of world history and the focus was limited to the Euro-American development. In his view, the contemporary world community was virtually

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[11]For example, out of about 300 pages of ancient history, about 30 pages were devoted to the ancient history of China and India. Out of a total of about 1150 pages of accounts of the historic period in the two volumes, about 150 pages were devoted to non-Western histories.

characterized as Europeanization and the unity of the world community was found in the spread of European ideas and institutions.

History of the World for the Rest

Americans were shocked by the rapid growth of Japan, the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, and the precarious situation confronting European control over the colonial states in Asia and Latin America. Politicians, journalists, educators and scholars called for a better understanding of nations beyond Europe. The demand for a non-European dimension in world history came from intellectuals regardless of their world outlooks. A high school history teacher in Eugene, Oregon, urged the teaching of the history of non-European nations, recognizing the challenges that these countries posed to nations in the West. He stated:

> Unless we familiarize ourselves with condition[s] in the East, we may at some time in the near future be very suddenly and unpleasantly awakened to the fact that there is a virile race of people in the Orient who have recently become progressive and one that gives promise of becoming more powerful in the future (Smith, 1929, p.208).

Americans feared the fact that China and Japan seemed to resist Western domination of the world and sought to create their own domain of control in the world arena. Americans as well as Europeans were threatened by their growth. Americans needed to know about their potential enemy. Meanwhile, educators and historians with an internationalist perspective, calling for "intelligent and cosmopolitan hospitality," demanded "a more extensive consideration of the Oriental nations" in world history textbooks (Griffin, 1921,

pp. 78-80). Eldon Griffin, history professor at the University of Oregon, criticized existing textbooks and classroom practice:

> The traditional method of instruction has been to regard the Oriental countries as a kind of wilderness into which European nations have hacked their way, much as the American pioneers did into this country. This method is all very well in itself, but not sufficient to meet present requirements, which make it necessary for us to consider our relations with the other half of the world, not merely as a phase of our own experience and as a development of our history, but as a part of the national life of the peoples of the East, with as nearly their own method of approach as possible and with due attention to their habits of mind (Griffin, 1921, p.78).

Griffin believed that "Oriental countries" deserved a better treatment than the treatment they received in currently used textbooks. World history courses invariably touched countries of Asia only in relation to European exploration and never gave sufficient attention to their national characteristics, education, governmental systems, cultures and histories. He argued that it was time to expand the treatments of nations in East Asia in world history. He worried about Americans' provincialism that seemed to increase after World War I. Griffin believed that the expansion of American outlook beyond Europe and the United States would be the cure for it. He felt that no justification of "the promotion of the history of the Orient to a position equal to that of Europe" was necessary (1921, p. 79). Japan and China, in his view, demonstrated their growing places in world affairs during and after the war. The critical obstacle to teaching "Far East history," in his view, was that there was little known about the history of those nations. There was no well-known history of the Orient as a whole, nor was there an adequate or completely satisfactory textbook on what was ordinarily called the "Far East." However,

he argued that no matter how inadequate our knowledge may be, there was enough to begin modifying the general textbooks.

Historians of non-European histories suggested that because the crowded school curriculum would make it impossible to arrange a separate course on non-European histories, the preferable way was to teach them in connection with the European history course (Smith, 1929; Latourette, 1929). They presented two possible ways to incorporate non-European histories into world history. First, it was possible to deal with non-Western nations whenever events taking place in Europe were connected to other parts of the world. For example, peoples and cultures of Asia could be treated in connection with the Europe experience of the Mongol incursions under the leadership of Genghis Khan, in the Middle Ages. European overseas explorations in modern times could also give some space to mentioning China, Japan, Africa, and the Americas (Smith, 1929, p. 209).

Second, whenever the course dealt with different periods of European history, it could briefly point out what was taking place at the same time in the Far East, Near East, or other parts of the world (Latourette, 1929, p.110). Henry C. Fenn (1933), a teacher at Oak Lane Country Day School of Temple University, adopted that principle of organization, but took it one step further. He attempted a balanced treatment of "the West" and "the East" in terms of length. He suggested the following units for the world history course: "Beginnings of historical record;" "The age of philosophers," "The First world empires," "The golden age of literature," "The collapse of Empires," "The Moslem Era," "The Mongol tide," "The Aftermath," "Modern history." [12] In his outline, he highlighted the fact that "some events in the stories of China, India, and Japan," were

[12] These units seem to be adopted from those of H. G. Wells in his universal history textbook.

really more important to general knowledge than some of the facts of European, English, even American history..." Fenn believed that world history must be organized in a way to recognize prominent developments in those nations beyond Europe. One of the useful ways was to adopt a comparative approach to explore developments in the West and those in the East. For example he compared the Chinese Empire of the Han Dynasty (205 B.C. -- 220 A.D.) with the better-known empires of the West. He found that the Han ruled a land area approximately equal to the combined extent of Alexander's domain and the Roman Empire at its greatest extent. Fenn argued: "Han Empire meant fully as much to the progress of civilization as did its Roman contemporary"(1933, p.196). He sought in the histories of non-European cultures parallel development with those in Europe and put the developments of non-European regions as well as those of Europe together under one unit.

Historians of non-European histories increasingly insisted that schools should teach non-European history, particularly histories of those countries that were resisting Euro-American domination of the world – for example, China, Japan, and Russia. As an essential qualification for world history teachers, they emphasized knowledge of both European and non-European portions of the world as an essential qualification for world history teachers. They also stressed that the contemporary world was a result of encounters of people in the world; therefore, world history teachers must know "the influences of the East on the West and the West on the East" (Flick, 1927, pp.63-4).

Nevertheless, the organizational themes, topics, and periodization in world history did not escape from the conceptual framework of Western civilization. In particular, no one disputed that histories of non-Western civilization eventually converged into Western

civilization in modern times. The modern development in Western civilization could be read as the common adventure of all human kind in modern times. In constructing a history of humankind in which all of the people in the world found their parts, what mattered was how to tell the history of pre-modern times. The solution was to put some seemingly parallel developments of the non-West into the grand trunk of world history, Western civilization. Generally speaking, few world history textbooks until the mid-1930s were concerned with the pre-modern history of the non-European nations. Pahlow argued:

> Since Young America belongs to the Euro-American family, it ought to be his business to get to feel at home with the members of his family, especially those in western Europe. If he can't understand these near kinsfolk who, taken all together, had the identical ancestors that he did until only a few score years ago, then it is nonsense to suppose that he will ever be able to understand the Hindus and Chinese and other peoples whose civilization are markedly different from his own (Pahlow, 1932, pp.v-vi).

The history of Western civilization was Euro-American history. To Americans, it was little use to give attention to histories of other peoples such as Indian civilization or Chinese civilization, which were markedly different from their own, without the study of Western civilization, in which American cultural heritage was rooted. The belief that Americans were of European stock frequently became an obstacle to the construction of a world history that was more culturally inclusive.

CONCLUSION

World War I created two, extremely different, political attitudes regarding how to deal with the problems posed by the World War in history teaching as well as writing. One line of thought was developed by the Committee of History and Education for Citizenship. This committee adopted "the growth of democracy" as the interpretive theme of the high school modern history course and conceived of modern world history as the struggle of democracy against autocracy, with democracy emerging triumphant. After World War I, the Committee of History and Education for Citizenship placed its sole focus on democratic progress, marginalizing other modern developments in its plan for the modern history course. This committee recognized liberal democracy as the central factor in molding modern civilization. To the committee, World War I was a test for democratic survival and, at the same time, proof of eventual world progress toward democracy. Asserting that each generation had seized upon the materials that seemed best to respond to its own immediate educational needs, the committee decided that the history that students in America should study in 1920 was the history of modern democracy.

As a result of World War I, American educators who insisted on promoting Americanism stressed the notion that in order to prevent another revolt against democracy, the central focus of the history course must be how modern democracy strove against autocracy and thrived in modern civilization. The war served to emphasize the democratic struggle against autocracy as a central modern process in world history textbooks. The war encouraged history and social studies educators to envision the world

as two different political poles: democratic civilization of the West and "antidemocratic" and "nondemocratic" civilizations of the rest.

The other line of thought in the revision of the high school world history course in the post-war decade was grounded in the movement for international education. At the core of this movement lay the aspiration for peace, which was, to the intellectuals in the post-war decade, a normative value that shaped their work. Supporters of international education believed that World War I was a result of selfish nationalism and of the failure of international understanding. Disclaiming parochial nationalism and promoting international mutual understanding were the best solutions to prevent another great war of waste. For this purpose, the world history course, advocates of international education urged, should teach the history of humanity, the grand drama of human adventure, in which all the people in the world could find their parts. They encouraged world history educators to broader their focus beyond Europe and include in the domain of world history those nations beyond Europe and the United States. Pre-modern histories of non-European nations began to appear in world history textbooks to explain what was happening in those areas, when classical civilization was formulated in ancient Greece, when the Roman Empire expanded its territorial and political power beyond the Italian peninsula, or when Christianity created new ideas and institutions in medieval western Europe. Some developments in non-European areas that seemed to parallel those in Europe began to gain attention in world history textbooks. With development in the field of non-European histories, it became a growing tendency to incorporate the histories of areas other than Europe and the United States.

From the standpoint of present global education, the internationalist approach to the high school world history course remained locked in a Eurocentric perspective. This perspective determined the central theme for selection and organization of course content and it evaluated the progress made in the nations in Europe as well as the continents other than Europe. World history was still essentially the history of Western civilization. From the standpoint of history educators before World War I and even some of the post-war decade, the world history conceptualization of advocates of international education, however, was a radical revolt against the American tradition of history instruction, which aimed at the transmission of Euro-American values and institutions.

These two perspectives were, no doubt, products of the political climate after World War I. Nations in the "Far East" and Russian communism threatened Western domination of the world. This political condition demanded history and social studies educators to deal with contemporary issues and problems as well as cultures and histories of those countries. While educators generally perceived that the study of those countries was necessary because they were potential enemies, advocates of international education suggested that schools teach about those countries in order to lessen the conception of enemies and to create a "cosmopolitan brotherhood."

The post-war political climate forced the high school world history courses to expand the treatment of non-European civilizations. Advocates of international education presented "effective" ways to include those events in non-European civilizations. However, by the mid-1930s, world history courses as well as textbooks showed little interest in expanding cultures and histories of non-European civilizations. They continued to treat the "Westernization" process in the non-western regions. Modern

Western civilization was regarded as the one that reached the highest state of cultural development, a condition that countries in the non-West were eager to adopt.

World history textbooks and courses of study generally stated that because of the influence of Western civilization, Japan, China and other non-European nations could experience modern transformation. In particular, they argued that because Japan was successful in Westernization, it could become one of the world powers of the day. The inclusion of the pre-modern developments in areas outside Europe in world history was frequently accompanied by the favorable recognition of those developments that were parallel with or more prominent than developments in Europe. If one considers that advocates of international education and historians in the field of non-European histories called for the celebration of histories of non-European nations, it is likely that they made significant contribution to enhancing pre-modern histories of non-European nations in high school world history courses.

After World War I, the world was soon ideologically divided into two camps; on one side, Communism in Russia and its eastern neighbors, and on the other, western-European and American allies of democracy. This post-war, global ideological confrontation gave increasing currency to the theme of the growth of democracy. World history textbooks came to show favorable attitudes toward nations that made contributions to the world struggle towards a common democratic goal.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

Conceptualizations of World History, 1875-1934

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, German comparative philologists categorized human races into different groups on the basis of linguistic and other categories. In particular, they traced the origin of the present Aryan race to its primitive tribes in the East. They provided a major intellectual buttress for the European tendency from Herder through Schlegel to Hegel to visualize the progress of civilization as a movement from East to West across Asia with the Aryan race as the central agent. In the early nineteenth century, German philosophers, such as Hegel and Ranke, conceived that the history of civilization was a history with Europe at the center, delegitimizing the study of non-European cultures and races. The Hegelian and Rankenian visions of histories were rooted in German nationalistic imagination that served mainly to explain the history of the German people in order to glorify the supremacy of Prussia over other European states. They wrote the history of civilization with the Aryans (Germans) as the main player in the drama of human history. Aryanism, which glorified the supremacy of the Aryan race, perpetuated its historical imagination of world progress. This historical imagination had a profound impact on historical writing and teaching in the United States in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. In this period, American historians, with little change, accepted German historical methods and concepts as well as their visions of world progress. The Hegelian liberal vision of world progress became prominent in

American high school world history textbooks. Although the course was called general history or world history, attention mostly focused on the European past, in order to trace the growth of freedom.

The European discovery of the idea of liberty gave European civilization an exclusive place in the conception of world history in high school textbooks. In contrast, because "Oriental" people never possessed the idea of liberty, they were marginalized by this conception of world history. European civilization was conceived as the imaginative, progressive center while "Oriental" civilizations were characterized as being located in the submissive and stationary periphery of world history. The dichotomy of European civilization versus Oriental civilization became a basic assumption underlying the conception of world history.

The concept of modern European civilization, originated in the study of Leopold Von Ranke, emphasized the uniqueness of European civilization. According to this concept, the racial and cultural mixture of Romans and Aryans (Germans) was the foundation on which modern civilization was built. It became entrenched as a valid explanation of how modern European civilization was formed. The emphasis on the two elements of modern European civilization – the Greco-Roman element and the German element – helped to limit the scope of world history to the Mediterranean Sea and Western Europe.

During the latter half of the nineteenth century, Europe witnessed the proliferation of racial theories, which presented the different nature of human races and human cultures. The racial theorists generally correlated different races with their different cultural progress. Their common assertion can be summed up as the racist doctrines of

White supremacy among the human races and Aryan supremacy within the White race. The Darwinian natural law of evolution gave scientific legitimacy to these racial doctrines. In the nineteenth century, racial theories produced in anthropology, ethnography, and comparative philology provided supplementary values to historical study and frequently filled in what seemed to be blanks in the historical record. In this regard, general history textbook writers in the last quarter of the nineteenth century embraced those racial assumptions and assertions without much critical evaluation. They took it for granted that civilization was the product of an intellectually, physically, and mentally perfect race.

Racist doctrines also contributed to accentuating a Eurocentric perspective in world history conceptualization by arrogantly pushing out the histories of non-Aryan races from the domain of civilization on the basis of their racial inferiority. The writers imagined that the civilization of the Aryan race, by the race's progressive nature, progressed at unprecedented speed that no other race could match, while cultures of non-Aryan races, because of their conservative nature, made little progress or no progress at all.

Civilization generally implied the refined European institutions, moral values, and cultures of states and their elites. Civilized people were perceived to be polished and refined, wealthier and happier than their predecessors. In contrast, the terms, "savage" and "barbarians," indicated the peoples of color, the Yellow and the Black races, who Euro-American intellectuals generally thought lacked the kind of great republic and a common set of religious and political beliefs that Europeans possessed. To them, it was self-evident that no other cultural and political entities outside of Europe were entitled to

be called "civilized." World history textbook writers sometimes described the Chinese development, which represented the progress of the Yellow race, as "half-civilized" in order to acknowledge its advance far beyond the seemingly primitive people of the Black race. The term, "civilization," was generally regarded as a synonym for progress. Each of the White, Yellow, and Black races had different capacities for civilization; therefore, they had made different degree of progress. The "civilized" vs. "savage" (or "barbarians," "primitive," "backward") contrast became a standard element to specify different progress made by different races. The idea of the uniqueness of European civilization was developed from an exclusive Eurocentric viewpoint, embracing the assumption of non-European inferiority in high school world history textbooks.

By the early twentieth century, just a few European history and world history textbook writers, for example, Hutton Webster, continued to use racist terms and descriptions. It was a general tendency that most world history textbook writers including the Aryan liberal writers discarded racist terms and descriptions. Racist terms like "savage" and "barbarians," even the term, "race" itself, gradually disappeared; racist descriptions of different intellectual, mental, and physical capacities of different races claimed no space in world history textbooks; and racial character became an invalid factor to explain historical changes in the textbooks. Instead of terms, "half-civilized," "savage," and "barbarians," the term, "backward" was employed to describe the different degree of progress made by African, Asian and Latin American peoples. Instead of the term, the "Aryan race," the term, the "Indo-European people" was used to identify the peoples with a western-European cultural coherence. However, discarding racist terms was not followed by changes in perspective, content, and scope. Even in the mid-1930s,

in world history textbooks, it was commonly asserted that European Whites played the chief roles in the great drama of human history. While racist assertions gradually became invisible from the surface, they remained as deep-rooted beliefs.

The history of the Aryan race served a twofold purpose: While it explained human progress toward liberty, it also explained the European background of American history. The exclusive celebration of the Aryan race's history was a product of the intellectual and political climate of the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Throughout the nineteenth century, Germany was regarded as the cultural center of the nineteenth century. German academic culture was admired in the United States as well as in European nations. In England, on the basis of the German historical trends, Edward A. Freeman and his school presented the theory that traced modern, democratic, representative governments in western Europe and the United States to the primitive tribes of the Aryan race. American historians, accepting Freeman's theoretical framework, also traced the origin of the American republic to the Aryan primitive tribal system in the pre-historic period. The history of the Aryan race was, American intellectuals believed, the pre-history of the American Republic. Nationalism in the nineteenth century gave currency to the Aryan race's history. It could satisfy the nationalistic aspirations in the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century in the United States by glorifying American superior racial heritage and cultural tradition as well as democratic, political institutions.

According to Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob, the English adjective "modern," referring to the present as opposed to the remote past, first came into usage at the end of the sixteenth century (Appleby et al., 1994, p.60). In the seventeenth and especially in the

eighteenth century, "modern" came to mean better. Historians began to call their age modern so as to distinguish it from what came before. As the idea of progress became a standard element in European literature, the modern period became the measure by which the past was judged.

In the visions of the Aryan liberal writers and the liberal democratic writers, the modern period was better than the times before in terms of the ideas of liberty and democracy. Their interest in world history was tracing the growth of liberty and democracy. At the turn of the twentieth century, New Historians appeared with a new interest in telling the story of world history in tracing the evolution of modern civilization. New Historians gave preference to the study of the contemporary past over the remote past. They sought the origin of modern civilization in contemporary western European history. They perceived science, together with industrialization, as the dynamic force that brought modern transformation. They emphasized the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth century as the most important events because they believed that those events, by expanding scientific outlooks and industrialization, made the contemporary world as it was. After World War I, New Historians pointed out that scientific knowledge, the nation-state, democracy, capitalism, and Europeanization were distinctive traits of modern civilization. Tracing back those traits, they found that the origin of modern civilization went further back than the eighteenth century. In the sixteenth-century commercial revolution in western Europe, they found the emergence of the middle class, "the bourgeoisie," which was the main actor in the drama of modern political, economic, and intellectual development. They imagined that modern world civilization was synonymous with the Western civilization of western Europeans and

Americans. They predicted that the world would become Europeanized. Modern traits created and developed in western Europe and the United States would ultimately become global. Science and industry measured the progress that nations achieved. The European creation of modern civilization justified western civilization as the whole of world history, while defining other civilizations as "backward."

In the early twentieth century, Americans enjoyed the highest standard of living in the contemporary world. They were proud of their economic and cultural influence over other parts of the world – Latin America, Europe, Asia and Africa. To Americans, other nations in the world seemed anxious to adopt American ideas and institutions for their development. Americans were optimistic that modern science would bring unlimited prosperity to people all over the entire world. American progressive educators set economic betterment as an important goal of humanity. Not only New Historians, but also social studies educators such as Harold Rugg adopted modern industrialism as the main theme for their social studies courses and textbooks. In this regard, the internationalist's conception of world history was also consistent with those of New Historians and social studies educators. The term, "Westernization" connoted progress. The term, "Westernization," was frequently used to describe social and economic progress of non-Western civilization.

After President Woodrow Wilson defined World War I as a struggle between democracy and autocracy, the American mission for democratic expansion became the central focus in the discussion of educational as well as other matters. Furthermore, the worldwide growth of communism after the Russian Revolutions amplified the importance of American democratic ideals in American citizenship education. History, as well as

other subjects in the social studies, reflected this post-war political climate by underscoring democracy as the central emphasis of the course. Almost all world history textbooks adopted the growth of democracy as one of the central themes of modern history.

Before the war, the liberal vision of world history focused on the development of political institutions, nation-states and representative governments, as the embodiment of liberal progress in modern times. After World War I, American interest in telling the story about "liberty" shifted its emphasis from the Teutonic virtues of liberty to the modern democratic idea of political equality. The democratic vision of world history after the war focused on the development of democratic ideas of equal political rights, which were underscored in the American and French Revolutions. Although their central topics in telling the story of the world progress toward liberal democracy were different, both visions shared a common interest in the story of liberal democracy.

No other values have been rooted so deeply in American political, economic, and social culture as the ideas of liberty and democracy. Americans have embraced the idea of liberty and democracy as their mission for humanity. The American exceptional mission and aspiration to nourish and spread democracy has driven American educators to underscore the transmission of democratic ideas and institutions formulated and grown in Western civilization as primary knowledge for citizenship education. The American exceptional ideals of liberty and democracy have given Western civilization preference over any other civilizations that have existed throughout the history of the humankind. The idea of liberty was developed first in western Europe and western Europeans spread the idea of liberty all over the world. World history courses, together with American

history course, have been regarded as the main vehicles to deliver the history of democratic struggle and triumph. Children who know this history will be willing to take their responsibility for democratic development.

World War I brought a remarkable increase in interest in "international education," which aimed to enhance international understanding and thereby to improve international cooperation for world peace. Employing such notions as "international understanding," "a world friendship and understanding," or "a world citizenship," advocates of international education after the war called for international awareness, while denouncing "parochial, or racial nationalism." Internationalists of the post-war decade believed that if they could transcend parochial concerns and chauvinistic excesses, international tensions could somehow be surmounted. They perceived that "the history of humanity" or "histories of nations" were the main vehicles for achieving their goals of international peace.

Advocates of international education believed that binding the peoples of the world together, based on common historical developments of all humankind, was the only way to keep world peace and prosperity. Social studies educators such as Clarence D. Kingsley and Harold Rugg made tremendous efforts to reject biased notions of the cultures and peoples in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and eastern Europe and to esteem those cultures, seeking "the cure for narrow and partisan attitude" (Kingsley, 1916, p.39). World history writers, with the same purpose, suggested that high schools teach the history of humanity. H. G. Wells, the English writer, wrote a world history textbook, with an ambition to tell a human history in which all the peoples in the world could identify their parts of common adventure. In his picture of world history, the history of Western

civilization was the great stream of world history and brief descriptions of Chinese, Indian, and Islamic peoples were added as if they were puddles scattered around the stream. Although the histories of those peoples took only small parts of world history, his organization of world history, together with adamant suggestions from historians in non-European history, enriched the history of humanity by incorporating the histories of peoples other than western Europeans and Americans. While advocates of international education, as did other educators of the times, emphasized the "backwardness" of non-European countries, unlike others, they championed the recognition of non-Western civilizations' contributions to human progress and their potential for future development. In this sense, advocates of international education contributed to paving the way for global and multicultural education in the second half of the twentieth century.

Still, the internationalist conception of world history would not escape from the conceptual framework of Western civilization. In this conception, world history was mostly about the history of Western civilization except that it gave a little more attention to the histories of China, India, and Middle East than did other conceptions of world history. Their conception of world history was established on the same basis as the conceptions of others in this period. Western values, institutions, cultures, and systems grew in a self-sufficient system and finally came to diffuse throughout the world, creating the world as a unified whole. In their narrative conception, common humanity meant the Western way of modern thinking and living.

Implications of this Study

This study has revealed that in the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, American high school textbooks in general history, European history, and world history portrayed the history of humankind as a narrative of liberty and science (reason). World history was largely about western Europe and the United States, where the idea of liberty, the idea of democracy, a scientific outlook and industrialization were originally invented and developed. The path of world history was imagined as a shift of its innovative center from the "Near East" to ancient Greece and Rome, later to medieval and modern western Europe, and finally to the United States. The course topics were always ideas and institutions of Western civilization and the Westernization of other continents. Under the rubrics of the history of humankind and world history, textbooks invariably taught the history of Western civilization.

In this period, the Western idea of liberal democracy and Western creation of modernity were the fundamental basis on which Western civilization was claimed as the organizational center of world history, and the unavailability of liberty and modernity in non-Western civilizations justified their treatments in a marginal, superficial fashion at best. The ideas of liberal democracy and modernity also were the cornerstones of the apparent propagation of the belief in Western superiority. Western Europe and the United States were creative centers and their modern political, intellectual, and economic developments became absolute standards to measure the progress of civilization. According to textbook authors, world history was a linear line of progressive movement,

leading by stages to the contemporary world, where western Europeans and Americans played leadership roles in cultural creation and diffusion.

In this conceptualization of world history, Western values became universal values, and almost everything about the West including Western science, Western philosophy, Western political ideas and institutions, and Western economic systems were not only the most advanced but were destined to prevail universally. This conceptualization of world history was based upon Western ethnocentrism; it assumed that the development of modernity in western Europe and the United States was an absolute goal toward which history flowed. World history was regarded as a linear process in which Westernization was considered the single goal of humanity.

This conceptualization of world history not only emphasizes the uniqueness of enduring values and traditions of Western civilization, but it also carries a belief of Western superiority over the rest. It underestimates the importance of other, independent civilizations of the world. It shows little interest in those values, institutions, and traditions of different cultural origins. When it does, the intention is to contrast cultural values, political ideology, and political, social and economic institutions of the "West" with those of the "rest," generally viewing those of the West as norms and the rest of the world as either essentially different or even inferior. This discriminative image of world progress penetrates American perception of what the world history course should be.

This Western-centered approach owed much of its formation to racial nationalism that advocated racist doctrines of White supremacy among human races and Aryan supremacy among White men. It gained its ascendancy and confidence from the dynamic European penetration into other continents and the consequent destruction of the

autonomous civilizations that they found in their path. It also owes much of its consolidation to the post-war political climate, in which Europeans and Americans found themselves in a deep crisis, as European world hegemony was threatened by the rise of nationalism and anti-colonial striving in Asia and by the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. In particular, Americans envisioned themselves as partners with the European democracies in a great Atlantic civilization, formed from a common history, challenged by a common enemy, and destined to a common future. It gave rise to the birth of Western civilization as an explicit ideology to defend Western values, political ideology and economic structures. Fascism and Bolshevism threatened these values and perspectives.

The Western-centered approach to world history has retained the historical consciousness of the era of nationalism, Western imperial enterprise, and an ideological conflict between democracy and communism. The fact that the United States has become the wealthiest and most influential nation in the world, and that the United States, together with western European democracies, have played leading roles in the ideological battle against communism have allowed the historical consciousness of the late nineteenth-early twentieth centuries dominate the American historical profession as well as the educational profession.

In the last several decades, high school world history textbooks have expanded their treatments of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, but textbook chronology and structure still feature the issues and topics of Western civilization. Today, advocates of the Western-centered approach continue to justify their view of world history on the same grounds as history educators did in times of nationalism, Euro-American hegemony, and

the rising ideological conflict. Their imagination of world history has not escaped the impact of the social and political climate in the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century.

Changing social and political realities have forced historians to rewrite history "from the new points of view afforded by the present" (Turner, 1911, p.226). They have also required history educators to revise history courses to make them relevant to the social demands of the time. Historians of every generation have asked new questions of the past, have adopted new points of view, and have shifted their foci so as to give meaning to different experiences of their predecessors. History educators have modified the organization of history courses and have redefined substantial knowledge and values of their courses to help future citizens cope with cultural and social transformation of the day. Today, multicultural and global educators believe that now is one of those times to rewrite world history and reconceptualize school world history, emancipating it from the old restraint of the Western-centered perspective.

Peoples in every corner of the world have, more than ever, interacted with inescapable intensity. Such increasing contacts between individuals through trade and travel, on one hand, call for global identity, uniting peoples in the world; on the other hand, these contacts demand more awareness of and tolerance for multicultural characteristics of the human society. In this multicultural and global climate, there is no merit in a conventional way of teaching world history, which reflects the images of world history from times of exclusive nationalism, Euro-American hegemonic domination, and ideological conflicts.

Internationalists and specialists in non-European histories in the 1920s have already pointed out the misconception of the "non-West" that world history courses have conveyed. Since then, critics have continued to claim that the Western-centered world history approach was narrow, limiting, and arrogant, and have called for a reorganization of world history with a perspective transcending a Eurocentric one. After World War II, as American foreign policy and economic activities became more involved in non-Western countries, the demand for public knowledge and specialists concerning other areas than Western countries increased. A noticeable growth of area studies during the 1950s and 1960s has helped expand the treatment of the histories of areas other than the West in high school world history textbooks. In particular, in the last four decades, with Leften S. Stavrianos and William H. McNeill as important early advocates, multicultural and global educators have made tremendous efforts to convince American academicians, as well as the public, of the need for a revision in the world history course. Rejecting the traditional way of organizing the world history course, they have urged incorporating a global, multicultural perspective in world history courses. Geoffrey Barraclough noted:

> One of the distinctive facts about contemporary history is that it is world history and that the forces shaping it cannot be understood unless we are prepared to adopt worldwide perspectives; and this means not merely supplementing our conventional view of the recent past by adding a few chapters on extra-European affairs, but re-examining and revising the whole structure of assumptions and preconceptions on which that view is based. Precisely because American, African, Chinese, Indian and other branches of extra-European history cut into the past at different angles, they cut across the traditional lines; and this very fact casts doubt on the adequacy of the old patterns and suggests the need for a new ground-plan (Barraclough, 1967, p.10).

Supplementing an existing course with some area studies would not, they have argued, remove such a Western-centric point of view; only reorganization and reconceptualization would meet the demand.

In developing new approaches to transcend the limits of traditional Western-centered world history, historians like Leften S. Stavrianos and William H. McNeill were forerunners. In order to counter the prevailing Western-centered world history approach, Stavrianos applied the "equal time" strategy to structure his textbook in a way to construct a culturally inclusive world history. In his textbook, *Global History of Man* (1962), Stavrianos took separate chapters to explore the formation and style of each of the major Eurasian civilizations, and he tried to treat the West as one civilization among equals, although his equal time strategy was employed only to explain histories of major Eurasian civilizations of the world before 1500. In Stavrianos' textbooks, world history after 1500, however, was virtually about Western civilization and its expansion.

McNeill sought to construct world history based on the common experiences of all human beings: cultural encounters. He focused on the interrelation and interconnection among cultures, peoples, and events to search for the common realms of human experiences from ancient time to the present. In constructing world history, he identified and described, for any given period, the most advanced civilization and then explained how the advanced cultures were defused to other regions. In his view, world history was "the unifying thread as the spread of culture and cultural innovation from one or more centers" (Barraclough, 1991, p.161). In other words, world history was a sequence

of history of successive civilizations. "The Rise of the West" was the central theme of world history as well as the title of his book.[1]

Stavrianos and McNeill should be credited for their tremendous efforts to go beyond the Western-centered approach and to include multicultural and global themes. They have pointed out the gap between the world history instruction that was in practice and the world history instruction that is needed to cope with the contemporary world of multicultural and global growth. Their revision, however, existed primarily in a continuum of the Western-centered approach. Their attempts did not emancipate the conception of world history from the traditional Western-centered conceptual framework. Their world histories continued to feature Westernization as the process of modern times and credited Westernization for the globalization of the contemporary world. Only Western civilization, in their narratives of world history, has gained a coherent unity and a legitimate position in world history. The linear conception of world history and the perception of a single goal of humanity permeated their narrative conceptions.

Social historians and historians favoring multicultural and global approaches have attacked the linear conception of world history. Masur said: "The linear interpretation and the establishment of a single goal, the emphasis on liberty, on reason, on science were certainly short cuts that precluded an unbiased appraisal of all that was non-European. (1962, p.607). Historians in multicultural and global approaches have argued that the linear conception of world history is not inherently sustainable and rather it is misconceived. They have also argued that the world needs to be pictured as "manifold forms of humanity" (Barraclough, 1991, p.161). Raghavan Iyer has called upon historians to "discard the unitary view of civilization" and to accept the "irreducible plurality of

[1]William H. McNeill fist published his textbook, *The Rise of the West* in 1963.

civilizations," and Satish Chandra has urged scholars to "abandon the concept of 'center' and 'periphery'" – whether the center is identified with Washington, Moscow or Peking – and replace it by a "concept of the multi-focal growth of human civilization" (Barraclough, 1991, p.162).

Recently, scholars whom Michael Adas calls "writers of new global history," unlike Stavrianos and McNeill, are less interested in constructing a comprehensive history to offer total understanding of human development in a coherent scheme (Bentley, 1996, p.v).[2] In their view, world [global] history is concerned with points of contact and inter-relationships; it does not call for a synthetic reconstruction of the whole of the past (Barraclough, 1991, p.161). In other words, in their view, "the subject-matter of world [global] history is not the sequence of civilizations" but rather "the study of the differences between different countries, areas and civilization, and of their interactions" (Barraclough, 1991, p.161). According to Michael Adas, their work tends to be thematically focused on recurring processes like war and colonization or on cross-cultural patterns like the spread of disease, technology, and trading networks (Bentley, 1996, p.v). Their works are often more consciously and systematically comparative than the studies of earlier world historians.[3] The main task of these historians is to prove that world [global] history is a viable research field by focusing on "less than total" (Schafer, 1993, p.48).

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[2]For example, Wolf Schafer calls for a radical separation between world history and global history. According to him, world history attempts to cover the whole world, the whole human past, and the whole of humanity; global history is the study of global processes in contemporary history. He argues that traditional world history, particularly in "its totalizing form," tried to give "a total account" of world history and offers "no longer plausible conceptions due to the growth in knowledge and an increasing complexity" (Schafer, 1993).

[3]As a result, recent global historical analysis develops along three main lines that reflect interests and analytical predispositions of individual historians (Bentley, 1996). One approach is represented by the diffusion theory, which has paid attention to the phenomenon of diffusion-- particularly the diffusion of technology and its effects on the societies involved. Another school has explored large-scale patterns in economic and social history, concentrating particularly on long-distance trade and the economic integration

Currently, history educators using a global multicultural approach have attempted to adopt the cross-cultural approach and comparative approach to constructing world history for high school students, emphasizing diverse organizational themes. They believe that by examining the participation of the world's peoples in processes transcending individual societies and cultural regions they can give new meaning to the study of world history. By providing descriptions of experiences in which a large number of people transcend cultural and political borders, students can better identify themselves as participants in the process of world change.

History educators generally acknowledge that each civilization and people has had its own trajectory of development. They believe it is important that each civilization should be understood on its own terms. However, global and multicultural educators do not see value in organizing world history with separate civilizations as the primary units. This is because first examining all civilizations and all nations' and peoples' histories from ancient times to the present is impossible to sustain. Anyone attempting to do this either omits most of history by default or moves so rapidly that each epoch and each civilization can only receive cursory attention. Moreover, Ross E. Dunn argued: "[M]any of the most important events in history, even in ancient times, have been played out on a map bigger than any single country or civilization" (1989, p.218). Therefore, historians using current multicultural-global approaches argue that each civilization should not be studied as mere a fragment of world history, because this will prevent students from seeing the grand movements of world changes. The aim of world history should be to make sense of the larger, more extensive patterns of the past; then these patterns, not

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of large regions. The last approach has illuminated environmental and ecological processes that had effects on a large, and sometimes literally global, scale.

separate cultures, can become the leading categories for sorting out and organizing the raw material that students will be asked to learn (Dunn, 1989, p.219). In this way, global multiculturalism can be integrated into the school world history course.

In this context, scholars in multicultural and global approaches argue that today school world history should not be a juxtaposition of the histories of different continents or cultures, which has been the most popular way to organize world history. Nor should it be sequences of the individual histories of successive civilizations, as William McNeill organized his world history.[4] Instead, world history, Ross E. Dunn argues, should be organized to provide students "a big picture of the world changes in whatever age is being studied" (Dunn, 1989, p.220). The argument runs:

> Each primary unit of the course would be organized around an important chain of events (and I use the term 'event' broadly to include relatively long-term developments) whose impact was wide enough to involve peoples of differing cultures in a shared experience. These 'big' events would provide the common reference point for investigating and comparing other events and trends that related more narrowly to particular civilizations and cultural groups (Dunn, 1989, p.220).

In order to provide students with "the common reference point," currently scholars concentrate on cultural, social, economic, and political interconnectedness across peoples and regions. They have sought the grand movements with worldwide influence and the links across political and cultural boundaries to offer a meaningful periodization

[4]Dunn argues that "world history cannot, as U.S. and Western surveys have done, trace a single narrative line of history, neatly sliced up, against the background of a relatively unified, coherent cultural development" (1989, p.221).

from a global point of view.[5] They believe that this periodization can provide students with important historical turning points from which to undertake explorations of diverse cultures and their interactions as well. In this context, historians find benefits in adopting cross-cultural interaction as a main theme to identify different periods in world history. Moreover, they view that comparison between one part of the world with another part enables students to investigate the deeper nature of institutions, patterns, and movements in a global context so that it can help them overcome "a trivial and parochial" outlook (Dunn, 1980, p.39; Barraclough 1977, p.14). In this view, organizational themes are multiple and the focuses are major civilizations in a global context as well as their interactions. In this line of new global approaches, the *World History Standards* presented by the National Center for History in 1996 adopted cross-cultural and comparative approaches and themes. They suggested that teachers adopt diverse organizational themes. They encouraged students to study the important ideas and technological advances of peoples in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and the Americas in a global perspective. They emphasize the importance of studying the influence of large-scale developments transcending cultural or political boundaries over the world historical process.

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[5]For example, Ross E. Dunn (1985) provides periodization since the year 1000 by identifying global process, those trends and development that transcend political or cultural boundaries: 1) 1000-1200: The First age of Hemispheric Exchange; 2) 1200-1350: The Mongol Age; 3) 1345-1450: The Age of the Black Death; 4) 1450-1600: The Age of The Great World Convergence; The National Center for History in the Schools presents the *National Standards for World History* (1994). The standards divide world history into eight eras. The title of each era attempts to capture the very general character of that age. Era 1. The beginnings of Human Society; Era 2. Early Civilizations to 1000 BCE; Era 3. Classical Traditions, Major Religions, and Giant Empires, 1000 BCE-300 CE; Era 4. Expanding Zones of Exchange and Encounter, 300-1000 CE; Era 5. Intensified Hemispheric Interactions, 1000-1500 CE; Era 6. Emergence of the First Global Age, 1450-1770; Era 7. The Age of Revolutions, 1750-1914; Era 8. The Twentieth Century; In order to identify global periodization, Jerry H. Bentley (1996) also derives from experiences of all human beings "three kinds of processes that had significant repercussions across the boundary lines of societies and cultural regions: Mass migrations, campaigns of imperial expansion and long-distance trade."

This study has examined the conceptual origins of Western-centered world history in high school general history, European history, and world history textbooks in the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. This study, in conclusion, underscores the limits of the Western-centered conception of world history, with western Europeans at the center, Americans on the side, and everyone else in the world in the periphery.

Pleading for a new conceptualization of modern history, Charles A. Beard (1908) stated: "History always has served the interests of men and illuminated their problems and it is the task of each generation of historical teachers to emancipate themselves from the inherited routine and readjust themselves to their own problems" He also pointed out: "The sound doctrine of historical continuity does not imply intellectual bondage" (Beard, 1908, p.13). This study emphasizes that now is one of those times that Beard had in mind. What we teach about the history of the world in the schools mostly shapes the future citizens' image and their ideas about the world. Studying and teaching world history entail locating past identities of the United States as well as those of others in a large map of relationships among nations. Contemporary political and cultural changes occurring in the world require history and social studies educators to reconsider the validity of the world history approach that centers on western Europe and the United States. High school world history courses and textbooks must be unshackled from the old conceptual framework of world history and give attention to new problems and issues created by increasing cultural and ethnic pluralism and intensified global interdependence in the present world.

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Appendix A
Textbooks used for Analysis of the Aryan Liberal Writers (Chapter 2)

- William Swinton (1874) *Outlines of the World's History*
- John D. Quackenbos (1878) *Illustrated School History of the World from the Earliest Ages to the Present Time: Accompanied with Numerous Maps and Engravings.*
- John J. Anderson (1862)
- John H. Anderson (1882) *New Manual of General History with Particular Attention to Ancient and Modern Civilization*
- Joel D. Steel and Esther B. Steel (1883) *A Barnes' General History: A Brief History of the Medieval And Modern Peoples with Some Accounts of Their Movements, Institutions, Arts, Manners and Customs*
- George P. Fisher (1885) *Outlines of Universal History* and (1898) *A Brief History of the Nations and of Their Progress in Civilization*
- Frank M. Colby (1899) *Outlines of General History*
- George B. Adams (1895/1914) *Civilization during the Middle Ages Especially in Relation to Modern Civilization*
- William F. Allen and Phillip V. N. Myers (1889) *General History for Colleges and High Schools*
- Phillip Van Ness Myers (1906) *General History for Colleges and High Schools.*
- Phillip Van Ness Myers (1921) *General History.*
- Phillip Van Ness Myers (1888/1904/1916) *Ancient History*
- Phillip Van Ness Myers (1886) *Medieval and Modern History.*
- Phillip Van Ness Myers (1895) *Outlines of Medieval and Modern History: a Textbook for High Schools, Seminaries, and Colleges.*
- Phillip Van Ness Myers (1902/1905/1920). *Medieval and Modern History.*

- Phillip Van Ness Myers (1904/1916) *Ancient History*
- Phillip Van Ness Myers (1895/1905/1920) *Medieval and Modern History*
- Phillip Van Ness Myers (1921) *General History*
- George W. Botsford (1914) *A History of Ancient World*
- Willis M. West (1902) *Ancient History*
- Willis M. West (1904/ 1913) *Ancient World*
- Willis M. West (1904/1907) *Modern History*
- Willis M. West (1915/1927) *Modern World*
- Willis M. West (1920/1931) *Story of Modern Progress*
- Willis M. West (1922/1928) *Story of World Progress*
- Willis M. West (1920/1931) *Story of Man's Early Progress*

Appendix B
Textbooks used for Analysis of the Modernist Writers (Chapter 3)

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- James H. Robinson and James H. Breasted (1921). *A General History of Europe: From the Origins of Civilization to the Present Time.*
- James H. Robinson, Emma P. Smith, and James H. Breasted (1924). *Our World Today and Yesterday.*
- Lynn Thorndike (1927). *A Short History of Civilization.*